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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This scholarly work aims to focus on the roles of four institutions – the UN, the CIS, the 
OSCE and the EU – in the process of conflict resolution in South Caucasus and wherever 
applicable, the analysis of their effectiveness in facilitating the achievement of final 
settlement. The reason why the “effectiveness analysis” is specified with the words “wherever 
appropriate” is due to the fact that [as it will be further described in the work], effectiveness 
analysis in the case of the latter institution – the EU, which unlike the previous three 
institutions has until recent times maintained rather distant conflict resolution approach – 
would risk to bring to fallacious conclusions. In the case with the EU, the overall evaluation 
of its conflict resolution strategy will be made, instead of the mentioned “effectiveness 
analysis”. 
 
For the above purpose, this work at the outset will provide the empirical data and historic 
excursion to the involvement of the four institutions in conflict resolution, well as the 
overview to the South Caucasus conflicts – Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts within Georgia. On the basis of this 
empirical data, the subsequent analysis of their effectiveness and evaluation of their policies 
will be conducted. In order to analyze the effectiveness of the UN, the CIS and the OSCE in 
addressing the conflict cases in the South Caucasus and evaluate the EU involvement in 
conflict resolution, the assumptions of the “effectiveness” concept of regime theory, 
theoretical approaches to the study of international mediation and theoretical approaches to 
the study of European integration [intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism] are chosen as 
theoretical frameworks.  
 
Although some scholarly works have been previously written on the subject, the originality to 
this dissertation is added by virtue of the fact that it attempts to explore the effectiveness and 
evaluate the policies of these institutions by incorporating various assumptions of regime 
theory, theoretical approaches to international mediation and theoretical approaches to the 
study of European integration. Moreover, provided that the in scholarly literature, regime 
theory and its “effectiveness” concept were mostly researched and applied to international 
environmental regimes, and study on the effectiveness of non-environmental regimes from the 
perspective of the regime theory seems lagging behind, this work is one of the humble 
attempts to fill this gap.  
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The effectiveness of the UN, the CIS and the OSCE will be attempted to be analyzed from the 
prisms of two regime theory hypotheses:  
 
1. Actors’ interests: Interests and preferences of the concerned powerful states influence the 
effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE and the CIS to facilitate the achievement of a final solution 
to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics.  
 
2. Problem solving capacity: Problem solving capacity of the organizations influence the 
effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE and the CIS to facilitate the achievement of a final 
settlement to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics.  
 
Problem solving capacity will be measured against three determinants: 1) the institutional 
setting or the rule of the game; 2) the distribution of power among the actors involved; 3) 
efforts directed to achievement of cooperative solutions.  
 
The reason why the aforementioned two hypotheses are tested together is because of the fact 
that they are interconnected, i.e. problem solving capacities of the institutions are to a great 
extent influenced by actors’ interests, therefore, these two hypotheses will be considered in 
conjunction with each-other. Moreover, it should be especially emphasized that although 
“actors’ interests” element is often seen as one of the determinants of organizations’ problem 
solving capacity, in this work it is taken as an independent variable influencing the 
effectiveness of the institutions due to the strength of this determinant in the context of the 
current research. 
 
The mentioned regime theory hypotheses will mostly explain the cases of the UN, the CIS 
and the OSCE [particularly its role in South Ossetia] effectiveness. However, in the case of 
the CIS one determinant of problem solving effectiveness [institutional setting/rule of the 
game] will not be applicable. In the case of the OSCE Minsk Group the first hypothesis of the 
regime theory [influence of powerful states] cannot really explain the effectiveness of the 
OSCE Minsk Group, but can help to highlight the internal dynamics within this entity. Only 
the third determinant [efforts directed to achievement of cooperative solutions] of the second 
hypothesis [problem solving capacity] will applicable to this case. This is due to the fact that 
the Minsk Group is not a full-fledged regime and hence, has no decision making procedures, 
and power balance within this entity is not disturbed. 
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The effectiveness/success of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been doing 
mediation/facilitation work in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1994 will additionally be 
evaluated using the suppositions of theoretical approaches to international mediation, owing 
to the fact that it cannot qualify for a full-fledged regime due to the specifics of its 
institutional build-up. Theoretical approaches to international mediation assume that the 
effectiveness/success of the OSCE Minsk Group is contingent upon the following factors: 1) 
previous relations between the conflicting parties; 2) nature of problem; 3) mediation 
strategies; 4) impartiality/or perceived bias of the mediators.  
 
What concerns the evaluation of the EU role in conflict resolution, as it was earlier noted, 
“effectiveness” analysis based on the mentioned two hypotheses from the prisms of regime 
theory will not be applied to the EU1, due to the fact that the EU is to be regarded as an 
aggregate of partial regimes entailing multiple behavioral norms, rules and procedures and 
therefore, is considered to be a too split system of state and policy interrelations, which 
disqualifies it as an international regime as such.2 Instead, In an attempt to explain the EU 
approach to the conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region, this work will refer to the 
relevant assumptions of two theoretical approaches to the study of the European integration - 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, which will be utilized to in explaining different 
aspects of EU stance towards conflict resolution in the region.3  
 
Intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist approaches to the study of European integration 
will explain the EU involvement in the South Caucasus region and its role in facilitating 
conflict resolution as follows: 1) distant EU approach towards conflict resolution and its 
indirect role in facilitating conflict resolution is due to the lack of interest on the part of EU 
members states to dedicate attention to the region [intergovernmentalist assumption]; 2) 
subsequent increase of EU profile in the region after August 2008 events was due to the 
initiative and a leading role of an EU member state [intergovernmentalist assumption] 3) EU’s 
emphasis on the necessity of regional cooperation on practical issues [economy, border 
issues] and its belief that favorable grounds for conflict resolution are created though 
economic assistance and stabilization aid, instead of a direct involvement in the mediation of 
                                                 
1 The third regime theory hypothesis, nonetheless, could be applied also to the EU. The third regime theory 
hypothesis will be described later. 
2 Dimitrius N. Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration, (Routlage, London and New York, 2009):39. 
See Chapter IV for more description.   
3 It should nonetheless be noted that application of integration theories to EU policy towards conflict resolution 
in South Caucasus is conditional and different from the EU case. In application to South Caucasus word 
“integration” is to be interpreted as “cooperation”. 
 
9 
 
the conflicts is generated by the EU conviction that cooperation/achievement on more 
practical issues [like economics] will lead to expansion of cooperation on issues of high 
politics, which subsequently will bring to the attainment of peace in the relevant conflict cases 
[neofunctionalist assumption].  
 
Despite of the mentioned situations where the above regime theory hypotheses cannot provide 
full-fledge explanations, it still constitutes the main theoretical framework, since it can be 
applied to the majority of the researched cases. Moreover, the nature of the problem in South 
Caucasus conflicts, which is a strong, independent4 and external factor impacting the 
performance and the effectiveness of all the institutions [this time including also the EU] can 
also be explained through the assumptions of regime theory. This makes the third regime 
theory hypothesis: 
 
3. Nature of the problem (Problem structure):  Characteristics of the given conflicts 
influence the effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE, the CIS and the EU to facilitate the 
achievement of a final solution to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics. 
 
In order to fulfill the set objective, this work will be structured in the following way: Chapter 
I will be dedicated to the general introduction of the South Caucasus region and its 
transformation processes after the reacquired independence, and the Section 1 will focus on 
democracy, human rights, elections, security sector reform and economic challenges. 
Moreover, given its strategic geographic location and ongoing power politics among the 
influential regional as well as some external players, Section 2 of the Chapter is devoted to the 
description and analysis of the interests of prominent regional and external players in the 
region. 
 
In the Chapter II historical background to the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts will be the main subject of discussion, while 
Chapter III will focus on theoretical frameworks of the dissertation. In Chapter IV the roles of 
the UN and the CIS in conflict resolution in Abkhazia will be highlighted and subsequently, 
their effectiveness will be analyzed based on the first and the second regime theory 
hypotheses. The reason why this chapter discusses the two mentioned institutions in 
                                                 
4 Independent - in a sense that it does not depend on problem solving capacity, the interests of powerful actors, 
or other factors stemming from the internal dynamics of the organizations themselves.  
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conjunction is due to the fact that the activities of the two actors – the UNOMIG and the CIS 
PKF - were interrelated to each other. 
 
Chapter V will deal with the OSCE role in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetian conflicts 
and will evaluate its effectiveness from the spectrum of the first and the second regime theory 
hypotheses. In case of the OSCE part in South Ossetian conflict, regime theory keeps its 
relevance and is able to explain the factors influencing the OSCE effectiveness, while in the 
situation with the OSCE Minsk Group regime theory will only be useful to highlight the 
internal dynamics within this entity. Therefore, theoretical assumptions to international 
mediation will be utilized in order to rate its effectiveness/success.    
 
Chapter VI will focus on the EU role and evaluation of EU policy towards the conflict 
resolution in South Caucasus. As it was qualified earlier, “effectiveness” analysis from the 
perspective of regime theory will not be applied to the EU due to the specifics of EU as a sui 
generis entity and its policy-making, which disqualifies it as a simple international regime. 
Therefore, this Chapter will first discuss the nature and evolution of EU policy towards the 
region of South Caucasus and its conflict cases, and later, will evaluate the EU conflict 
resolution strategy towards the region from the spectrum of intergovernmentalist and 
neofunctionalist approaches.  
 
In the Chapter VII, which is the last one, the third regime theory hypothesis will be explored 
in an attempt to see the impact of the nature of problem [problem structure] in the South 
Caucasus conflict on the possible effectiveness or the success of the discussed four 
institutions. Although the previous two hypothesis of the regime theory is not applied to the 
case of the EU, the propositions and findings of the last-third hypothesis could also be 
relevant to the EU, which alongside other three institutions has encountered the difficulties 
and challenges posed by the nature of problem in the South Caucasus conflicts. While 
exploring the nature of South Caucasus conflicts, this chapter will deal with the legal issues 
and concepts such as the rights of peoples to self-determination, principle of territorial 
integrity, legality/illegality of secession, correlation of the principles of self-determination and 
territorial integrity, debate between the conflicting parties over the real nature of the problem 
and the perceived superiority of one principle over the other. Moreover, this part of the work 
will also focus on the as well as the contradictions and omissions in some documents of 
international law about the interrelation of the two principles, which further exacerbate the 
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real nature of problem in the South Caucasus conflicts. Based on these data, the analysis of 
the impact of the nature of the problem on the effectiveness of the institutions will be done. 
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I. SOUTH CAUCASUS IN A PERSPECTIVE   
 
Geographically the South Caucasus region is on the crossroads of Europe and Asia. It stands 
at the meeting point of the “Eurasian steppe to the north and the Middle Eastern Highlands, 
comprising the Anatolian and Iranian plateaux, to the south”.5 In political terms, “the South 
Caucasus” is nowadays understood as a common name given to the three republics of the 
former Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, that has replaced its predecessor 
term “Transcaucasus”, which was predominantly used during the Soviet times for the same 
purpose. 
 
Geographically being situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and often referred to as a 
corridor between the two continents, the region largely came under the impact of the two 
divergent cultures and thus compounded in itself their differences - a characteristic feature of 
the region’s uniqueness. This peculiar geographical location of the region through natural 
flow of historic events made it also a playground of complex geopolitical games among the 
big powers for the influence in the region. Therefore, the complicated mixture of geographical 
and geopolitical attractiveness has presented the region countries with the task of preservation 
of their self-existence - an intricate task alongside being precarious.  
 
1. South Caucasus republics after independence: challenges of transition 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the world map was enriched with fifteen newly 
independent states, which were seeking ways of integration into the world community and 
striving to gain recognition as sovereign entities that would give them the opportunity of 
independent membership and representation in international organizations. Obtaining world 
recognition became a foreign policy priority also for the South Caucasus republics. The 
independence of the republics created fertile grounds for their integration into the world 
community.  
 
Their membership in international organizations and the horizons for further integration into 
different arrangements seem to expand. All three republics are the members of the UN, 6 and 
                                                 
5 Edmund Herzig, The New South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, (The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1999):1. 
6 UN membership: Armenia- (2 Mar. 1992), Azerbaijan - (9 Mar. 1992), Georgia - (31 July 1992) 
(http://www.un.org). 
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participate in the NATO’s partnership for peace program.7 They are also participants of a 
number of regional and sub-regional arrangements, such as the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS),8 Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC),9 GUAM,10 etc. From 
pan-European organizations OSCE became the pioneer to host the republics as members. It 
was subsequently followed by the Council of Europe, which accepted the republics as full 
members in the period of seven to nine years after their membership in the OSCE.11 
Aspirations for recognition in the common European have intensified these republics’ 
cooperation also with the European Union, a leading body in the process of European 
integration, which recognized their independence on December 31, 1991.12   
 
Nevertheless, international recognition and membership in various international organizations 
were only the positive and more euphoric part of their independence. Like other former Soviet 
republics, they had come to grapple with other realities of their re-acquired independence, 
fraught with many problems and challenges of transition on internal and external levels. 
Among internal factors inhibiting the smooth transition to democratic and market oriented 
statehood, the most disturbing were the internal systemic shortcomings - dominance of public 
sector over the private sector, social inequality, embryonic middle-class, nomenclature 
leadership that remained from Soviet era, economic underdevelopment and rampant 
corruption, which had intruded almost in all layers of society. Moreover, the consolidation of 
                                                 
7 NATO Partnership for Peace Program. - Armenia (05.10.94), Azerbaijan (04.05.94), Georgia (23.03.94) 
(Online, available from (http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm). Accessed in August 2008). 
8 Between December 8 - 21, 1991 Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the CIS (Azerbaijan’s parliament, however, 
rejected ratifying its membership until 1993), Georgia joined in 1993 (Mark Webber, CIS integration trends in 
Russia and the former Soviet South, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997): 20-24) and 
withdrew a year after Russia-Georgia war in August, 2009. 
 9 The BSEC is composed of eleven participating states Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. On June 25, 1992, their heads of state or government signed in 
Istanbul the summit declaration on the BSEC, which set up a regional structure of cooperation in various fields 
of economic activity. (Musa Qasimov, Azerbaycan beynelxalq munasibetler sisteminde, (Baki: Genclik, 
1995):32) 
6 GUAM is the geopolitical bloc that groups Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.  In 1997, the leaders of 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (Uzbekistan joined the group later, in April 1999, however, later it 
withdrew from the group) signed the agreement in Strasbourg, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, on 
the establishment of a new organization with the aim to counterbalance Russia's political dominance in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. (Online, available from 
(http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav041801.shtml). Accessed in August 2008). 
7 OSCE membership-Armenia, Azerbaijan (30 January 1992), Georgia (24 March 1992). (http://www.osce.org/); 
Council of Europe membership-Armenia (25.1.2001) Azerbaijan (25.1.2001) Georgia (27.4.1999) 
(http://www.coe.fr.). 
8 Irina Komissina, “The Transcaucasian Republics and the European Union: Integration Prospects,” Central Asia 
and the South Caucasus, Information and Analytical Center, [journal online], available from (http://www.ca-
c.org/journale.shtml). Accessed in April 2008, unpaged. 
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democratic practices at the decision making level has proved to be restrictive in view of the 
fact that societies of these republics were accustomed to living under the authority of strong 
leadership. Decrepit Soviet style management made the development of civil society, rule of 
law, accountability and transparency all the more difficult.  
 
In addition to those internal factors, external-regional factors became vigorous determinants 
shaping the process of democratization in these countries. The most troublesome of them was 
and still remains - the existing conflicts in the region - which generates military build-ups, and 
sets the hardest task of coping with economic and societal burdens of supporting internally 
displaced persons. This complex security environment of the region, in ensemble with socio-
economic instabilities of transition, created rather pessimistic picture for the fragile balance of 
their statehood. In an environment dominated by mistrust, security has become a rare 
commodity in the South Caucasus region. Therefore, by prioritizing security issues and 
allocating larger share of national revenues to meeting security demands, these states find 
themselves lagging behind the other set of outstanding issues that are indispensable for 
democratization process.  
 
All three republics have strong central government and vast authorities endowed on the 
president, with immature system of checks and balances, and little to no independence of the 
two other branches of power – legislative and judiciary – from executive branch of power. 
Lack of proper knowledge and experience of the process of democratization in the countries, 
which had for decades lived under the Soviet rule, has proved to be a potent factor to slow 
down the pace of reforms.  
 
1.1. Democracy, human rights  
 
However, each of the three countries claims to have achieved significant progress with regard 
to delicate issues such as democracy and human rights. These states have demonstrated their 
commitments to the principles of democracy and human rights through joining numerous 
international and European human rights conventions, building relations with international 
and European institutions fostering democratic values, and through making relevant 
amendments to their domestic legislation in order to harmonize it with the required 
international standards.  
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Democratic development processes in the South Caucasus republics were also watched and 
occasionally disapproved by the international community. The issues such as the respect for 
freedom of speech, media, and protection of human rights, free and fair elections have 
repeatedly been the subject of scrutiny and criticism by the EU, the OSCE and Council of 
Europe election observers. Annual human rights reports of Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 
Human Rights Watch World and Amnesty International give disavowing overview of the 
situation with respect to electoral rights, civil liberties, including freedom of assembly, 
freedom of speech and media, existence of political prisoners, lack of rule of law, 
transparency and widespread corruption in the economies. Although the real situation is far 
from being ideal, some improvements are also recognized. 
 
Among the three, Georgia is considered to be on the forefront of the democratic development 
process, mostly due to the reforms implemented by Saakashvili regime after the latter’s 
assumption of power. Upon the change of leadership, the country started to openly and 
ardently emphasize its pro-European and pro-Western vocation, which has poured into its 
foreign policy as well and is commonly accepted as one of the reasons of the West’s, 
especially the US’s sympathy towards this state compared to Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
Saakashvili administration, who took power as a result of Rose Revolution of 2003 and 
replaced Shevardnadze, pledged to seek closer integration with the West. He was resolute to 
demonstrate the declared intentions with the actual deeds, and the most prominent way of 
doing so was the implementation of democratic reforms that touched upon political, social 
and economic life of the country, including, but not limited to constitutional changes and the 
reform of numerous state institutions. Whether the targeted objectives were all reached to its 
maximum and indeed improved the state of affairs in the above mentioned areas, is a 
contentious subject within Georgia, as well as beyond its limits, however, the positive 
achievements in fight against corruption and organized crime, as well as improvements in the 
area of transport and education during Saakashvili’s presidency is acknowledged as an 
important milestone of democratic state building.13  
 
                                                 
13 For example, in 2002 Georgia was ranked 85th out of 102 countries included by Transparency International in 
its “corruption perceptions index”, while in 2007, it was ranked 79th out of 179 countries included. (Neil 
MacFarlane, “Georgia: Risk and Opportunity,” Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, April 2008, 
p.4). 
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Nonetheless, degree of criticism did not bypass his reforms. Local and international observers 
underlined that certain policies and government practices were implemented out of political 
considerations rather than in line with principles of democracy, respect for rule of law and 
human rights, and that certain measures were not in congruence with European and 
international human rights standards to which Georgia claims to be devoted after the Rose 
Revolution of 2003. Among the outstanding human rights problems in Georgia, the lack of 
independence to judiciary, violations of the right to life, torture and ill-treatment, bad 
conditions in prisons, shortcomings in refugee protection and persecution against human 
rights defenders are specifically mentioned.14 However, the major problem was indicated to 
be related to freedom of expression, since it was estimated that there were more pressure on 
media than it was before the Rose Revolution, which mostly resulted in self-censorship of 
media outlets.15 
 
Furthermore, August 2008 conflict was a notorious culprit affecting the situation with regard 
to human rights in the country, which caused large humanitarian disaster and human rights 
violations.16 Alongside, other indicators with regard to human rights have also relatively 
worsened after August 2008 events. For example, in the US Human Rights Report of 2009, 
conspicuous drawbacks in the field of human rights, democracy and media freedom in 
Georgia is highlighted. The report underlines the negative trends like arbitrary arrest and 
detention, politically motivated arrests, excessive police violence, government intrusion into 
judiciary, abuse of prisoners and corruption in higher echelons. It especially focuses on the 
issue of corruption, concluding that although the level of corruption has fallen, “elite 
corruption” is still an issue for the country. It is also noted that situation with regard to media 
freedom has deteriorated and that government has restricted freedom of speech and press. 
However, the report also emphasizes that new Criminal Procedure Code and amendments to 
Electoral Code are important steps forward in the democratic development of the country. 17 
 
Likewise, Armenia and Azerbaijan have restated their dedication to and affiliation with 
Western democratic standards, the process which never was a smooth one. However, being in 
                                                 
14 “Georgia,” Human rights in the OSCE region, IHF Report 2007, p.68. 
15 “Georgia: Sliding towards authoritarianism?” International Crisis Group, (Europe Report N 189, 19 
December, 2007): 24. 
16 According to the estimations approximately 138, 000 people were displaced in Georgia and up to 37, 000 
persons escaped to the southern region of the Russian Federation. (Report on human rights issues following the 
August 2008 armed conflicts, by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe, Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Gali, 8 to 12 February 2009). 
17 US Human Rights Report on Georgia, 2009, online, available from 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136032.htm). Accessed on July 23, 2010, unpaged. 
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a state of war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region and having no political and economic 
interactions between themselves, the states had further complicated their transition, which 
could have been relatively seamless in the absence of factors stemming from their mutual 
hostility. I will focus on this conflict, later in the Chapter, but one thing is certain that had 
they had good neighborly relations between themselves, those two states would have been 
better off in terms of their development and achievements. 
 
For Azerbaijan, the most daunting challenge of the war with Armenia is the social burden of 
meeting the demands of large number of IDPs expelled from their homes, let alone the fact of 
occupation of one fifth of its territories. For Armenia, its isolation from the benefits of all the 
ongoing regional economic projects is the hardest effect of its war with Azerbaijan. 
Armenia’s plight is also exacerbated by the country’s troubled relations with Turkey due to 
the ambivalent “genocide” issue, and the latter’s trade embargo, its ambivalences with 
Georgia over Armenian minority in Javakheti region of Georgia, and heavy economic 
dependence on Russia – all of which became an inhibiting factor in post-Soviet development 
of Armenia, as well as for undertaking steady reforms.  
 
In the light of the mentioned factors, it is not surprising that these two states are estimated by 
the international organizations as having relatively worse record of human rights violations as 
well as in other areas of democratic state building, such as respect for rule of law, free and 
democratic elections, free media, freedom of assembly etc. In both republics the state of 
affairs in regard to freedom of speech and press is named by the international observers to be 
disturbing. For instance, in 2009, the UN Universal Periodic Review of Azerbaijan’s 
commitments to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, expressed its 
concern over the widespread restrictions to freedom of speech. 
 
Nonetheless, the government does not maintain total censorship on the freedom of expression, 
inasmuch as the opposition parties has freedom to publish their newspapers, human rights 
activists are able to work without the threat of punishment.18 Periodically, the country is 
accused by the international organizations of the detention of political prisoners for the 
latter’s’ exercising their freedom of speech, which is backfired by the county substantiating 
that those journalists should be regarded as ordinary citizens violating state legislatures, rather 
                                                 
18 US Human Rights Reports 2009, Azerbaijan, online, available from 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136032.htm). Accessed on July 23, 2010, unpaged. 
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than political prisoners and that international organizations are maintaining double standards 
regarding itself on this issue.  
 
Similarly, Armenia is also occasionally blamed for undertaking restrictive measures on 
freedom of speech. For example, in 2008, European Court on Human Rights stressed that 
Armenia has violated the Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
concerning the freedom of expression, in respect to broadcast company A+, since the 
company was prohibited from regaining its license after being closed in 2002. In addition, 
Armenian National Assembly adopted restrictive amendments to the law of the meetings, the 
decision which was condemned by the Council of Europe and the OSCE.19 Within this 
context, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe considered suspension of 
Armenia’s voting rights unless the country undertook necessary measures, inter alia being the 
elimination the restrictive amendments to the law of the meetings, as well as conducting 
impartial investigation of the events after February 2008 elections and releasing the detainees 
on political charges. However, after some months, PACE noted progress in several areas, but 
lamented that the country did not comply with all the requirements.20  
 
1.2. Elections 
 
In evaluation of democratic transition of the South Caucasus republics the electoral process 
should be given special focus, since elections have been the most vivid portents of the degree 
of effectiveness the reforms were being undertaken. Throughout the independence of the three 
states, there have been numerous parliamentary and presidential elections held in each 
republic. International observes were present in almost all elections, their views and reports 
were largely diverse and even controversial in elections evaluation, which at the early years of 
independence mostly contained criticism and strong calls for improvement. Nonetheless, with 
the lapse of time and with each presidential and parliamentary election, habitual criticism in 
the reports of the international observers and in the evaluations by relevant organizations has 
toned down, and greater emphasis on developments and improvements in the election process 
became subtly distinct. However, irrespective of some positive developments, election 
process is still in need of considerable improvements.  
 
                                                 
19 “Armenia,” Europe and Central Asia, World Report, 2009, pp.334-336. 
20  Ibid.,338. 
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Georgia has been through number of elections since 1999. Parliamentary elections of 1999, 
presidential elections of 2000, parliamentary and presidential elections of 2003 and 2004 were 
evaluated negatively by the international observes and numerous procedural irregularities 
were reported among other privations. Especially the parliamentary elections of 2003, which 
triggered the Rose Revolution, were estimated as defective and cutting across the democratic 
standards.21 However, with the steady reforms implemented by the new leadership of the 
country, improvements in this field were noticeable. For example, presidential and 
parliamentary elections of 2008 in Georgia were characterized as “the first genuinely 
competitive presidential elections” and the parliamentary elections, which were largely in 
accordance with international standards.22    
 
From 1995 Azerbaijan had conducted five parliamentary elections (one is a repeat election of 
2005 parliamentary election) and three presidential elections, the last one being conducted in 
2008.23 Evaluation of those elections by international observers was not unambiguous. 
Although the latest presidential elections of 2008, was estimated by the OSCE election 
observation mission as having made a noticeable progress “towards meeting OSCE 
commitments and other international standards”, it was also noted that elections did not meet 
all of those commitments. In 2005 OSCE’s final observation report for the 2005 
parliamentary elections only noted that they did not meet some of the OSCE and Council of 
Europe commitments.24 
 
Other international observers from Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and European 
Parliament also noted progress in 2008’s elections; however, restricted competition and little 
media involvement were noted among drawbacks of those elections.25 The latest 
parliamentary elections, which took place on November 7, 2010 were also evaluated likewise 
by the international observes. In the joint statement of the OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament it was noted that although 
the elections were peaceful and all opposition parties took part in the political process, “the 
                                                 
21 See: Election documents on Georgia, from OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, online, 
available from (http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections). Accessed on June 23, 2010.  
22 “Georgia,” World Report 2009, p.377. 
23 The previous ones were - 1995 parliamentary elections, 1998 presidential election, 2001 parliamentary 
elections, 2003 presidential election, 2005 parliamentary elections and 2006 repeat parliamentary elections. 
24 US Human Rights Reports 2009, Azerbaijan, unpaged. 
25 “Azerbaijan,” Europe and Central Asia, World Report, 2009, p.339. 
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conduct of these elections overall was not sufficient to constitute meaningful progress in the 
democratic development of the country”.26 
 
Despite of the similar efforts for the improvement of electoral legislation in Armenia 
drawbacks were also observed during the 1995, 1996 and 1998 and partly during 2003 
presidential and parliamentary elections. OSCE and PACE observes estimated the campaigns 
as peaceful, but noted that elections did not meet international standards.27 Presidential 
elections of February 2008 in the country have become a true test case for democracy. The 
elections which resulted in victory of incumbent president Serj Sarksyan, was accompanied 
by violence and election irregularities. The country experienced one of its biggest civil and 
political rights crises since its independence, which was brought by extreme use of force by 
the security forces of the country against the opposition demonstrators who were protesting 
the results of February 2008 elections. State of emergency was declared, which temporarily 
restricted freedom of movement, assembly, expression and access to information. These 
events and the reaction of the government were the subjects for international criticism.28  
 
1.3. Security sector 
 
Reform of the security sector became another outstanding challenge for these states. Among 
the numerous hurdles for carrying a successful security sector reform, the most painstaking 
ones were related to the lack of political will, coherent vision as to what exactly security 
sector reform means, as well as resistance and conservatism to carrying out such a reform. 
Persisting problems in the area of democratization, human rights and rule of law, 
establishment of liberal market economy, and existing unresolved conflicts in the region, 
which make regional stability elusive, are yet other potent factors that bode ill for prospects of 
efficient security sector reform. The whole process is vexed by volatile dynamics of the 
region, where the cumulation of changing interaction of international and regional actors over 
conflicting interests and high tendency for internal instability create feeble grounds for 
carrying out such reforms.  
 
                                                 
26 See: “Statement on preliminary findings and conclusions,” online, available from 
(http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2010/11/47506_en.pdf). Accessed on November 23, 2010, p. 1.  
27 Hayk Kotanyan, “Armenian security and US foreign policy in the South Caucasus,” The Quarterly Journal, 
(Vol. III, No. 2, June 2004):20. 
28 “Armenia,” Europe and Central Asia, World Report, 2009, p.334. 
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Soviet legacy with its notorious residues such as corruption and alien attitude to elimination 
of political control of the security sector and introducing legalistic controls is yet another 
factor to obstruct the process of successful security sector reform. Existing shortcomings in 
the Armed Forces of the republics, such as corruption, shortcomings in accommodation, food 
quality and infrastructure and other similar problems diminishes the military’s effectiveness 
alongside undermining public trust and support for it.29  
 
However, among the three independent republics Georgia has become the pioneer to carry out 
and finish its first Strategic Defense Review, (SDR)30 a process which involves substantive 
reform not only of the Armed Forces, but also other sectors and policies instrumental in state 
defense. In the context of Georgia’s NATO aspirations, this process was closely assisted by 
the United States, which guidance and substantial military aid through various assistance 
programs31 have become intrinsic for Georgia to outshine its neighbors in this realm. What 
concerns the SDR process in Armenia and Azerbaijan, this process is still underway. Both 
countries are benefiting from the US assistance, which aims at teaching the corresponding 
methodology for conducting the SDR process. 
 
1.4. Economic challenges 
 
Since good economy is the cornerstone for the existence and prosperity of any nation, a little 
more attention will be devoted to economic challenges faced by the three republics. With their 
regained independence, transition to market based economy became exigent, and was 
conspicuous with ups and downs, adding up to the disenchantment of population, who became 
immediate targets for all the hardships brought by these processes. The economic systems of 
the republics during the Soviet times were primarily centrally planned economies, with 
                                                 
29 Peter Forster, “The paradox of policy: American interests in the post-9/11 Caucasus,” Security Sector 
Governance in Southern Caucasus – Challenges and Visions (Study Groups, Regional Stability in Southern 
Caucasus, Security Sector reform, Vienna and Geneva, January 2004): 25-26. 
30 Strategic Defense Review is a process where substantial reform of Armed Forces and overall defense sector is 
carried out. The states of South Caucasus have undertaken the task of performing an SDR according to the 
objectives and priorities contained in their Partnership Actions Plans with NATO. Georgia, with the close 
assistance by US experts had completed its first SDR process in 2008, however, after the August 2008; it redid 
the whole process and finalized it in 2009. 
31 USA has been instrumental in assisting Georgia through number of special programs which it does not 
specifically offer to other South Caucasus republics. For example, The Georgia Train and Equip Program 
(GTEP) was an US-sponsored 18-month, $64-million plan designed to increase the capabilities of the Georgian 
armed forces, which was implemented from 2002-2004. Another program offering US military assistance was 
the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program for preparing Georgian units for operations with the 
US led Multinational Force Iraq. The program ended in September 2007. (See: “Georgia Train and Equip 
Program,” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, online, available from 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_Train_and_Equip_Program). Accessed on July 14, 2010, unpaged. 
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leading authorities in Moscow doing the planning for all of them. Nonetheless, independence 
of the republics did not immediately result in their economic self-sufficiency and 
diversification of economic partners. Some more years after independence, Russia still 
remained the biggest economic partner for all three republics.   
 
Socio-economic situation and incomes in the South Caucasus republics have become more 
contrasting compared to Soviet times, where in terms of centralized economy and governance, 
poorer republics had the chance to somehow equally benefit from the proceeds involving 
resources of other Soviet republics. For example, rich in natural resources Azerbaijan had no 
ownership and no or little control over the management and export of its resources and goods, 
since this was done though Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, independence of the republics has 
brought to them a responsibility for and self-management of their resources, although not to 
be seen as a positive outcome for all republics. This re-possession of own goods and resources 
in the states with little to no experience of economic self-management, also brought its 
challenges in terms of achieving  economic transparency and accountability, since 
underground economy, or the so-called “black market” became one of the unwanted 
phenomena of the transition. 
 
Socio-economic conditions and indicators in each of three republics differ.32 For example, in 
the early years of independence, Azerbaijan and Armenia were the only CIS countries to show 
significant GDP growth in 1998 and 1999. Oil sector was the main driving force beyond 
Azerbaijan’s economic rise, while Armenia’s stool of hold was predominantly the agricultural 
sector. In Georgia, however, economic slump was noticeable in 1997-1999, with GDP 
decreasing from 11 percent in 1997, to 3 percent in 1998 and 2 percent in 1999.33 
 
Throughout the years that have elapsed since independence, Azerbaijan was the most 
economically successful among the three; with highest GDP indices and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) index. From 1991-2001 Azerbaijan’s share of FDI was higher than any 
                                                 
32 Azerbaijan - GDP - real growth rate is 9.3% (2009 est.), GDP - per capita (PPP) is $10,400 (2009 est.), and 
GDP - composition by sector: is agriculture: 5.6%, industry: 61.4% and services: 33% (2009 est.). 
Armenia - GDP - real growth rate is -15% (2009 est.), GDP - per capita (PPP) is $5,900 (2009 est.), and GDP - 
composition by sector: agriculture: 22.5%, industry: 43.5%, services: 34.1% (2009 est.). 
Georgia - GDP - real growth rate is -7% (2009 est.), GDP - per capita (PPP) is $4,400 (2009 est.), GDP - 
composition by sector: agriculture: 12.2%, industry: 26%, services: 61.8% (2009 est.). (See: CIA – The World 
Factbook – Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, online, available from (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/index.html). Accessed on July 21, 2010, unpaged). 
33 Ben Slay, “Economic change and modernization: South Caucasus,” Minutes of the Conference on Central Asia 
and Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics, (held in April 2000 by National 
Intelligence Council. Minutes are from October 2000):8. 
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other former Soviet republic.34 Thanks to its vast natural resources, and the decision of its 
leadership to open them for international exploitation35, the country was able to sustain itself 
and prosper even through the hardship of conflict with Armenia and a huge refugee and IDP 
problem in the country. As a result of oil exploitation policy of Azerbaijan, starting from 
1995, economic difficulties were overcome and slowly but surely led to the path of 
recuperation and development.36 Economic achievement of Azerbaijan was reflected in the 
reports of international organization, for example, Azerbaijan is ranked 51 in the Global 
Competitiveness Report for 2009-2010, the best indicator among other CIS countries.37 
 
The biggest challenge for the country though is to wisely manage and direct the proceeds 
from oil and gas industry.38 In order to ensure transparent spending of oil revenues, and 
provide economic continuity, State Oil Fund was established in 2001, which is considered to 
be a stabilization measure for undertaking economic activities, especially in non-oil sector, 
supposed that oil incomes may diminish in the process of time.39 Azerbaijan’s dependency on 
its energy resources has also made its economy vulnerable to fluctuations of world energy 
prices, which makes the diversification of the economy a dire necessity. However, some 
                                                 
34 Peter Laurens, “Azerbaijan taking tentative steps toward diversifying economy,” Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute, October 23, 2002, online, available from (http://cacianalyst.org). Accessed October 2, 2010, unpaged.  
35 The Caspian Sea is famous for its rich oil and gas reserves. Figures for the discovered oil and gas reserves in 
the Caspian region have proved to be between 5 and 40 billion barrels, and between 6.7 and 9.2 trillion cubic 
meters, respectively. However, since much of the region is still unexplored, the existence of additional vast 
reserves is also possible. (See: “Oil from Caspian could match production from North Sea, says IEA Report,” 
Caspian Oil and Gas IEA/PRESS (98) 4 Paris, 27 May 1998), online, available from 
(http://www.iea.org/new/releases/caspian.htm). Accessed in December 2007, unpaged). Since 1994, with the 
signing of the so-called “Contract of the Century” the Caspian has become the focus of attention for foreign oil 
companies, which opened Caspian oil resources for the international exploration. In September of 1994, the late 
President Heydar Aliyev, issued a decree to allow the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) 
to sign a contract, Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) with an International Consortium of oil companies. 
Initially, the contract provided oil developments in the “Azeri”, “Guneshli”, “Chraq” deposits for 30 years and 
created favorable investment opportunities for the economy of the republic, which subsequently resulted in 
signing of new oil contracts and attracted more investments.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
36  In 1995-2003, GDP growth was 90,1 %, state budget income increased more than three times, inflation was 
reduced to 2-3 %, total amount of investments constituted about $ 20 billion. In 2004-2009 GDP increased for 
2.8 times, and amounted to 43 billion USD. GDP per capita rose from 2004 to 2009 more than 2.2 times and 
amounted 4874.1 USD. (See: “General information on Azerbaijani economy,” Azerbaijan Information Portal, 
online, available from (http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/Economy/General/general_e.html) within the Ministry of 
Economic Development of Azerbaijan. Accessed on July 23, 2010, unpaged).  
37 “General information on Azerbaijani economy,” Azerbaijan Information Portal, online, available from 
(http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/Economy/General/general_e.html)., within the Ministry of Economic 
Development of Azerbaijan. Accessed on July 23, 2010, unpaged. 
38 At the outset many investors found that investment climate was not sufficiently favorable in the country and 
numerous bureaucratic barriers, especially in tax, customs and regulatory authorities existed. In order to improve 
the investment climate as well as the economic performance in the country, Azerbaijani authorities initiated new 
institutional reforms and new programs in privatization and poverty reduction. (For example, the State Program 
of Socio-Economic Development of the Regions of Azerbaijan (2009-2013), the State Program of Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan (2008-2015)). 
39  Peter Laurens, unpaged. 
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achievements are also registered in this direction. According to the numbers of first six 
months of 2010, the growth of non-oil sector in the country equaled to 15 %.40 
 
Vast resources and a favorable geographic location have turned Azerbaijan into a reliable 
contributor to global energy security, supplier of energy resources, as well as a transit for 
majority of energy and transportation projects in the region. Economic success of Azerbaijan 
and its central role in implementation of regional energy projects, bestowed on it the role of a 
hub where geopolitical and business interests of many international players meet and even 
clash. Global and regional players like the USA, Russia, Iran, Turkey and the EU became 
engaged in energy geopolitics, each aiming to have a say and a share in the geography of 
energy transportation routes. Regional political groupings like Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan, 
which is supported by the US, and Russia-Armenia-Iran axis brought new dynamics to the 
complex geopolitics of the South Caucasus region.  
 
This complex geopolitical constellation of interests has manifested itself during the 
construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline, which came into being in 2006 
after the prolonged political and economic considerations. With the support of Western 
countries, especially, the US and the EU, it emerged to be a politically rather than 
economically reasonable project, which utter target was to provide the transportation of the 
Caspian oil bypassing Russia and reducing Europe’s dependence on this country.  
 
Similar scenarios happened during the becoming of Baky-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, which 
again was designed to play into political, rather than economic aims. In seeking to diversify 
the supply of Europe’s increasing gas demand and to diminish its dependence on Russian oil, 
Europe wanted to make sure that the itinerary of gas pipeline bypasses Russia, while for 
Azerbaijan due to its troubled relations with Armenia, it was imperative that the pipeline also 
leaves this country aside. Nabucco project, which is initiated by the European Union countries 
with the same purpose of reducing Europe’s dependence on Gulf Oil, also involves great deal 
of geopolitics between west and Russia. However, since the aim of this Section is different, it 
will not focus on the dynamics of geopolitical interplays in depth, and these issues will be 
dealt with in the next section of this chapter.   
 
                                                 
40 “Президент Илхам Алиев:” эти цифры свидетельствуют о том, что экономические реформы в 
Азербайджане ведутся в верном направлении,” from Day.az Information portal, online, available from 
(http://www.day.az). Accessed on July 23, 2010, unpaged.    
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Despite of declared achievements in socioeconomic realm, Georgia and Armenia have 
comparatively lower indicators of economic prosperity and limited natural resources. As no 
hydrocarbon economies, these two states mostly relied on agriculture and service sector.41 
Georgia, thanks to its better relations with Azerbaijan and mutually beneficial cooperation 
among the two, has done considerably better by becoming a transit country in many regional 
energy projects involving European economic interests in Azerbaijan. The country has 
benefited greatly from the existence of natural and financial resources in neighboring 
Azerbaijan, as well as from impaired relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, how cynical 
it would sound, as a result of which Georgia became the main partner and a transit country for 
the plethora of energy and transportation projects in the region.42  
 
Before the Rose Revolution, the country was suffering from weakened economy, rampant 
corruption, foreign debt, budget crisis and other sort of economic ailments. As a state which 
has encountered two civil wars and unconstitutional changes in government, its economy 
shattered in early 1990s, with GDP dropping by more than 50 percent in 1990-1995 and 
inflation rising up to 15,000 percent in 1994.43 In 1999-2004, it was a challenge for Georgia 
to get financial loans from international institutions and half of the population lived below the 
poverty level. By 2002, Georgian economy had decayed to 38 percent of its GDP purchasing 
power in 1989; the country had troubles in privatization field, low investment level and high 
unemployment rate. Since 1989, considerable part of the population has left the country in 
order to find jobs in neighboring countries, especially, Russia and Ukraine.44  
 
Nonetheless, Saakashvili administration was considered to be successful in developing the 
economy, eradicating corruption, diminishing revenue leakage. In 2003-2005, Georgian 
incomes increased from 16.2 percent to 23.4 percent GDP and economic growth in 2006 was 
                                                 
41 See footnote 32, in current chapter. 
42 For example, only for the construction of BTC pipeline in its territory, Georgia is receiving a 25-years loan 
from Azerbaijan at $ 220 million with one percent of annual interest rate.42 It was estimated that FDI, which flew 
into Georgia’s economy with BTC pipeline, had reenergized the country’s economy to higher energy rates, with 
6.5 percent in 2003 and 9 percent in 2004. About 150 mile of the BTC oil and South Caucasus gas pipeline 
corridor passes though Georgia and is estimated to include the $ 3.9 billion BTC oil pipeline, which began to be 
filled in May 2005 and $ 1 billion South Caucasus natural gas pipeline, which was finalized in 2006.42 Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline had even favorable effect on Georgia’s economy, with economic growth rate 
reaching 12 percent in 2005.42 According to the study of the BTC pipeline, this pipeline would add up to $ 62.5 
million annually to Georgia’s state budget, diminish the unemployment by 33.3 percent and contribute to the rise 
of GDP, which would significantly improve its economic prosperity. (from “Energy profile of the Caucasus 
region,” Encyclopedia of Earth, online, available from (http://www.eoearth.org). Accessed on June 23, 2010, 
unpaged). 
43 Neil MacFarlane, “Georgia: Risk and Opportunity,” Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, April 
2008, p.1. 
44 Ibid. 
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9.4 percent. Nevertheless, strained relations with Russia and economic embargoes, which was 
introduced by Russia in 2006 and affected the areas such as gas, electric supply, as well as 
wine and mineral water - Borjomi industry, have to a considerable extent shrank potential 
economic well being of the country. This has manifested itself in complicating the lives of 
myriads of migrant Georgian workers, who financially support their families with the money 
earned in Russian markets.45 Still, the declared economic achievement in economic realm 
after the assumption of power by the incumbent Georgian president is often challenged by 
opposition forces, which cast doubts on the declared figures and call them exaggerated in 
view of Georgia’s EU and NATO aspirations. 
 
Armenia is an interesting case due to its heavy dependence on external financial resources, 
mostly, on diaspora funds. Overall, its economic indicators do not much differ from those of 
Georgia. The country does not possess vast amounts of exportable natural resources, except 
for some mineral deposits, such as copper, zinc, lead, iron and most importantly, gold. Her 
ongoing grievances with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and deteriorated relations with 
neighboring Turkey over the so-called “genocide” issue, which has resulted in closure of their 
common border and in no or trivial economic interactions, has left Armenia economically 
stranded. Under such conditions, the country’s leadership commenced a radical restructuring 
of the economy and a process of decentralization. However, these efforts for the restructuring 
of the economy were built in the absence of practical skills for carrying out such an 
undertaking and ended up in further waning of the economy as well as social partitioning, 
mass migration from the country and entire dependence on external financial and economic 
donations.46    
 
The country had hard times in trying to keep the economy from fallout.47 Armenian 
government undertook intensive measures in order to stop the economic slump, which has 
been rather steadfast in declining since 1993, when the borders with Turkey were closed. 
Nonetheless, the government has managed to initiate number of infrastructure projects, such 
                                                 
45 “Georgia: Sliding towards authoritarianism?” 13-14. 
46 “The Republic of Armenia’s decade of independence,” Ten Years of Independence and Transition in Armenia, 
UNDP National Human Development Report, (Armenia, 2001): 31. 
47 In the first four months of 2009, Armenia experienced a 9.7 percent of GDP decrease, which lead the 
government to appeal to external financial institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, also Russia. Increasing 
poverty level has added up to government concerns. 47Some harsh measures had still to be taken: in 2010 
Armenia reduced its budget, and among other reductions it also cut its military budget by 22 percent. (See: 
Haroutiun Khachatrian, “Armenia to cut its budget next year despite expected economic recovery,” Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute, (November 11, 2009): 4, available from (http://cacianalyst.org). Accessed on April 12, 
2010, unpaged).  
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as Iran-Armenia-Georgia motorway and commissioning new block of Medzamor Nuclear 
Power Plant, and embarked on measures to improve business climate and stimulate economy. 
Also, Armenia has managed to keep the level of living standards from deteriorating despite 
the inhibiting economic challenges. 48 
 
However, the existence of powerful, rich, politically and economically active Armenian 
diaspora around the world and their dedicated financial assistance to an infant motherland has 
become a true salvation for this state. Ring of diaspora organizations throughout the world 
had been extremely active in rendering Armenia any sort of assistance, economic support 
being the foremost. Majority of investment programs were initiated by them and substantial 
part of foreign capital are inflowing to the country from the states with major constellation of 
Armenian community, such as Russian Federation, USA, Iran, France, etc.49  
 
When Armenian economy is the target of discussion, it is rather difficult to overlook the role 
of the Russian Federation. Russian role in Armenia’s economy is very much different from 
that in the Georgian economy. If with respect to Georgian economy Russia’s role is 
spectacular with economic sanctions, in Armenia a different picture is conspicuous. Alongside 
its historic political leverage over Armenia, Russia also successfully maintains its economic 
influence and dominance in this South Caucasus republic. Russian investment is omnipresent 
in variety of areas – telecommunications, banking system, electricity networks, let alone its 
monopoly in energy, gas distribution network and the country’s hydroelectric plants. Armenia 
has transferred significant part of its economic assets to government and private Russian 
companies, including granting to Russian Gasprom biggest share of its largest thermal power 
plant - Armrosgasprom50, a joint venture between Gasprom and Armenian government that 
manages the transportation and distribution of Russian gas within Armenia. Until the year 
2010 the total amount of Russian investments in Armenia equaled to $ 2.4. billion, which 
makes this country the largest investor in the Armenian economy.51  
                                                 
48 Haroutiun Khachatrian, “Armenia to cut its budget next year despite expected economic recovery,” Central 
Asia – Caucasus Institute, (November 11, 2009):4. 
49 For example, Las-Vegas based “Lincy” Foundation has been the frontrunner of all the external financial aid 
programs and its involvements has been instrumental in the country’s economic development. Other Armenian 
diaspora organizations established abroad, such as Hayastan pan-Armenian Fund, Armenian General Benevolent 
Union, Armenian National Committee are among the diaspora organizations active in delivering economic 
assistance to their homeland. (See: The Republic of Armenia’s decade of independence,” Ten Years of 
Independence and Transition in Armenia, UNDP National Human Development Report, (Armenia, 2001):34). 
50 Maria Raquel Freire and Lichnia Simro, “The Armenian road to democracy,” CEPS Working Document, (No. 
267/May 2007):11.  
51 “Russia is the largest foreign investor in Armenian economy,” AKRA News Agency, online, available from 
(http://www.akra.am). Accessed on July 23, 2010, unpaged. 
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Although Russia’s political weight in Armenia has earned it a role of faithful Russian satellite 
throughout the history, and many has already got used to the existing vertical political 
dependence of Armenia on Russia, big brother’s increasing economic power in this tiny 
country was often lambasted by opposition forces of the country. Many fear that keeping 
Russia that close augurs ill for the prospects of Armenia’s integration with west. Nonetheless, 
in view of Armenia’s lasting economic isolation in the region, brought by its deeply impaired 
relations with Azerbaijan, as well as Turkey, over festering issues, maintaining close political 
and economic ties with Russia seems to be indispensable for this country.  
 
This holds true also against the picture of surging energy infrastructure in the region from 
which Armenia is getting increasingly isolated. The construction BTC oil and BTE gas 
pipelines and further of Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway project between Georgia, Turkey and 
Azerbaijan further increases Armenia’s isolation. As was noted earlier in the section, when 
engaging upon the lucrative energy projects with international oil companies, Azerbaijan 
made sure that Armenia is left out, and gets no piece of energy pie of the Caspian, irrespective 
of the fact that Armenian territory provided shortest and economically most feasible 
transportation route. This state of affairs is to be expected to persist until the final peace deal 
on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is reached. At least, Azerbaijan’s immovable attitude in this 
regard does not promise any positive changes in the foreseeable future.  
 
Within this geopolitical context, Armenia embarked itself on the search for possible allies, 
which could to some extend alleviate the state of insulation. Its cooperation with neighboring 
Iran on gas issue since 2005, which ended in construction of Iranian-Armenian pipeline, 
attests well to this argument. In accordance with the arrangement, initially Armenia will 
receive 1.08 million cubic meters gas per year, with the prospects of doubling the amount of 
imports by 2019.52  By doing so, Armenia hopes for getting itself out of the regional isolation 
that it had lived for years. 
 
2. Interests of key players in South Caucasus  
 
Strategic geographic location on the crossroads of Europe and Asia and the possession of 
hydrocarbon resources make the region of the South Caucasus an attractive hub for the 
interests of many actors that are eager to access the strategic commodities and benefits that 
                                                 
52 “Energy profile of the Caucasus region,” Encyclopedia of Earth, online, available from 
(http://www.eoearth.or). Accessed on June 23, 2010, unpaged. 
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the region can offer. Complex interactions and interplay of interests among the main players 
in the region shape the intricate geopolitical setting of South Caucasus. The following 
paragraphs are designed to briefly sketch the interests of the key players in the region, which 
will also be useful in conducting of the effectiveness analysis in the coming parts of the work. 
 
2.1. Russia 
 
It is never easy to give an unambiguous estimation to the Russian role and interests in the 
region of South Caucasus, taking into account common history that the region states share 
with Russia and evolving nature of mutual relations that are dramatically different from the 
past relationship when these states were the constituent parts of the bigger Empire. Having 
ruled throughout two centuries [during Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Empire] over the states 
of the South Caucasus region, alongside other regions in the Eurasian continent, Russia had 
hard times to accept and come to grips with new realities of 1990s that ceased the existence of 
the USSR and ended its domination over what it considered to be its “sphere of influence”.  
 
When the states of South Caucasus became independent, despite of the fact that Russia had 
established diplomatic relations and economic contacts with the region republics – a formal 
acknowledgement of the fact that they are sovereign and independent republics, Russian 
policy towards the republic had never been free from the emotions of the past and was 
accompanied by a backstage agenda. In fact, the mainstream of Russia’s South Caucasus 
policy was and still remains to be the preservation of its control over the state of affairs in the 
region. This became the underlying cause of Russia’s apprehension over the declared pro-
Western orientation of the region republics [especially Georgia] and its resistance to 
deepening of other external influences in the region, particularly to that of the USA.   
 
The striving to keep the South Caucasus within the orbit of its influence explains many 
controversial aspects of Russian policy in the region. The region’s rising geopolitical 
significance has enticed equally great geopolitical interests of other actors that often cross cut 
with those of Russia’s and have become one of the reasons why Russia is so adamant in 
pursuing its objectives. Trying by all means to keep the three countries dependent on itself, 
Russia had employed wide range of instruments – economic, political tools; instigative, 
coercive measures and even the use of force. Russia was eager to include the states of the 
South Caucasus into the CIS membership in the early 90s and to station its military bases in 
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the territories of the South Caucasus states. Unfortunately, unstable South Caucasus fraught 
with long standing unresolved conflicts presents to be a fertile soil for advancement of 
Russia’s imperialist ambitions.     
 
During Putin’s Presidency, Russia increasingly dived into nationalistic policy and any western 
involvement in what it considered to be its “near abroad” met with strong Russian suspicion 
and opposition. In order to prevent or at least reduce the external competing influences, 
Russia did not refrain from overt interference into the internal affairs of its former subordinate 
republics, South Caucasus states included. For this purpose, it availed of any option to 
consolidate the dependence of the South Caucasus states on itself an hinder the successful 
state building process, therefore, greatly incited and manipulated the territorial conflicts in the 
region53.  
 
At this juncture, it would be useful to do a brief, but targeted description of how Russia is 
perceived in each of the South Caucasus states, for having a better idea of the concomitant 
factors serving for entrenchment of Russia’s influence in the region. Since the independence 
of the republics, Russia had a significant role in the instigation of separatists movements in 
Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is undeniable that without Russian support those 
breakaway republics had little to no chance to make their way towards their de-facto 
independence today. If before the August 2008 events, Russian support to South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia were extended mostly in economic and political terms, - like giving the inhabitants 
citizenship passports and enabling them for free movement within Russia, supporting the 
regions economically, - August 2008 events in fact had demonstrated that Russia was more 
than serious when it came to defending its “grips” of leverage over the region of South 
Caucasus even if it implied the resort to forceful action.54  
 
Georgia is the country which has the most plagued relations with Russia and which in fact had 
never hid its animosity towards its bigger neighbor and accuses it for openly supporting 
Georgia’s separatist entities. When Abkhazian forces gained a military victory with Russian 
support in 1993 and expelled Georgian forces as well as the Georgian population from 
Abkhazia, the then Georgian President Shevardnadze was obliged to accept Russian demands 
to station its military bases in four strategic sites in Georgia: in Vaziani, surroundings of 
                                                 
53 Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr, “The Caucasus: A challenge for Europe,” Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute and Silk Road Studies Program (Uppsala University, 2006): 58. 
54 See Chapter II for broader description of August 2008 events. 
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Tbilisi, in Gudauta, Abkhazia, in Batumi, Ajaria, and in Akhalkalaki, which is the center 
where the Armenian minority live in cluster. These four Russian military bases had been a 
subject for fervent disputes between Georgia and Russia. In fact, Georgian parliament had not 
ratified the agreements legalizing the stationing of Russian military bases in Georgia, which 
left the status of the Russian military forces doubtful. Moreover, in Istanbul Summit of 1999 
Russia undertook a commitment to withdraw its forces from these bases and in 2006 Georgia 
had finally reached an agreement with Russia on the closure of Russian bases in Georgia.55  
 
By the end of 2007 Russia had vacated its military bases in Georgia, with the exception of 
Gudauta base under the pretext that the base is demilitarized, contain no military equipment 
and only Russian pensioners are living there. Therefore, Russia considers Gudauta base to be 
also closed, while Georgia continues to demand the full demobilization and transfer of the 
base to Georgia. This issue was one of the stumbling stones in Georgian-Russian relations. 
Their relations had further deteriorated and diplomatic relations ceased after the bloody 
August 2008 events.  
 
As was touched upon in the first section of the chapter, Armenia is the principled Russian ally 
in the region and is more economically and politically dependent on Russia than Azerbaijan 
and Georgia.56 In fact, Russia by making Armenia greatly dependent on itself, well utilizes it 
for consolidating its position and keeping the security balance in the region in constant 
fluctuation. It is known that during the active military hostilities between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia in the early 90s, Armenia had enjoyed great deal of Russian military and financial 
support, which made the occupation of Azerbaijani territories possible. By doing so, Russia 
aimed at perpetuating already deep rooted historic animosity between the two countries, 
which would allow it to stick to its time proofed motto of “divide and rule”. Even after the 
end of warfare and the achievement of the cease fire, Russia continued to grant Armenia with 
armaments without any financial charges. From the known cases, in 1997 it transferred to 
Armenia armaments that cost 1 billion $57 and in 2008 another transfer of weapons and 
ammunitions amounting to 800 million US dollars.58 
 
                                                 
55 Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr, 52. 
56 See Chapter I, Section 1 for more information on Armenia’s economic ties with Russia. 
57 Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr, 54. 
58 Statement by the Delegation of Azerbaijan to the Joint Consultative Group, 684th Plenary meeting,, in Journal 
of the 684th Plenary Meeting of the JCG, (January 20, 2009, RESTRICTED):1. 
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Another reason why Armenia is a propitious partner for Russia interests is because this is the 
only country of the region, which had hosted Russian military bases on its soil without much 
pressures on Russian part and up to date expresses no objection in this regard. Russia’s 
military bases in Armenia (102nd military base in Gymri and air base in Yerevan) beyond 
serving as a favorable ground for Russian efforts to influence the overall security of the 
region, have especially destabilizing effect in the context of Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and causes justified apprehensions of Azerbaijan. Russia and Armenia are 
also strategic partners and have several agreements on strategic partnership.59 Besides, it is 
not only Russia’s main economic and political partner in the region, but also a member of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian-led military bloc of the CIS. 
Neither Azerbaijan, nor Georgia is represented in the CSTO. 
 
As for Azerbaijan, it displays the most moderate attitude towards Russia compared to Georgia 
and Armenia and have shown that it is better off by maintaining a balanced policy towards its 
northern neighbor. Russian-Armenian strategic partnership and the “special relations” 
between the two states doubtlessly present certain concerns for Azerbaijan and it is very well 
understood in this country that it was due to Russian support that Armenia was able to achieve 
control over the certain portion of its territory. However, unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan does not 
embark on an overt verbal war and animosity against Russia for supporting Armenia in its war 
against Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Neither does Azerbaijan evinces its 
pro-Western orientation as vividly as it is done by Georgia, and instead, prefers to speak in 
more reserved tones and act likewise, in order not to vex Russia.  
 
Azerbaijan was quite consistent in pursuing relatively independent foreign policy compared to 
openly pro-Western Georgia and Russia-dependent Armenia. The period of becoming of the 
Baky-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline that lasted throughout the 90s until the year 2006, 
and Baky’s persistence in getting western support to ensure that the pipeline bypasses Russia 
was a good paradigm of Azerbaijan’s endeavor to pursue independent policy freed from 
Russian interference to a maximum extent. Also, it should not be forgotten that Azerbaijan in 
fact became the only state in the entire region, which did not allow the stationing of Russian 
military bases in its territory despite the facts that certain attempts to this end were made on 
Russia’s part during the early years of Azerbaijan’s independence.60  
                                                 
59 There are number of agreements between the two on military and technological cooperation, the agreements 
on the preservation of Russian military base in Armenia.  
60 See Chapter IV, footnote 282 for more information. 
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Having sketched Russia’s interests in the region and the nature of its relations with each 
region state, the next step will be to consider how the said factors influence the effectiveness 
of the CIS, the OSCE and the UN. That will be done later in the work. It is pretty much 
perspicuous that the existence of strong Russian interests in the region, first and foremost its 
desire to keep the region states under its control, certainly pours into various aspects of its 
state policy, including also its position and response to the events in the South Caucasus 
region, when those are addressed within the relevant international organizations.  
 
2.2. United States 
 
After the independence of the republics, the United States had also demonstrated an 
increasing attention towards the region. Being fairly new to the region unlike Russia, at first, 
the US had rather simple objectives – promotion of democracy in these newly independent 
states, facilitation of their rapprochement with the western states, in order to balance Russia’s 
domination. To this end, the US backed strongly these states’ inclusion into the NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) in 1994 and contributed economic and other kinds of aid 
to the republics.61 
 
However, there were many other reasons standing behind the increasing US presence in the 
region. Firstly, the region is situated in the strategic geographic location between Europe and 
Asia, Middle East included, which is the region of strategic importance for the US.  Secondly, 
rising instabilities in the region due to the persistent conflicts, which became safe heavens for 
terrorism and other kinds of illegal activities, and have a devastating impact on the security 
and prosperity of the region necessitated higher US profile and material assistance in the 
solution of the lingering problems. 
 
Thirdly, and most importantly in this context, after the signing of the “Contract of Century” in 
1994 and the opening the Caspian oil and gas resources for international exploration, the 
South Caucasus had acquired the image of energy-producing region and thus, started to attract 
the international attention, the US being no exception in this case. Since rich hydrocarbon 
resources of the Caspian Sea promised to be a good alternative source in Europe’s search for 
                                                 
61 US economic aid to the South Caucasus covers freedom Support Act (FSA) initiatives, food donations, Peace 
Corps activities, assistance based on the Millennium Challenge Corporation and different kinds of security and 
democracy building assistance. (See: James Nixey, “The South Caucasus: drama on three stages,” America and a 
changed world, online available from (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16492_us0510_nixey.pdf):126. 
Accessed on January 12, 2011, unpaged).  
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energy diversification and reducing its dependence on unstable Gulf oil, as well as on Russian 
exports, the US in support of Europe’s quest for alternative sources of energy got particularly 
interested in developing long-term cooperation on energy field.  
 
The fact that the US extended its full and strongest support for the construction of the Baky-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which was politically motivated and was financially more expensive 
than if the main export pipeline transited the Russian territory, had shown that the US has 
finally got earnest and tenacious grip of the region. After the terrorist acts of 9/11, which 
raised the strategic geographic importance of the South Caucasus region for US plans in 
regard to Afghanistan, Iraq and further Middle East, the US position became even entrenched 
in the region. Plus, all three states of the South Caucasus became the active participants of the 
US war against terror and supported allied coalition operation in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
provided their troops. 
 
Among the three, Georgia was the most ardent supporter of the US presence and policy in the 
region and was very vocal in expressing its wish for NATO membership to tear itself away 
even further from Russia. After the assumption of power by the incumbent Georgian 
President M. Saakashvili through the Revolution of Roses in November 2003, relations 
between the two states became even closer and reached its cusp with the official visit of the 
US President George Bush to Georgia in May, 2005. After this date, the US valued Georgia as 
a harbinger of a democracy in the South Caucasus and rendered active financial assistance to 
the country in many spheres of its statehood.62 Things nevertheless changed for worse after 
the August 2008 events, where Georgians felt betrayed and not supported by the US against 
Russian assault and Georgian leadership was often blamed for taking immature decisions by 
launching the offensive on South Ossetia. Nonetheless, irrespective of this fact, Georgia 
remains to be the US still extends its unconditional support for Georgia in international arena. 
 
Azerbaijani relations with the US are more balanced and mostly contain the economic 
element due to Azerbaijan’s significance as the oil producing and exporting country. 
Azerbaijan, being a geopolitical center of the South Caucasus region due to its economic 
strength has opened itself to cooperation with many interested countries that are ready to 
invest in its economy and support it in this direction. The US has been no exception in this 
regard and cooperation on energy issues has constituted the purport of the US-Azerbaijani 
                                                 
62 See footnote 31, current chapter. 
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relations. As was noted above, US support was indispensable in building the Baky-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline, which showed that the US attaches great importance to Azerbaijan’s 
potential to offer alternative source of hydrocarbon resources as well as their means of 
delivery that would reduce Russian dominance in this field, and ensure unhindered transit of 
oil and gas exports to Europe.  
 
This is what Azerbaijan also strove for: to provide the unimpeded export of its hydrocarbon 
resources to world markets and to assure that Russia has no control over the export itineraries 
and does not turn this into another means of political leverage over Azerbaijan. However, 
irrespective of having the US support for the implementation of its economic endeavors, 
Azerbaijan still manages to strike the right balance between the US and Russia without too 
much inclination towards one or the other and does not allow the deployment of military base 
of any of these two states on its territory.63 Nevertheless, beyond the economic factors, it is 
also tacitly known that Azerbaijan’s geographic proximity to Iran also counts high and is one 
of the reasons of continual US interest in the country. 
 
The US relations with Armenia are formed neither by Armenia’s strong pro-western vocation, 
nor the possession of vast hydrocarbon resources. In fact, Armenia has large Diaspora and 
lobby groups64 in the US, which can influence any decision concerning Armenia and its 
relations with the US. The power of Armenian lobby had managed to direct vast amount of 
US funds for Armenian economy and for years Armenia received large portion of financial 
assistance65 compared to its rival Azerbaijan. Armenia is also the participant of the PfP 
progarmme and supported the US in anti-terrorism war, however, Armenia’s close ties with 
Russia is very well understood in the US and the latter therefore, does not count on 
developing more politically strategic relationship with the country, like with Georgia.   
 
                                                 
63When the US had to close its air base in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan was considered as a next location where the 
US bases could be stationed. But Baky did not agree to the idea of hosting permanent US presence.  
 One of the stumbling stones in Azerbaijani relations with the US was the Section 907 in the freedom Support 
Act of US, which considered rendering economic assistance to the newly independent soviet states. By 
introducing this amendment the US prohibited government-to-government ad to Azerbaijan until it “ceases the 
economic blockade against Armenia”. Azerbaijan was for years very unhappy with this amendment and that 
remained a constant problem in US-Azerbaijani relations. Finally, when Azerbaijan took active part in US-led 
anti-terrorism campaign after the 9/11 events, Bush administration issued a yearly waiver of the section, which is 
renewed every year. Moreover, the US extends training support to Azerbaijan in performing Strategic Defense 
Review as well as trainings of maritime border guards.  
64 For more information on Armenian diaspora see Chapter I, Section 1. 
65 Under different assistance programs US has until present given Armenia about 2 billion USD in humanitarian 
and development assistance. (Available from (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5275.htm). Accessed on January 
23, 2011, unpaged).  
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2.3. Turkey 
Turkey values its role in the region and like the previous two states it has both economic and 
political interests. Economically, Turkey attaches great significance to its share in the ongoing 
energy projects in the region and participates closely in their development. Its role as a transit 
country in the construction of the Baky-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export and Baky-Tbilisi-
Erzurum gas pipelines if on one hand attested to the country’s efforts to help the countries of 
the South Caucasus region to further detach themselves from Russia, on the other hand, it was 
also motivated by Turkey’s increasing demand for crude energy.66  
Rising energy needs turned the country into one of the main markets for oil and gas exports of 
the Caspian basin and consolidated the economic element in Turkey’s relations with the 
region. Turkey’s participation in the becoming of Nabucco gas pipeline that would allow 
transportation of natural gas from the Middle East and Caspian region [including Iran, 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan] to Western Europe, which would pass through Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Hungary to end in Austria, enhances its profile as a transit country and the 
importance it attributes to the region. 
Politically, South Caucasus is a favorable spot for Turkey to prove its strength as a player on 
regional level. The value of the South Caucasus for Turkey’s leadership ambitions is 
augmented given its strategic location of a gateway to Central Asia and Middle East. 
Moreover, Turkey has good relations with two states of the region, Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
which are its main economic and strategic partners. Turkey supports the two countries in their 
efforts to build regional energy projects and regards its own role of a transit country for 
energy transportation corridors as another opportunity to boost up its regional significance.  
 
It has special relations with Azerbaijan, with which it shares common language, religion and 
ethnic identity. Therefore, beyond strategic partnership, the two states have closer bounds and 
often name themselves as being “one nation in two states”. In this light, Turkey supports 
Azerbaijan’s regional policy, including its stance in Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, as well as renders its backing to Azerbaijan on international fora to a 
possible extent. Relations with Georgia are also positive and the countries cooperate on 
Caspian energy projects as well as Black Sea related issues with the Organization of Black 
                                                 
66 In 2003 Turkish government have predicted that energy needs of Turkey will increase about 10% a year for 
the next 20 years. (Selma Astern, “Turkey’ energy and foreign policy,” online, available from 
(http://www.globalization.icaap.org/content/v3.1/03_stern.html). Accessed on January 23, 2011, unpaged. 
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Sea Economic Cooperation. Besides being involved in developing joint energy projects 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia also cooperate on the construction of Baky-Tbilisi-Kars 
railway. 
 
In this geopolitical context, some words should be devoted to Armenia-Turkey relations. As it 
was mentioned in the Section 1, Turkish-Armenian border is closed due to existing 
controversies between the two countries. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in 
support of Azerbaijan, which was in a state of war with Armenia. However, this was not the 
only reason beyond the cessation of diplomatic relations and closure of state borders between 
the two countries. Armenia’s accusations of Turkey in committing massacres against 
Armenians in 1915 in Ottoman Turkey and insistence on international recognition of these 
events as act of “genocide”, generates Turkey’s enragement, which denies these charges. On 
the contrary, Turkey argues that Armenia does not recognize Turkey’s internationally 
recognized borders and has territorial claims for Kars region in eastern Turkey.  
 
However, against all odds and mostly under international pressures67, Turkey started a 
process of rapprochement between the two countries. In October of 2009, Turkish-Armenian 
protocols were signed, which envisage the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic 
and economic relations as well as a joint commission of historians, which would research the 
events of 1915.68 This marked the cusp of new era in the relations of the two countries. 
However, the process was stalemated and the parliamentary approval of the protocols has not 
yet taken place. This was due to strong rejection of Azerbaijan - Turkey’s long time ally - to 
these developments, plus Turkey’s stipulation to further this process in parallel with 
achievement of progress in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and withdrawal 
of Armenian forces from the region. Talks are still carried out towards the ratification of the 
protocols; however, with the lapse of time, neither Armenia, nor the international community 
seems to doubt that irrespective of their efforts to separate the two mentioned issues, the 
process of Armenia-Turkey rapprochement is not expected to be detached from the Nagorno-
Karabakh topic.  
 
 
                                                 
67 Mostly the bigger powers like, the USA, France, Russia and the EU. 
68 See: Protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic 
of Turkey, online, available from (http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/pr_09/20090831_protocol.pdf). 
Accessed on November 23, 2010, unpaged. 
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2.4. Iran  
 
In comparison with the previous three actors Iran played respectively limited role in the 
region after their independence. However, it also has certain objectives in the region. Having 
lived in isolation since the Iran Islam Revolution of 1979, and suffered great economic slump 
in the consequence of Iran-Iraq wars of 1980-88, Iran regarded the countries on its north as 
potential markets for its energy exports and possible transit for their transportation to world 
markets. From political perspective, Iran was cautious to see the activism of external players 
in the region, namely, the US, with which it has troubled relations and therefore, sought to 
establish bilateral contacts with every state in the region in order to somehow counterweight 
the US intrusion into the regional affairs.  
 
Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan are more complex and often dictated by Iran’s apprehension 
over Azerbaijan’s possible influence on Iran’s Azerbaijani minority, which is the largest 
ethnic group in the country.69 Although it was never openly acknowledged by Iran, 
independent and strong Azerbaijan is not thought to be a good example for Iran’s Azeri 
minority, whose cultural rights were often reported not to be properly granted and that had 
caused several uprisings in demand of respect for their rights and unification with northern 
Azerbaijan.70 In the early years of Azerbaijan’s independence a more nationalistic leadership 
of Azerbaijan led by President Elchibey put much focus on the idea of Azerbaijan’s 
reunification, which further deteriorated Azerbaijan-Iran relations. Nonetheless, during the 
tenure of President Heydar Aliyer, Azerbaijan took more neutral stance on the issue of 
Azerbaijan’s reunification. Hence, although certain problems still exist71, Azerbaijan-Iran 
relations got into a more practical dimension.72  
 
Perhaps it would be right to assert that Iran’s main ally in the region is Armenia. As was also 
depicted in the previous section, Armenia seeking to compensate its non-cooperation with 
Turkey and Azerbaijan was eager to find a balancing power in order to alleviate is isolation. 
                                                 
69 Azerbaijani minority of Iran is about 30 million, which constitute 24 % of the entire population. (Iran: Ethnic 
and religious minorities, CRS Report for Congress, November 25, 2008, online, available from 
(http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34021.pdf). Accessed on January 23, 2011, unpaged. 
70 In the 20th century Iran had to suppress three anti-Iranian Azerbaijani freedom movements. 
71 Disagreements over the legal status of the Caspian sea, Iran’s precaution over Azerbaijan’s good relations with 
USA and Israel are among the reasons. 
72 Azerbaijan supports Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and refrains from joining 
anti-Iran groupings. Besides, the two countries have signed energy agreements, because Azerbaijan considers 
buying Iranian gas as the Russian gas becomes too expensive. Cultural ties have been developed with the 
establishment of Iran-Azerbaijan Friendship Association. (See: Kaweh Sadegh-zadeh, “Iran’s Strategy in the 
South Caucasus,” Caucasus Review of International. Affairs, Vol. 2 (1) (2008): 39). 
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Iran-Armenia relations therefore developed rapidly, since Armenia’s quest for regional 
partners was reciprocated by Iran who also saw Armenia as a possible force by which it could 
deter Azerbaijan’s potential to become an influential regional player once the solution over 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is reached. Therefore, Iran focused on developing its economic 
ties with Armenia by embarking on energy and transportation projects73 and making Armenia 
its main strategic partner in the region.  
 
Relations with Georgia are comparatively less dynamic and also less problematic than 
relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, after the August 2008 events, Iran engaged 
on raising its profile in Georgia as well as in the region. In 2010 Iran officials visited Georgia 
and signed agreements on visa free travel, agreement on regular air connections between the 
courtiers, etc.74 Plans exist to expand bilateral cooperation on energy field, such as the 
construction of hydro power plant and the development of wind energy via Iran’s 
investments.75  
 
2.5. Actors’ interactions 
 
Although the geopolitical interplay in the South Caucasus region was slightly described in the 
preceding section, this part aims to a little bit extend this view. With the presence of so many 
divergent and often conflicting interests in the region by regional as well as external actors, 
some words are to be said about the dynamics of the interactions between the influential 
players. Even though economic factors had currently shaped two main axes in the region - 
Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan backed by the US, and Armenia-Iran-Russia, - when it comes to 
political issues, this picture gets vague, and does not repeat itself identically. 
 
The US and Russia are the main contenders over gaining major influence in the region with 
the first trying to drag the region states further away from Russia and the latter working hard 
to keep its erstwhile control. US’s main ally remains to be Georgia, while Russia mainly 
                                                 
73 See page 19 of the current chapter. Also, 90 mile long Armenia-Iran gas pipeline is expected to pump 38 bcf 
per year, which is planned to be doubled by 2019. (See: Caucasus region energy data, statistics and analysis – 
oil, gas, electricity, coal, online, available from (http://www.eia.doe.gov). Accessed on September 4, 2010, 
unpaged). Iran and Armenia has agreed to build hydroelectric plant on Iranian part of Araz River, on Armenian-
Iran border.  
74 “Georgia is tightening its relations with Iran,” from EastWeek, online, available from 
(http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2010-11-17/georgia-tightening-its-relations-iran). Accessed on 
January 12, 2011, unpaged.  
75 “Georgian Deputy FM: New stage in Georgia-Iran Relations,” from Civil Georgia, Tbilisi 22 May 2010, 
online, available from (http://www.civil.ge/eng/aricle.php?id=22325). Accessed on January 20, 2011, unpaged. 
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relied on Armenia. Azerbaijan prefers to keep the proper equilibrium with both sides without 
further aggravating any of them.  
 
Other regional players Turkey and Iran are loyal towards each other, although often, Iran is 
not happy about Turkey’s export of secular Islam and its rising profile in the region. 
Moreover, Iran does not like the fact that Turkey is a NATO member and a US ally, plus it 
enjoys good relations with Israel, which could be also reflected on Turkey’s South Caucasus 
policy. Nonetheless, the two were on good terms and Turkey even regards Iran as a potential 
exporter for its energy demands.76 Turkey has good relations with Georgia, very close ties 
with Azerbaijan, and problematic relations with Armenia, while Iran has moderate but 
pragmatic relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, while having stronger cooperation with 
Armenia. 
 
Iran does not endorse increasing US weight in the region as an external player which is keen 
on consolidating Iran’s international isolation and also reducing its influence in South 
Caucasus. Iran therefore, mostly aligns itself with Russia, which also prefers to group with 
Iran in order to lessen the US role.77 Unlike Iran, Turkey has for long time been US’s strategic 
ally, despite the occasional problems that at times blight their relations,78 and it also tries to 
have healthy interaction with Russia by careful picking and choosing of a corresponding 
policy aspect where it could cooperate with both states. Like the US Turkey wants the states 
of the South Caucasus to be independent from Russia. However, it does not treat Russia as a 
country, which should be contained, quite the contrary; it never openly speaks up against 
Russia and its policy in South Caucasus. This cautious approach to Russia is necessitated by 
the fact that Turkey’s relations with Russia are mainly motivated by economic 
considerations,79 and not by purely political beliefs. 
                                                 
76 There is Iran-Turkey gas pipeline built in 2002, which is about 750 miles from Tabriz to Ankara and has the 
capacity to transfer 495 bcf of natural gas each year. (See: Turkey energy data, statistics and analysis – oil, gas, 
electricity, coal, online, available from (http://www.eia.doe.gov). Accessed on September 4, 2010). 
77 Russia as a member of the UN Security Council not once spoke against imposing sanctions on Iran or at least, 
mitigating them. 
78 Turkey was unhappy about US intrusion into Iraq in 2003 and refused to allow the US to use its territory for 
this purpose. The fact that Armenian diaspora is very active in promoting the recognition of “Armenian 
genocide” by the US, which was several times brought to the agenda of the US House of Representatives, and 
Turkey’s recently marred relations with Israel-long time US ally - over Israel’s’ raid on Gaza aid flotilla that 
belonged to Turkey are among the reasons that account for the scars in Turkish-US relations. However, the two 
still remain to be strategic allies, primarily because the US attaches great importance to Turkey as a secular 
Muslim democracy, and its ally with a growing role in the Middle East.      
79 Turkey cooperates closely with Russia on gas import issues and the two have embarked on the constriction of 
Blue Stream natural gas pipeline that transports  565 bcf per year of Russian natural gas to Turkey (See: Turkey 
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Close to the end of this section, I would also like to illuminate the interrelation of three South 
Caucasus republics among and between themselves. Due to the complexity of the problems of 
the region, especially, the intractability of the conflict between the two neighbouring states, 
the South Caucasus is a largely disintegrated, combustible and war-torn zone. Beyond the 
need to deal with the burden and consequences of the conflicts, refugee and IDP problem, 
problems of state-building and transition, the states of the region due to their geographic 
location of crossroads, have also encountered the necessity of coping with and undertaking 
appropriate measures against new risks and challenges like terrorism, terrorism financing, 
money-laundering, trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings, and etc., which have 
acquired exigency especially after 9/11. These and similar issues of urgency cannot be timely 
addressed by national governments separately and need to be tackled through the regional 
cooperation, and commitment to different regional programs. 
  
Irrespective of the necessity of regional cooperation to address these crucial issues, the 
prospects for trilateral regional cooperation including all states of the region are blocked due 
to the persistence of the conflict between the two states of the region - Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, which is the biggest destabilizing factor undermining the chances for mutual trust, 
confidence and incentives for integration and comprehensive regional cooperation. 
Lamentably, so far the efforts to promote regional cooperation by different international 
organizations have ended in failure due to the notorious realities of the region and mostly, 
Azerbaijan’s intransigence to embark on any all-inclusive cooperation before the resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.   
 
Therefore, the South Caucasus states carry bilateral format of cooperation in the form of 
Azerbaijan-Georgia and Armenia-Georgia. Georgia is the only state in the region having 
contacts with the other two states, since Azerbaijan and Armenia have no diplomatic relations. 
Azerbaijan and Georgia are strategic allies, predominantly due to their indispensable 
cooperation on major transportation and energy projects in the region and as it was mentioned 
above, Georgia benefits greatly from the proceeds offered to it through its participation in 
these undertakings. What concerns Georgia-Armenia relations, they also seem to be rather 
stable, although could hardly be qualified as strategic allies. Moreover, in recent years there 
were intermittent splashes of disagreements between the two due to Armenia’s support of its 
compatriots’ clamored rights for self-determination in Georgia’s Javakheti region. 
                                                                                                                                                        
energy data, statistics and analysis – oil, gas, electricity, coal, online, available from (http://www.eia.doe.gov). 
Accessed on September 4, 2010.).  
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Nonetheless, these disagreements are not yet so acute to deal a serious blow on the relations 
of the two states.   
 
As the preceding paragraphs illustrated, the dynamics among the regional and external players 
are as complex as their interests in the region and could be further dwelt on for better 
understanding. However, since the aim of the work is different, this analysis could be a good 
subject for a separate research. This section, which was devoted to the description of the 
interests of various actors in the South Caucasus region as well as the relations of the South 
Caucasus states among themselves, if on one hand was intended to give an overview to the 
geopolitics of the region, on the other hand will be useful in conducting the effectiveness 
analysis and while exploring the impact of actors’ interests on the effectiveness of the 
researched four organizations in the following parts of the dissertation.  
 
3. Summing up 
 
This Chapter was designed to serve as a starting point in the author’s attempt to analyze the 
role of four institutions – the UN, the CIS, the OSCE and the EU – in the process of conflict 
resolution in South Caucasus and wherever applicable, the analysis of their effectiveness in 
facilitating the achievement of a final settlement. 
 
The Chapter aimed to give introduction to the region of South Caucasus, and three 
independent republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - which emerged after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Having taken a quick glance at the transition process of the 
South Caucasus republics with all its challenges and achievements, this Chapter illustrated the 
overall picture of internal processes, interactions in and among these countries, as well as the 
interests of key players in the region. Independence, transition to market economy and 
democratization – were not the invitees that the three states were easily familiar with and 
ready to accept smoothly, with no pain. As this Chapter attempted to highlight, many hurdles 
had to be surpassed by the republics in order to preserve their independence and secure a 
place in the world, even if this place is still a little fragile and is to be consolidated though 
further reforms and achievements.  
 
Yet, as this Chapter slightly touched upon, there are still pending security issues in the region 
– the so-called “frozen conflicts” - that plea for resolution or the region states will hence 
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continue to be entrapped in the quagmire of conflicts and mutual hostilities, hence relegating 
to naught their chances for establishing effective statehood and better future. I will dwell on 
the ongoing conflicts in the South Caucasus region in the Chapter II. 
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II. SECURITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: Long-standing conflicts in the South 
Caucasus – “landmines” with delayed action 
 
Beyond the enumerated geographical and geopolitical factors, the South Caucasus region can 
daringly be identified as a melting pot of different ethnic units, which throughout history have 
busted into aggressive conflicts on various prerequisites. Regrettably, this dismaying 
historical “tradition” remains still alive in the region and makes the South Caucasus as one of 
the most complex conflict zones in the Eurasian continent by virtue of the number and 
complicated character of the conflicts. After the independence obtained by the region 
republics in 1991, leaving behind seventy years of Soviet subordination, latent conflicts of the 
South Caucasus became unveiled and subsequently exacerbated with a high degree of 
explosiveness.  
 
Thus, the conflict between two neighboring countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan; conflicts within Georgia - in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia - are nowadays disrupting the stability and development of the whole region. The 
distinct character of these major conflicts in the South Caucasus is maintained by the fact that 
none of them has been solved so far, instead they were “frozen” along the volatile cease-fire 
lines. In order to give a reader an overview of the potential threats they generate for the 
stability in the region, I will sketch each of them below. 
 
1. Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region 
 
Among the violent conflicts of the former Soviet Union the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can 
be characterized as the most intractable and combustible one, which is pending a solution for 
almost 20 years. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of 
Azerbaijan, which erupted and was further instigated by the Soviet leadership during the 
period of political upheavals in the already ramshackle Soviet Empire, was an immediate 
evidence of historical animosity between the conflicting parties that dates to the beginning of 
the century.80 The following sections are designed to cover the historical background as of the 
conflict.  
 
 
                                                 
80 In the beginning of the century, in 1905-06 and in 1918, there were serious clashes between Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis. 
 
45 
 
1.1. Roots of the conflict 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh was an Armenian-dominated autonomous region within Azerbaijan before 
the conflict broke up with Armenia in 1988. The roots of the conflict go deep into the history, 
with both sides claiming for the original ownership over the region. In such a thorny conflict 
even history looks messy and becomes the tool in pursuit of political objectives. History 
books written in Armenia and Azerbaijan tell absolutely different stories as for the roots of the 
conflict; therefore, the author of this thesis opted for the illustration of both positions. 
 
According to Azerbaijani perspective, from ancient times - from 4th century B. C. to 8th 
century A.D. - the territory of current Nagorno-Karabakh was one of the provinces of 
Caucasian Albania, which was the most ancient state of Northern Azerbaijan.81 Throughout 
the Middle Ages Karabakh has always been the part of the state entities that existed in the 
territory of what is now present Azerbaijan and was inhabited by Turkic speaking population. 
In the course of history, in 18th century this entity turned into an independent Karabakh 
Khanate – one of numerous independent and institutionalized state formations in the territory 
of contemporary Azerbaijan. However, as a part of Tsarist Russian expansionist policy, most 
of the independent state institutions in the   territory of modern Azerbaijan – including the 
Karabakh Khanate had come under the subjugation of Russian Tsarist Empire. The year of 
1805 with the signature of Kurakchay Treaty marked the end of the independent Karabakh 
Khanate.  
 
In order to strengthen its position in the newly acquired lands, the Tsarist government, by all 
means tried to weaken economic and political positions of the local Muslim population and 
initiated a policy of resettlement of these territories by Armenians, whom the Tsarist Russia 
considered religiously and culturally closer to itself. The works of number of Russian and 
Western historians prove the fact of Armenian immigration to Transcaucasia in keeping with 
to the provisions of the Russian-Persian Treaties of Gulustan of 1813 and Turkmenchay of 
1928. After the Turkmenchay Treaty of 1828, Russian empire started massive deportation of 
Armenians from Turkey and Iran and their resettlement in Karabakh, as a result of which the 
Armenian population in the region outnumbered Azerbaijani population. Before that date, 
78% of the population was Azerbaijanis and 22% was Armenians. By the time of the census 
                                                 
81 From the archive materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
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in the Soviet Union, this number shifted in the opposite direction: Armenians constituted 
77%, Azerbaijanis 21%.82  
 
Substantive numbers of Armenians being transferred to Azerbaijani territories were intended 
to dramatically change the demographic landscape of the region. For example, as per Western 
sources, between the years 1813 and 1828, 86, 000 Armenians from Turkey and 40,000 more 
from Iran were moved to the territory of Western Azerbaijan, which was later, conceded to 
Armenia. Deported Armenians were primarily settled in the territories of Nakhchivan, Irevan 
and Karabakh Khanates.83 The mass transfer of Armenians to North Azerbaijani territories, 
including Karabakh, continued even after 1830s. Afterwards, an Armenian province was 
created in these lands, which was subsequently abolished in 1846. 84   
 
In general, between 1828 and 1830, roughly 130,000 Armenians were settled in the South 
Caucasus and at the beginning of 1830 about 18,000 Armenians were resettled in the former 
Karabakh Khanate. For these newcomers new villages such as Maragali, Janyatag, Yukjhari 
Chayli, Ashagi Chayli, etc. were established within Karabakh.85 The settlement of Armenians 
into South Caucasus, and primarily in Nagorno-Karabakh increased in the mid-19th century 
after Russian-Turkish wars. At this time, there were already 900,000 Armenians living in the 
South Caucasus region.86 The fact that Armenians never constituted a majority in the 
Azerbaijani lands was also noted by Russian scholars. As indicated by some, over 1 million 
out of 1,3 million Armenians living in South Caucasus were transferred from Iran and 
Turkey.87  
 
Schisms between Azerbaijanis and Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh continued at different 
points of history. The beginning of XX century also marked the serious bloody clashed 
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, in 1905-06 and 1918-1920, which ended in mass 
                                                 
82“Azerbaijan: the status of Armenians, Russians, Jews and other minorities,” Department of Justice, (produced 
by INS Resource Information Center, 425 I Street, N.W, Washington 1993). 
83 Erich Feigl, “Karabagh? Karabagh!” in Fuad Aliyev and Eldar Farzaliyev (eds.), International Visions: The 
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Karabakh: from history to future peace prospects, (Visions of Azerbaijan, 
2007): 29.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Johannes Rau, The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: A brief historical outline, 
(Verlag Dr. Koster, Berlin 2008): 21. 
86 Crimean war between Russia and Turkey of 1853-1856, wars of 1876-1878.  See: Johannes Rau, 23-24. 
87 Nikolay Shavrov, "Novaya ugroza russkomu delu v Zakavkazye: predstoyashaya rasprodazha Mugani 
inorodcam" (New threat to the Russian affairs in the Transcaucasus: forthcoming sale of Mughan to strangers) 
(St.Petersburg, 1911): 60-61. 
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killings of civil population.88 These clashes even at that time testified the depth of hostilities 
between the two nations. Each side has its own angle of historical narrative of these events 
and blames the other side as the culprit.  
 
After the establishment of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan and Armenia in April and in November of 
1920 respectively, in order to put an end to dispute over the possession of the region, on July 
1921, with Stalin’s order, the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party decided to leave Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan SSR. The text of the 
protocol of the Plenary Session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
Russian Communist Partly of July 5, 1921, states the following in this regard:  
 
…Taking into account the necessity of establishing national peace 
between the Muslims and Armenians, the economic relations between 
upper and lower Karabakh shall be retained within Azerbaijan SSR and 
broad autonomy shall be given to Nagorno-Karabakh with Shusha city as 
an administrative center…89      
 
The decision of July 5, 1921 in fact ceased the debate over the ownership of Karabakh until 
the conflict flared up again after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a part of “divide and 
rule policy” and a next step towards alienation of Nagorno-Karabakh, Soviet leadership after 
resettling it with Armenians, materialized the idea of autonomous existence for the Nagorno-
Karabakh region and thus, on July 1923 Azerbaijani Executive Committee of the soviets 
issued a decree on the establishment of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous region within 
Azerbaijan, with the town Khankendi being the administrative center. 90  
 
Having looked at Azerbaijani perspective of Karabakh’s history, let me also give some 
illustrations on how Armenians interpret the history of Karabakh. Armenia in fact argues that 
Nagorno-Karabakh has always been the historical part of Armenia throughout different times 
and names the region as “Artsax”. As stated by the Armenian sources, in 1805 Russian Tsarist 
                                                 
88In 1905-06 and 1917-20, there were serious clashes between Azerbaijani and Armenian populations. 
Azerbaijan claims that Armenians carried out a series of large-scale bloody actions against the Azerbaijanis. The 
atrocities began in Baku and then extended over the whole Azerbaijan. After the 1917 revolution in Russia, 
Armenians took advantage of the weakened central authority, and started their plans of annihilation of 
Azerbaijani population from Baku, Shamakhy, Guba, Karabakh, Nakhchivan, Lankaran and other districts. In 
these areas civilian population was killed en masse, many national and cultural monuments were destroyed.  
Both sides claim to be the victim of these events, accusing the other side of perpetrating them.  
89 Extract from the “Protocol of the plenary session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
Russian Communist Party of July 5, 1921,” To the History of Formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Oblast of Azerbaijan SSR. 1918-1925: Documents and Materials, p.92.  
90 To the History of Formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan SSR. 1918-1925: 
Documents and Materials, pp.152-153.  
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Empire annexed Karabakh, which was also accepted by Iran in the Gulustan Treaty of 1813. 
Armenian perspective does not accept the facts of resettlement of majority part of Armenians 
living in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as in the entire South Caucasus. Armenian view suggests 
that in 1918, about 330,000 Armenians were living within Karabakh, which in their 
estimation, made up to 95 percent of the total population.91   
 
Armenians argue that in July 1918, first Armenian Assembly of Nagorno-Karabakh 
established a National Council and the government in Nagorno-Karabakh, which territory at 
that time was bigger than what became an autonomous region within Azerbaijan SSR. As for 
this view, in 1919 Karabakh National Council concluded a provisional treaty agreement with 
Azerbaijan and built its own attributes of statehood.92  
 
The most irreconcilable controversy is about the July 5, 1921 decision of Caucasus Bureau on 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia disagrees that this decision actually ruled for retaining 
Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan SSR and construe this decision as the cause of all the 
calamities, because it gave Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Stalin’s decision in favor of 
Azerbaijan was protested and regarded as a political decision, perhaps even for pleasing and 
establishing better relations with Turkey, which had close ties with Azerbaijan. However, 
Armenians never accepted this decision and throughout the later history contested it 
repeatedly.93 
 
By the time autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh was created in 1923, pro-Armenian position 
report that the region had the population of 158,000, and 95 percent of it were Armenians.94 
They also indicate that from 1923 to 1979 the Armenian population of Karabakh was reduced 
from 150,000 to 120,000, and Azerbaijani population was resettled and increased in numbers 
from 7,500 in 1923 to 38,000 in 1979.95   
 
Thus, as we see, Armenia denies any relevance of Karabakh to Azerbaijan, telling a 
completely different story, while Azerbaijan brings other facts, which actually speak for the 
                                                 
91 “The Nagorno-Karabakh crisis: A blueprint for resolution,” A memorandum prepared by the Public 
International law and Policy Group and the New England Center for International Law and Policy, (June 
2000):3. 
92 Ibid., 2. 
93 According to some sources in 1960, 1965, 1966 there were several attempts on Armenian part to petition 
Soviet authorities with the claims for ownership over Karabakh. (See: Nagorno-Karabakh: A White Paper, 
(Armenian Assembly of America): 6). 
94 “The Nagorno-Karabakh crisis: A blueprint for resolution,” p. 4. 
95 Nagorno-Karabakh: A White Paper, (Armenian Assembly of America): 3. 
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region’s historic pertinence to itself. Both sides are genuinely convinced in the validity of 
their positions, which further exacerbates the tensions and animosity between them. Both 
parties view Karabakh as a cradle of their culture and heritage and therefore, have strong 
sentiments for it. The highlighted above historical overview provided a depiction of the 
reoccurring confrontations between the two nations over who should control the region, which 
lamentably, became materialized in our contemporary history.   
 
1.2. Contemporary stage of the conflict 
 
The contemporary stage of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the region started some 
years before the dissolution of the USSR, during the tenure of Mickhail Gorbachov who 
initiated infamous glastnost and perestroika that had loosened the leverage over the Empire. 
Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh and their representatives at the session of the 
Soviet of People’s Deputies of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast adopted a decision 
on secession from Azerbaijan SSR on June 1988. This decision was immediately backed up 
by Armenia, who clamored for ownership over the region and its subsequent annexation to 
Armenia, or at least for its independence. 
 
The pretext for such a claim became Armenia’s accusations of Azerbaijani government in 
violating the Karabakh Armenian’s rights of self-determination and abusing their human 
rights by implementing discriminatory policies. However, in the statistical analysis of that 
time regarding the overall development of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
USSR in general, in many social areas Nagorno-Karabakh had higher indicators than both – 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the USSR.96 
 
In December 1989, Armenia, at that time still being an integral part of the USSR alongside 
Azerbaijan, adopted a resolution calling for the “reunification” of Nagorno-Karabakh,97 
which subsequently was backed by Karabakh Armenians who held a referendum in December 
1991 and declared the independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in January 1992.98 This 
                                                 
96 For example, number of doctors with average training per 10, 000 inhabitants for Nagorno-Karabakh was – 
122.7, while for Armenia - 93.5, Azerbaijan – 93.5, USSR – 114.7; Number of public libraries – for Nagorno-
Karabakh was – 13, while for Armenia – 4.1, Azerbaijan – 6, USSR –4.1; Hospital beds – for Nagorno-Karabakh 
was – 101.7, while for Armenia 86.2, Azerbaijan – 97.7, USSR – 130.1, etc.. See: Johannes Rau, 34. 
97  Musa Qasimov, “Azerbaycan diplomatiyasinin “Dagliq Qarabag meselesi”ni dinc siyasi vasitelerle hell etmek 
sahesinde fealiyyeti,” (“The role of Azerbaijani diplomacy in peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict”) Azerbaycan Beynelxalq munasibetler sisteminde, (Baki, Genclik, 1995): 98. 
98 Ibid. 
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action caused a political turmoil in Azerbaijan for which Nagorno-Karabakh was an 
inalienable part and cradle of its cultural heritage. The parties thus became engaged in the 
protracted dispute over the historical roots99 of the region as well as its political status. 
 
During the active military operations, which lasted from 1988 to 1994, the conflict took 
15,000 – 25,000 of lives from both countries, 50,000 people were wounded.100 One of the 
harshest consequences of the conflict beyond massive killings and social-economic damage 
became the huge army of Internally Displaced Persons, as well as refugees on both sides. 
According to the estimations, by the time the cease-fire agreements were reached in 1994, the 
conflict created about 300,000 Armenian refugees and about 800,000 Azerbaijani refugees101 
and IDPs.102 The recent estimations, however, cite the number of refugees in Armenia to be 
235, 235, in Azerbaijan 8, 606, 103 while IDPs in Azerbaijan are shown to be about 578, 
545.104  
 
Azerbaijan, nonetheless suffered the most from the active military hostilities - which actually 
took place on its territory, - and from heavy consequences of the conflict. In the aftermath of 
the conflict, 20 % percent of Azerbaijani territories came under the control of the Armenian 
Armed Forces. These territories include the region of Nagorno-Karabakh at first place, and 
plus other seven adjacent districts to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, such as Aghdam, 
Gubadli, Zangilan, Fizuli, Kalbajar, Lachin and Jabrayil. These districts which do not have 
any relevance to Nagorno-Karabakh and which were not the subjects for historic 
controversies and arguments are kept as “buffer” or “security” zones by Armenia which hopes 
for maximum gains from what it currently considers to be a “win-lose” situation in its favor.           
 
So far Armenia denies any kind of involvement in the war with Azerbaijan, reemphasizing 
that it is the dispute between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, and the conflict will not be 
                                                 
99 See Section I: Historical background. 
100 Edward W. Walker, “No Peace, No war in the Caucasus: Secessionist conflicts in Chechnya, Abkhazia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh,” from Colombia International Affairs Online, February 1998, unpaged.  
101 Azerbaijani refugees are Armenian citizens of Azerbaijani origin, who were expelled from Armenia at the 
outbreak of the conflict in 1988. Different sources cite the number to be about 200, 000. 
102 Brenda Shaffer, “East of the Oder: One conflict that can be solved,” Wall Street Journal Europe, July 26, 
2002. 
103The significantly reduced number of refugees in Azerbaijan is dues to the fact that many of them later had 
integrated in to Azerbaijani society and got the citizenship. In Armenia, integration of refugees was a bit slower. 
(See: “Refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,”Report Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Population, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, (Doc. 10835, 6 February 2006): 4). 
104 “Refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,” Report Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Population, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, (Doc. 10835, 6 February 2006): 4. 
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solved unless Azerbaijan accepts Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent party in the conflict. 
Armenia argues that Azerbaijan’s unjust attitude towards Karabakh Armenians, attempts for 
ethnic cleansing and subsequent military aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991-1994 
was Azerbaijani reaction to Karabakh – “Artsakh” Armenians’ will for acquiring their 
independence and their strive for “correcting historical mistakes”. 
 
Basing its arguments on the nation’s rights for self-determination, Armenia draws analogy 
between the referendum on independence in Eritrea, which was recognized by the UN in 
1993, and the referendum held in the Nagorno-Karabakh. Also, the recent events related to 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and its almost immediate recognition by 
leading world powers has become a living precedent for Armenia in arguing for Nagorno-
Karabakh’s independence. Therefore, for Armenia the issue number one in the conflict is to 
convince the world community that Azerbaijan’s actions is against the democratic principles, 
since it is suppressing the Karabakh Armenian’s rights for national freedom and 
independence.105  
 
Looking at the issue from Azerbaijan’s perspective, Armenia is an aggressor state that 
unleashed undeclared war against Azerbaijan and intruded into its territories, using the 
Nagorno-Karabakh’s so-called “right for self-determination” as a pretext to justify the use of 
force against another sovereign state. As to the referendum held in Karabakh, in Azerbaijan it 
was regarded as a very well Armenian prepared scenario to fit the action of aggression under 
the principles of International Law. Azerbaijan’s stance on the issue has been mainly built on 
the principle of territorial integrity. Any dialogue with Karabakh Armenians is out of question 
for Azerbaijan, since it does not accept Karabakh as an independent party in the conflict. For 
Azerbaijan Karabakh Armenians are ethnic minority living within its borders and enjoying the 
same rights as Azerbaijani majority. Azerbaijan sees the actions of Karabakh Armenians as 
separatist movements, a tool, which was ignited by Armenia itself in order to prepare a 
prerequisite for aggression. In a nutshell, for Azerbaijan, Armenia is aggressor and Karabakh 
does not have a capacity to be an independent party to the conflict. 
 
In reviewing the above stated factors, the issue under discussion comes to the fore with all its 
complexity. The legal arguments used by both sides define the very nature of the conflict and 
                                                 
105 Gerard Libaridian and Arif Yunusov “New approaches to Nagorno-Karabakh: A window of opportunity?” 
East-West Institute, (EWI Policy Brief No.3, November, 1998): unpaged.  
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influences its solvability.106 However, extreme positions upheld by both parties excluded any 
possibility of the conflict resolution through bilateral efforts, thus necessitating the 
involvement of the international community to reconcile the clashing interests and find a 
compromise.  
 
2. Conflicts within Georgia 
 
Like the case with Azerbaijan, Georgian statehood had similarly encountered enormous 
challenges to its prosperity and development brought by threats to its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Separatist zones within Georgia – South Ossetia and Abkhazia, largely 
backed by the external forces – mostly Russian – have since the early years of its 
independence been a true scourge for Georgia’s welfare, progress, and sadly, for its very 
existence. Following paragraphs are intended to give some overview the said security 
challenges of Georgia.  
 
2.1. Abkhazia 
 
Out of the two separatist regions in Georgia – Abkhazia is the biggest from territorial point of 
view. Throughout history, Abkhazians and Georgians have been living side-by-side. 
However, while Georgians claim for the superiority of Georgian culture over Abkhazian and 
insist on Abkhazians to have always been the subordinate culture to them, Abkhaz have 
different interpretations of history. In an attempt to provide a historical backdrop to these two 
conflicts, I will try to illuminate the views of all parties to the mentioned conflicts, to the 
extent that the scope of this work allows me to do so. 
 
According to Abkhaz point of view, Abkhazia has been the part of Georgia, for a little period 
of time in history: between 900 and 1225 (“The Golden Age” of the Georgian kingdom) and 
from 1936 to 1992 (from the murder of the Abkhaz leader Nestor Lakoba by Lavernti Beria 
and conflict under the leadership of Ardzinba). Abkhazia was ruled by Mingrelians, and under 
Ottoman suzerainty.107 They believe that Georgians do not have the right to claim for Abkhaz 
lands, since they are not the original inhabitants of these lands, and have started to live in 
                                                 
106 I will elaborate on the arguments of the conflicting parties, and in this context, the nature of the conflicts in 
the following chapters. 
107 Donald Rayfield, “Limiting conflict in Caucasus,” Public Policy Research, (September-November, 2008): 
130. 
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those territories only starting from later history after the deportation of Abkhazians and 
massive resettlement of Georgians. 
 
The conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia dates back to the year of 1870, when mass 
resettlement of Abkhazians to Turkey took place after the end of Caucasus war. In 1877 
approximately 50,000 Abkhazians were deported from Abkhazia by the Tsarist Russian 
authorities, as a result of which the number of Abkhaz population in the region further 
ebbed.108 However, even after these measures, 1886 census indicated that Abkhazians still 
equaled to 85 % of the total population of the region.109 
 
After this resettlement took place, Abkhaz territories were divided and populated by various 
nationalities, such as Armenians, Greeks, Megrelians and Russians. When Georgia became an 
independent state in 1918 it sought to maintain its power on what it perceived to be its 
“historical territories”, as a result of which in Abkhazia and other areas massive resettlement 
of Georgians began. In 1921, Abkhazia also got a status of independent Soviet Socialist 
Republic and concluded a treaty of alliance with Georgia. However, in 1931, Georgia repelled 
its status and declared Abkhazia as an autonomous entity within Georgia.  
 
Abkhazians claim to witness more intensive Georgianization of Abkhazia, its culture, 
heritage, territory, political management, etc, which was also accompanied by massive 
resettlement of Georgians to Abkhazia. As a result of this continuous resettlement policy, at 
the end of 1980s, the share of Abkhazians living in Abkhazia was reduced to 17. 8 percent, 
while percentage of Georgians increased to 45.7.110 According to some sources, between 1926 
and 1979, the share of ethnic Abkhazian population declined from 27. 8 percent to 17.1 
percent, which was the basis of concern for Abkhazians.111  
 
Pro-Georgian perspective tells a different history for Abkhazia. It argues that Abkhazia has 
always been the part of Georgia and prior to 1992-1993 war, the question was not about 
whether Abkhazia should be part of Georgia, but rather, on what conditions, this region is to 
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be an integral part of Georgia. As for Georgia’s perspective, Abkhazia emerged in the eighth 
century in the western part of Georgia; as a result of “Abazgia” conquer of the western 
Georgian kingdom Lazica. Later, with the inclusion of central territory of eastern Georgia – 
Kartli, the territory of Abkhazia has further widened. When Georgia became disentangled at 
the end of the 15th century, alongside other Georgian lands, Abkhazia also became 
independent and up to 17th century, Abkhazian rulers included Inguri River as well as Gali 
district under their control.112 
 
At the beginning of the year 1560, the Ottoman Empire took some parts of Abkhazia under 
control and by 1810, Tsarist Russia started to invade Abkhaz and Georgian principalities. In 
order to prevent Abkhazians from resistance against itself, Russia started the deportation of 
Abkhazians to Ottoman Empire.  Later, when Georgia acquired its independence in 1918, it 
had also set up its rule over the region and granted it with wide self-rule status within 
Georgia. In 1921, when Soviet rule was established in Georgia, Abkhazian Soviet Socialist 
Republic was also established in parallel. On December of 1921 a confederation was 
established between Georgia and Abkhazia with a special Treaty. However, in 1931, Georgian 
side upholds, Stalin annulled the confederative status of Abkhazia to making it an 
autonomous region within Georgia.113   
 
Pent-up grievances of Abkhazians and Georgians were occurring in the course of history114 
and finally, when rickety Soviet Empire was near to its demise, in 1988, Abkhazians 
demanded for re-granting their status of Soviet Socialist republic that it had in 1921-31.115 
The conflict broke out in July 1989 in Abkhazian capital Sukhumi in response to the decision 
of the Georgian Council of Ministers to set up a Georgian language branch of Tbilisi State 
University in Sukhumi and ended up in severe confrontation.116 Serious discrepancies 
generated military conflict between the parties in 1989-1993. After being elected as Abkhaz 
president in 1990, Vladislav Ardzinba became a leader in Abkhazian movement for 
independence. With Georgia declaring its independence from the Soviet Union alongside 
other Soviet Socialist republics in 1991, Abkhazians also raised their voices for independence 
from Georgia. 
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Abkhaz nationalism and desire to return the old status of the region ended in their unilateral 
declaration of independence in 1992 and the demand to return to 1925 Constitution, which 
generated subsequent military reaction by Georgia. However, Abkhazians enjoying military 
support by Russia maintained control over the whole territory of Abkhazia by the end of 
1993, which was followed by massive expulsion of Georgian population living in Gali district 
of Abkhazia, who became the immediate targets of the conflict in Abkhazia. From summer 
1992 to summer 1993 Georgia controlled considerable part of Abkhazian territory, including 
Sukhumi.117 However, with active Russian help, Abkhaz forces regained the control over 
greater territory of Abkhazia.  
 
After active military hostilities, cease-fire agreement in Sochi was achieved on July 27 1993 
with Russian mediation.118 In April 1994 an interim peace agreement was concluded between 
the parties, with the mediation of Russia and the United Nations Special Representative for 
Georgia. This agreement set out general guidelines for the future political settlement, in 
particular, return of internally displaced persons and the referendum on future political status 
of Abkhazia.119 After this date, Commonwealth of Independent State Peacekeeping Forces 
was deployed in the territory of Abkhazia, which in fact consisted mostly of Russian forces. 
On May 14, 1994, Moscow Agreement was signed between the warring parties, which set up 
the cease-fire and separation of forces. In line with this agreement a “security zone” of about 
12 kilometers on each side of the cease-fire line was created, which considered the ban on 
military unites to be deployed there and allowed only personal units. The agreement also 
established a “restricted zone” on both sides of the security zone, which inhibited tanks and 
artillery systems.120  
 
In 1997 the parties agreed to refrain from the use of force.121 The situation was more or less 
stable with some intermittent violations, until July 2006, when Georgia embarked on what it 
named to be “anti-criminal operation” in Kodori valley in order to disarm local militia who 
were threatening Georgia’s constitutional order. This operation further deteriorated the 
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security situation and increased mistrust between the parties.122 Conflict is still unresolved 
and after August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, it seems to be even more intractable.  
 
One of the harshest consequences of Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was massive resettlement 
of about 300 000 ethnic Georgian population from Abkhazia. Before the war, Abkhazians 
constituted majority only in some regions, for example, Gudauta.123 As was stated above in 
this Section, before the conflict unleashed in 1992, Abkhazians were about eighteen percent 
of the entire population, while Georgians were about fifty percent. Georgia claims that ethnic 
cleansing took place during and after 1992-1993 war, as a consequence of which there are no 
more Georgians living in Abkhazia.124 The existence of large number of displaced Georgian 
population from Abkhazia further aggravated mutual mistrust and hostilities and hardened 
Georgia’s position in Abkhaz conflict. 
 
2.2. South Ossetia 
 
Unlike Abkhazians, who consider themselves to be of superior culture to that of Georgians, 
South Ossetians were never averse to Georgians living in this land and had the history of their 
people more intertwined with Georgians. The rate of intermarriages between Georgians and 
Ossetians were higher compared to Abkhazians. The border between South Ossetia and 
Georgia was easier to access, with people moving freely through the border and implementing 
economic and people to people interactions.125    
 
However, likewise the previous two conflicts, ambivalent historical argumentations were 
prominent in South Ossetian conflict as well. For example, Georgians view South Ossetians 
as aliens to their lands, who moved to South Ossetia from North Caucasus. They believe that 
Ossetians started to be settled in the lands of Georgian feudals in the 1860s and by 1880, the 
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number of Ossetians living in the historic Georgian lands increased to 52,000.126 They argue 
that South Ossetia is a historical Georgian territory called Samochablo and was ceded to 
Ossetians by the Bolsheviks in return of Ossetians’ assistance to occupy independent 
Georgian Republic by Soviets in 1920.127 Ossetians on the contrary, argue that historically 
both – South Ossetia and North Ossetia (in the Russian territory) were the parts of common 
Alan heritage-Skifs-Sarmat-Alans.128  
 
Ossetians are mainly Christians and speak the language which is close to Iranian language 
group. Close to the end of the Soviet period, about 10, 9 % of 600, 000 Ossetians of the 
Soviet Union were living in South Ossetian autonomous region, while 56 % lived in North 
Ossetian Autonomous Republic. South Ossetian region also covered several Georgian and 
mixed Ossetian-Georgian villages.129 In 1918-20 when Georgia acquired its independence 
alongside other South Caucasus republics, South Ossetia also made attempts to become 
independent, however, useless. During Sovietization of Georgia, South Ossetian Autonomous 
Region was established within it on April 20, 1922. This added up more to the 
disenchantment of Ossetians who considered themselves as having equal rights for 
independence as Georgians. 
 
In 1970, Ossetians constituted 3,2 % of the Georgian population.130 The figures of 1989 
census report of Ossetians constituting 66%, and Georgians 29 % of the population of South 
Ossetia (2% were Russians).131 According to the census conducted during Soviet times in 
1989, there were 98, 500 people living in South Ossetia at that time, of which 28, 500 were 
Georgians and others – were Ossetians, Russian and other nationalities. Despite being in 
majority in the South Ossetian region, the Constitution of the self-proclaimed Autonomous 
Republic of South Ossetia recognized Georgian language as a minority language and there 
was a direct bus connection between the two capitals.132 
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However, irrespective of its better relations with Georgia, compared to Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia was the first conflict spot within Georgian territory. In 1989-1991 Georgian and 
Ossetian clashes led to the outbreak of the conflict in South Ossetia with Georgians claiming 
the superiority of Georgian culture and official Tbilisi’s authority, and with Ossetians 
stressing their independence or their right to join North Ossetia in the Russian Federation. In 
September 1990, South Ossetia declared itself independent republic and in December of the 
same year Georgian Supreme Soviet rejected this decision and abolished an autonomous 
status of South Ossetia.133 This further aggravated the situation. Conflict unleashed in January 
1991 and the hostilities in the capital Tskhinvali lasted until June 1992.  
 
As a result of active warfare, 1, 000 people were dead, 100 became missing with great number 
of IDPs fleeing from their homes. In the aftermath, the South Ossetian leadership maintained 
control over the districts of Tskhinvali, Java, Znauri and parts of Akhalgori.134 As maintained 
by the Georgian authorities, about 40, 000 Georgian refugees were expelled from South 
Ossetia to the Gori region and to Tbilisi. Ossetian sources indicate approximately 100, 000 
refugees fleeing from Georgia to North Ossetia.135 
 
According to “Agreement on Principles of the Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict 
between Georgia and Russia”, signed in Sochi in 1992, a ceasefire was achieved. With the 
same agreement, a Joint Control Commission (JCC) was established with participation of 
Georgian, Russian, North and South Ossetian representatives, plus the OSCE.136 JCC was 
tasked with numerous undertaking, including coordinating the activities of Joint Peace 
Keeping Force (JPKF) in the zone of conflict.137 On May 29, 1992, before the ceasefire 
agreement was reached, South Ossetian Parliament adopted a new declaration of 
independence, which laid the foundation of the de-facto independent state in post-Soviet 
area.138 
 
On April 4, 1994 Georgia and Abkhazia agreed upon a Declaration of Measures for a Political 
Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and undertook a commitment to strictly 
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observe the cease-fire. A demilitarized security zone was set out along the Inguri River on 
May 14, 1994.139 In the memorandum signed in May 1996, the parties committed themselves 
to the non-use of force in mutual relations and sought ways for a final settlement.140 However, 
these positive events did not alleviate the stalemate that the conflict has ended in due to the 
absence of a comprehensive solution.  
 
After the ceasefire agreement, South Ossetian front was rather stable with no major 
confrontation being detected. However, this relative stability lasted until the election of 
President Saakashvili, who, in words and in deeds declared the restoration of Georgia’s 
territorial integrity as being his supreme objective. He enforced some restrictive measures to 
the surreptitious and to Georgia’s perception, “illicit” trade and economic interactions of 
South Ossetians with Georgia, which was indispensable for sustaining life in this region. In 
addition, in 2004 under the slogans of “anti-smuggling campaign”, Georgia increased its 
forces in the region, which generated opposing reactions on the part of South Ossetians. In 
August 2004, disagreements exacerbated and led up to new tensions and causalities, which 
ended in conclusion of a new cease-fire agreement in the same year.141 
 
Frequent violations of cease-fire became usual and buttressed by the belligerent statements on 
Georgian part about returning South Ossetia to Georgia’s boundaries.142 In 2006 next 
referendum was held in South Ossetia to confirm its independence from Georgia, which was 
accompanied by a parallel voting among the ethnic Georgians of the South Ossetia, where 
pro-Georgian representative Sanakoyev was elected as a governor of South Ossetia and the 
outcome of the voting supported the territorial integrity of Georgia.143  
 
Having looked at the historic background of the two conflicts, a certain corollary could be 
inferred. Both conflicts have ethnicity and nationalism in their historical roots, and from the 
legal point of view, they are entrapped in the clash of the two principles of international law: 
territorial integrity and rights of peoples for self-determination. However, the difference 
between the two conflict lies in the fact that Abkhazians were more ardent in their desire to be 
independent from both states – Georgia and Russia, while in case of South Ossetians it was 
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not unambiguous whether they wanted to be independent or integrate with North Ossetian 
region of the Russian Federation. Moreover, as was noted above, before 2004, South 
Ossetians could freely travel to Georgia and interact with Georgians, which suggested that 
before the bloody events of August 2008, South Ossetians were more willing to reintegrate 
with Georgians than was the case with Abkhazians. And finally, while South Ossetians 
considered the possibility of joining their ethnic relatives in North Ossetia, Abkhazians did 
not have a willingness of merging with any member of their ethnic family, such as the 
Kabardins, Adyghe and Abazinians, which are within North Caucasus part of the Russian 
Federation.144 
 
In sum, having looked at the historical background of the conflicts within Georgian territory, 
their differences and similarities, in the next Section I will briefly sketch Russian role in 
Georgian conflicts and the events of August 2008, which have become a turning point in 
upsetting the delicate balance in conflict zone and changing the existing realities on the 
ground. 
 
2.3. Russian role145 in Georgian conflicts and August 2008 war 
 
Russian factor is an inalienable element of Georgia’s conflicts; therefore, it would not be fair 
to bypass this issue while describing the roots and causes of conflicts within Georgia. Georgia 
is assured that in reality it is confronting with its big neighbor – Russia, and not with its 
secessionist regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgians are convinced that as a 
continuation of conventional Russian “divide and rule” policy, Russia’s interests in 
buttressing Abkhazia and South Ossetia is mostly conditioned with its goal to seize Georgian 
territories and maintain its influence over its so-called “near abroad”.146 Indeed, Russian 
support for the breakaway regions has been instrumental, if not vital. 
 
Georgia blames Russia for rendering all kind of assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For 
instance, on July 17, 2006 Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution where it called on 
Georgian government to start procedures in order to suspend Russian peacekeeping operations 
                                                 
144 Paula Garb, “The view from Abkhazia of South Ossetia ablaze,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, (June 
2009, Routlage Foundation): 236. 
145 The role of Russia in the region has been depicted in the Chapter I. However, due to specific role of Russia in 
both –South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts this section is aimed to illustrate Russia’s role in the given 
context. 
146 “Abkhazia today,” 7. 
 
61 
 
in Abkhazia, since they were considered to be one of the main hindrances on the way of 
conflict resolution.147 Georgian president Saakashvili went even further in calling Russian 
peacekeeping presence in breakaway regions as a “gangster occupation” and noted that 
Georgian separatist regions are being annexed to north and Russian role is indispensable in 
making this happen.148 With Saakashvili assuming power, Georgia was adamant and 
outspoken on international fora in demanding the withdrawal of Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping forces from Abkhazia, which consisted only of 
Russian military forces. As a result, in December of 2007, Russia had closed its military bases 
in Akhalkalaki and Vaziani, while Russian base in Qudauta remained as a stumbling stone in 
Russian-Georgian relations, up until the events of August 2008, when relations entirely 
worsened. 
 
Both regions have strong economic interactions with Russia and basically, Russia encourages 
more political as well as economic contacts with the two regions. Russia’s presence in these 
regions is so great that – considerable numbers of Abkhazian and South Ossetian people even 
have Russian passports and thus, free access to Russian markets. They do not want to have 
Georgian citizenship and Georgia retorts issuing UN travel documents for them. About 80-90 
% of Abkhazian people and great majority of South Ossetian people hold Russian citizenship, 
which gives Russia a pretext to claim about its obligation to protect its citizens and thus, 
deeply interfere into Abkhazian and South Ossetian matters.149 Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
perceive Russia as their main partner in the fight for independence and separation from 
Georgia.  
 
Russian military forces played even bigger role in Abkhazian conflict, and with the assistance 
of Russian Defense Ministry Abkhazians felt more motivated and supported. Great numbers 
of former Soviet mercenaries and volunteers from Northern Caucasus within Russian territory 
helped Abkhazians with arms and weaponries acquired from Russian military. Russian 
military forces, which were protecting main transport and infrastructure objects in Abkhazia 
upon Georgia’s request, were intermittently also attacking Georgian forces. Encouraged by 
this dubious Russian policy, Abkhazians who are considerably less in numbers – 93,000 
Abkhazians against 3.8 million Georgians – were also embarking themselves on numerous 
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attacks against Georgian forces and thus even achieved to occupy the Abkhaz capital 
Sukhumi.150  
 
Georgia, being aware of potent Russian factor in its regions, occasionally negotiated with 
Russia over issues concerning the quality of life in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For example, 
in 1993-2000 Georgia and Russia made agreements on economic rehabilitation of the conflict 
zones in South Ossetia. However, mutual finger pointing did not circumvent this joint 
undertaking either. Russia accused Georgia for not fulfilling its responsibility under this 
agreement, while Georgia saw Russia’s dedicated efforts for economic contribution as a chip 
for getting Ossetia’s dependence. For this reason, Georgia was striving for internationalization 
of the aid for the regions.151  
 
Russia, on the contrary, assures that it is playing more of a stabilizing and pacifying role in 
the conflicts, and not an instigating and provocative role as Georgia claims. However, the 
deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had far deeper 
implications for Georgia than only the consolidation of “security and stability” as portrayed 
by Russia. With unaided eye one can conclude that the main purpose for Russia’s benevolent 
peacekeeping assistance was to serve its hegemonic ambitions to preserve its power over what 
it considered to be its zone of influence. Russia’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus and 
its desire for the world to recognize its leading role as the security provider in the former 
Soviet Union area overshadows its impartial and unequivocal security contributions to the 
lingering conflicts of the South Caucasus, especially the ones within Georgia.  
 
Therefore, Georgia does not see Russia as an unbiased interlocutor in South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian conflicts and occasionally, as was said before, made unsuccessful attempts to alter 
Russia’s status in and perhaps, even exclude it from peacekeeping operations and 
negotiations. Russian factor in Georgia’s conflicts is definitely bigger than what was depicted 
in the paragraphs above and will be highlighted more in relevant chapter, while describing the 
involved actors’ interests in details. However, this issue was important to be addressed in 
order to give a pre-history of intensive Russian involvement in the August 2008 war.   
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Events of August 2008 have left the world startled in fuzzy questions about the start of new 
war in the South Caucasus and its long-term implications for the overall security of the 
region. The ambiguous moment was the instigation of the war in South Ossetia, which among 
the two separatist regions was on relatively better terms with Georgia.152 This work will not 
go into the detailed description of the causes and consequences of this five day war, but will 
give some background to it in order to highlight the escalation of conflict situations within 
Georgia. 
 
The war started with a military offensive by Georgia on the night of August 7-8, 2008. South 
Ossetia blamed Georgia of attacking the separatist republic, while Georgia claimed that the 
offensive was started from the other side with massive shooting of Georgian villages. Georgia 
asserts that South Ossetian forces did not agree to Georgia’s ceasefire call, instead, they 
intensified shooting and attack, which made Georgia to send some more troops to South 
Ossetia and capture Tskhinvali and surrounding areas.153 On August 8, 2008, Russia launched 
a military offensive in response and gained control over Tskhinvali and considerable part of 
South Ossetia. Russia charges Georgia for committing genocide during its attack on South 
Ossetia, citing numbers of 2000 civilians killed and 34, 000 displaced.154 Russian side reports 
that 13 of its soldiers were killed and 70 were wounded.155  
 
Who is to blame for the initial launch of armed hostilities is a subject of ardent debate on both 
sides. Both - Georgia and Russia have some valid points for accusing each other and their 
argumentative and factual “wrestling” had been ongoing for considerable time even long after 
the war ended. During 2008-2009, Russian-Georgian debate over who had to bear the brunt of 
guilt for unleashing the August war became the most contested topic within international 
forums, especially in the OSCE, with both sides substantiating the legitimacy of their 
positions.156 Georgia claimed that its military involvement was prompted in response to the 
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provocations on the part of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, while Russia argued that 
Georgia launched an attack on South Ossetia, killed and wounded noticeable number of 
Russian peacekeeping personnel deployed in this region and caused unjustified humanitarian 
disaster and human tragedy. Russian arguments in favor of its military involvement in the 
conflict was built around the thesis that it was obliged to protect its citizens from ethnic 
cleansing and stop the forceful annexation of South Ossetia to Georgia.  
 
However, while recognizing that Russian response to Georgia’s military operation in South 
Ossetia was not proportionate – in terms of scale of military hostilities and the consequences, 
there is a little doubt in political discourse that Georgia bears core responsibility for offensive 
against South Ossetia that augmented into a devastating war. In pursuit of his declared 
objective to make the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity his main goal, Georgian 
President Saakashvli opted for what he saw to be the easiest solution – to repeat his success in 
Adjaria157 and thus solve the territorial issues within Georgia once and forever. However, 
Russian interference turned Georgian initial plan of retaking the secessionist regions by force 
against itself. Russian and Abkhazian action in the Upper Kodori Valley suppressed out the 
Georgian troops that were deployed there. Russia undermined Georgian command Centers 
Gori and Senaki and sank Georgian ships in Abkhazia’s coast, which considerably dwindled 
Georgia’s capacity to attack Abkhazia.158  
 
In the aftermath of the conflict, about 20,000 to 60,000 Ossetians and Abkhazians fled to 
Tbilisi and were living under harsh conditions. According to UN estimations, another 20,000 
have fled to Russia.159 At least 600 people were dead on both – Georgian and South Ossetian 
sides and some parts of Georgian territory became occupied by Russian military forces. 
Georgia lost the territories in Upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, Akhalgori district in South 
Ossetia and other Georgian villages in South Ossetia-such as Liakhvi Gorge in proximity of 
Tskhinvali, which was under Georgian control before the conflict broke out.160 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cooperation (FSC 555 - 557 (September 10, 17, 24, 2008, respectively), Special FSC-PC joint meetings 33-35 
(September/October, 2008)),etc. from OSCE delegations website (http://www.delweb.osce.org) 
157 In 2004, Georgian leader Saakashvili managed to oust Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze, who refused to obey 
Georgian authorities, and thus solved Adjarian problem, which was increasingly becoming another separatist 
entity within Georgia. 
158 George Hewitt, “Abkhazia, Georgia, and the crisis of August 2008: roots and lessons,” Global Dialogue, Vol. 
11, (Winter 2009):20  
159 “South Ossetia: the playfield of Russia-or Georgia?” New Statesman, (November 2008), online, from 
EbscoHost Academic Research. 
160 Jonathan Wheatley, 129. 
 
65 
 
Russia stationed considerable number of troops in both breakaway republics and recognized 
their independence. The most lamentable consequence for Georgia - now many seem to 
tacitly acknowledge – is that both former autonomous regions, at present independent 
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are unlikely to be integral parts of Georgia again. 
Apart the problems caused by the large number of causalities and displaced persons, the war 
has augmented anti-Georgian sentiments in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which buttresses the 
assumption that these two regions seems to never henceforth consider the possibility of 
reintegrating with Georgia again.  
 
On August 25, 2008 Russia’s Federation Council and the Duma recommended the Russian 
president to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On August 26, 
Russian President Medvedyev responded positively and thus, Russia has recognized the 
independence of two Georgian secessionist regions. On September 17, 2008 Russia concluded 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance agreements with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.161 Those agreements imply that Russia will hence assist those republics in protecting 
their borders and entitles Moscow to station its military bases on those territories and double 
the number of soldiers up to 7600.162 Later, the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
was recognized by more states – Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. 
 
There are some important lessons that August war vividly displayed. The most conspicuous of 
them was that irrespective of West’s growing role in the South Caucasus region, Russia still 
cannot be ignored when it comes to changing or correcting any realities in the South Caucasus 
region. Also, the five day war had shown that Russia was absolutely serious about what it 
considers to be its “zone of influence” and that it was ready to speak from the position of 
force in order to preserve its interests and achieve its objectives. For West, however, it was a 
litmus test in highlighting its unreadiness to confront Russia for assisting its ally – Georgia. 
This had brought to a necessity for the West to rethink over its relations with Russia, as well 
as undertake a different strategy towards the region of South Caucasus, especially Georgia, 
which became largely disenchanted over its failure to Russia, in the absence of support by 
those whom it considered to be its allies. 
 
                                                 
161 Jim Nicol, “Russia-Georgia conflict in South Ossetia: context and implications for US interests,” CRS Report 
for Congress, (Congressional Research Service, Updated September 22, 2008): 9.  
162 Nona Mikhelidze, “After the 2008 Russia-Georgia war: implications for the wider Caucasus and prospects for 
Western involvement in conflict resolution,” Background paper of the conference on the Caucasus and Black 
Sea region: European Neighborhood Policy and beyond, (Rome, 6-7 February, 2009): 6. 
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Russia’s extreme position on supporting is actions in August 2008 crisis was also manifested 
later on when she blocked the extension of the mandates of the OSCE and UN Offices in 
Georgia, demanding for the recognition of the new realities on the ground and establishing the 
same representations for the “newly independent republics” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
This gave enough food for thought for the international community, especially the West, that 
toughness in Russia’s stance on the issues concerning its immediate neighborhood was neither 
ostentatious, nor temporary. Instead, it appeared to be rather continuous and persisting. 
 
As seen from the historical background provided by the Section II, there is a different history 
behind each of the so-called “frozen conflicts” in the South Caucasus region, as well as their 
interpretations. For the purposes of objectivity, I tried to highlight ambivalent narratives of the 
history by the conflicting parties. Despite of the differences amongst the conflict cases, there 
is however, one common feature for all three conflicts – all of them are complicated by the 
clash of two principles of international law – territorial integrity of states and right of self-
determination of peoples. This legal dichotomy makes all three conflicts more intractable, 
combustible and a subject for manipulation and jousting with legal argumentation over who 
has the upper right for the control of certain territory. In closer scrutiny though, territoriality 
seems to be the deepest underlying cause of all three conflicts. This permanent clash between 
the two principles affect the nature of all three conflicts, thus, making legalistic discourse over 
the superiority of one or the other principle inevitable. This issue will be focused on more in 
the relevant Chapter, while describing the nature of the said conflicts.   
 
3. Summing up 
 
Section II of the Chapter attempted to provide a historical overview to the long-standing 
conflicts in the South Caucasus region; conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh region, and conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia within Georgia. This 
section is imperative for understanding the roots and causes of the festering security problems 
of the region as well as their complexity, which necessitated international involvement for 
finding a panacea. In the next chapter I will introduce the theoretical frameworks of the 
dissertation and focus on the assumptions of regime theory, theoretical approaches to 
international mediation and theoretical approaches to the study of European integration – 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. 
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This Chapter will be devoted to the exploration of the assumptions of the theoretical 
framework of the current work. As was noted, the effectiveness of the UN, the CIS and the 
OSCE will be analyzed from the prisms of the first two hypotheses of the regime theory – 
interests of powerful actors and problem solving capacity of the organizations. As was noted 
before, in the case of the OSCE Minsk Group, however, the two regime theory hypotheses 
will explain its effectiveness/success partially. It will mostly help to explain the internal 
dynamics within the Minsk Group. Minsk Group effectiveness/success, therefore, will be 
further explained through theoretical approaches to international mediation.  
 
In explaining the EU approach to facilitation of conflict resolution, nonetheless, the 
mentioned two hypotheses of the regime theory cannot be applied, since the regime theory 
gets entrapped when applied to the model of EU integration. Therefore, the assumptions of 
other theoretical approaches – more specifically, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism 
– will be endorsed in exploration of EU role in and policy towards the conflict resolution in 
the South Caucasus region.  
 
However, the main framework of the analysis is still chosen to be regime theory and its 
“effectiveness” concept and the three hypotheses of the work are formulated based on this 
theoretical framework. What concerns the third hypothesis [nature of the problem, which is 
developed through the prisms of regime theory, it would describe the general nature of 
conflict situations in South Caucasus as an impediment to the effectiveness of international 
institutions and will be applicable to all four organizations, due to the fact that it is an 
independent and external factor that does not depend on the internal dynamics o any 
institution.  
 
1. Regime theory framework 
 
At the onset, I will start with regime theory assumptions. The following hypotheses of the 
regime theory are to be tested in the dissertation: 
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1. Actors’ interests: Interests and preferences of the concerned powerful states influence the 
effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE and the CIS to facilitate the achievement of a final solution 
to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics.  
 
2. Problem solving capacity: Problem solving capacity of the organizations influence the 
effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE and the CIS to facilitate the achievement of a final 
settlement to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics.  
 
3. Nature of the problem (Problem structure):  Characteristics of the given conflicts 
influence the effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE, the CIS and the EU to facilitate the 
achievement of a final solution to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics. 
 
As it was illuminated above, the effectiveness of the three institutions – the UN, the CIS and 
the OSCE are to be evaluated through the first [actors’ interests] and the second [decision 
making capacity] hypotheses that are developed using the assumptions of the “effectiveness” 
concept of the regime theory. Although the EU role is not to be analyzed through regime 
theory, the third regime theory hypothesis [nature of the problem] could be applicable to the 
EU.  
 
For the purposes of clarity, it should be reiterated that regime theory as such will not be the 
target of broad description and merely its assumptions concerning the evaluation of 
effectiveness of institutions will be employed.  
 
It has become habitual that in scholarly literature, regime theory was mostly researched and 
applied to international environmental regimes. Especially when it comes to the concept of 
“regime effectiveness”, the empirical test of the theory has predominantly lied within 
environmental regimes. Nonetheless, study and research on the effectiveness of non-
environmental regimes from the perspective of the regime theory also seems to gain attention 
in the academic discourse, although written contributions in this realm is still lacking. As it 
was stressed before, this work is one of the modest attempts to fill this gap. For evaluating the 
role and effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE, the CIS in South Caucasus conflict resolution, I 
will incorporate the concept of “effectiveness” of the regime theory.  
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Before doing that, however, let me briefly describe what regimes are and whether  regime 
theory could indeed be utilized for evaluating the effectiveness of the four institutions. To 
start with, it should be noted that regime theory suggests that “international institutions are 
relatively homogenous with regard to the functions or tasks they are created to perform”.163 
Regimes are created when certain group of state actors come together in order to improve a 
collective-action problems. Regimes therefore, are described as “sets of rules or behavioral 
descriptions designed to allow interdependent actors to avoid joint losses or to reap joint 
gains”.164 Regimes often attain organizational capacity as they progress over the time.165 
Regimes are defined to be sets of principles, rules and decision making procedures on which 
actors’ interests coincide on specific issue areas of international relations.166  
 
Some theorists distinguish between the regimes and the organizations to suggest that 
international organizations focus on “structural or institutional arrangements” and 
international regimes on “the norms and principles laid down by these organizations”.167 
Others emphasize that international organizations are in fact parts of the regimes and 
therefore, international organizations and international regimes are “coterminous in that of 
what they do is to monitor, manage and modify the operation of regimes”.168 
 
It is asserted that international regimes are international institutions and therefore, should be 
explored as such, and in many situations regimes will serve as basis for creation of an 
organization, which would buttress the regime in different ways. Although both regimes and 
international organizations are considered to be types of international institution, the most 
outstanding difference between the regimes and organizations is stated to be the fact that 
regimes as sets of principles rules and procedures lack the capacity to act, while organizations 
are able to do it. However, it is also suggested that some functions of a regime can only be 
performed if there is an organizational structure inserted in it.169 
 
Departing from the premise of the above suppositions, it could be suggested that the work of 
the UN, the OSCE and the CIS as organizations could be analyzed from the perspective of a 
regime theory as they all operate on a specific issue area and have formal rules and 
                                                 
163 Oran Young, Governance in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, (London 1999): 24 
164 Ibid.25. 
165 Ibid.7. 
166 Dimitrius N. Chryssochoou, 39. 
167 Ibid.38. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Andreas Hasenclever et al, Theories of international regimes, (Cambridge University Press, 1997):10-11. 
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procedures. Although there are some perceived differences between the organizations and 
regimes, no one excludes the fact that there are also many commonalities between the regimes 
and organizations, since they are both qualified as international institutions. Therefore, regime 
theory could be applicable to our research. 
 
What concerns the case of the European Union, it is thought that regime theory might not be 
very successful in application to this sui generis entity. The EU is considered to be a too split 
system of state and policy interrelations which disqualifies it as an international regime as 
such. Instead, it should be treated in a different way due to the particular cooperation patterns 
in number of issue areas. The “flexibility clause” of the various EU acquis strengthens this 
suggestion. Therefore, the EU is to be regarded as an aggregate of partial regimes entailing 
multiple behavioral norms, rules and procedures.170 
 
Against this backdrop, it appears complicated for the regime theory to explain the role of, for 
instance, national elites and decision making rules to come to grips with the levels of 
integration. It fails to elucidate pace and the nature of relations stemming from integration and 
the overall impact of the specifically structured system [treaties as cores, mutual vetoes, etc.] 
on the formation of different levels of integration at given times. Regime theory, therefore, 
gets entrapped in a scattered framework of interactions within the EU community and fails to 
explain the impact of EU legislation on national behavior of EU member states and other 
relevant phenomena pertaining to EU governance and decision making.171 Therefore, the first 
and the second regime theory hypotheses will not be applied to the analysis of EU 
effectiveness.172 Instead, the assumptions of intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist 
approaches will be refereed to in order to analyze the relevant aspects of EU policy towards 
the conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region.  
 
Returning to the analytical framework of regime theory and the “effectiveness” concept which 
will be employed, I should state that for current research purposes, I will use three main 
determinants that are often cited in academic literature to be influencing regime effectiveness: 
1 – actors’ interests; 2 – problem solving capacity; 3 – nature of problem/problem structure. 
Of course, those are not the only determinants that account for regime effectiveness and 
                                                 
170 Dimitrius N. Chryssochoou, 41. 
171 Ibid. 
172 It should be reiterated that the third regime theory hypothesis, nonetheless, could also be applied to the EU, 
because it concerns the independent and external factor [nature of problem] that is not contingent upon the 
internal dynamics of the organizations.  
 
71 
 
different scholars on the field have attempted to analyze divergent factors that are 
instrumental in evaluation of regime effectiveness. However, despite of the fact that some 
more determinants are considered to be accounting for regime effectiveness, and this list is 
not really exhaustive, those three determinants that are chosen by the author are the most 
common and fundamental ones that are present in the works of the most academicians who 
explore the theory of regime.173 Those three determinants also seem to be able to 
appropriately cover the phenomenon to be analyzed in the current work,174 and therefore, 
constitute the main analytical tool in this context.  
 
Regime theory presupposes that the regime effectiveness is a “measure of the extent to which 
these arrangements (e.g. regime) succeed in solving the problems that lead to their 
formation”.175 In different terms, effectiveness is defined as a degree to which a certain 
regime “eliminates or alleviates the problem that prompts their creation”.176 However, the 
above definition is rather narrow and limits the concept of effectiveness to the achievement of 
concrete results.  
 
Theorists also define effectiveness in less demanding terms and characterize it as the 
“contributions that institutions make to solving the problems that motivate actors to invest the 
time and energy needed to create them”. A regime that changes the behaviors in such a 
manner as to solve or greatly alleviate the problem that generated its creation is to be 
considered as a successful regime.177  
                                                 
173 For example, Oran Young defined six determinants of regime effectiveness which he has proposed in his 
study of the environmental regimes in 1994: 1) problem solving 2) goal attainment, 3) behavioral, 4) process, 5) 
constitutive and 6) evaluative. (Oran Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a 
Stateless Society, in Peter J. Katezenstein (ed), Cornell Studies in Political Economy, (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1994): 140-160). Moreover, in his further work, he had described five determinants of 
the regime effectiveness: 1) broader setting 2) regime attributes 3) institutional linkages 4) social practices, and 
5) problem structure. (Oran Young, Governance in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, (London 1999 a): 
117-124). In his work of 1999 “Regime effectiveness: taking stock” (in The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental regimes: casual connections and behavioral mechanisms) Young further specifies the 
determinants of effectiveness by indicating 1) behavioral effects: 2) rational utility maximizing (unitary and 
complex actors); 3) coercing compliance; 4) enmeshing states; 5) shaping expectations; 6) problem structure; 7) 
members and subjects – other non-state actors. In the work of joint authors – Edwards L. Miles, Arid Underdal et 
al., the authors specify two main determinants of effectiveness – problem structure and problem solving 
capacity, and included actors’ interests into the problem solving capacity element. (Edwards L. Miles, Arid 
Underdal et al., Environmental regime effectiveness: Confronting theory with evidence, The MIT Press, 
Massachusetts, USA, 2002).   
174 With some exceptions – the first and the second regime theory hypotheses explain Minsk Group effectiveness 
partially [only the internal dynamics] and are not applicable to the EU. The third hypothesis is applicable to all 
cases. 
175 Oran Young, Governance in world affairs, Cornell University Press (Ithaca and London, 1999): 109. 
176 Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1999):4. 
177 Ibid.,1-3. 
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According to this view, there should be decision making, legal, economic, normative and 
political approaches to effectiveness. Decision making approach is quite straightforward and 
as was shown above, also quite narrow and identifies regime effectiveness as extent to which 
the regime is successful in solving the given problem. Legal approach defines effectiveness in 
terms of degree of compliance with rules, procedures and obligations, without giving enough 
attention to regime achievements, though. Economics assess effectiveness not only by the 
attained outcome, but also by the calculations if the outcome was reached at the lowest 
possible cost. They view the thrifty arrangements as being the more effective. Normative 
approach to effectiveness conceptualizes it from the prisms of normative principles, like 
justice, participation, etc. However, this interpretation has not been as popular as an analytical 
tool.178 
 
Last, but not least, political approach to effectiveness evaluates the given phenomenon in 
relatively broader sense and suggests that regime is effective if it brings to the altered 
behaviors and interests of actors, or the policies of the organizations in such a way that this 
also assists in the solution of the existing problem. This approach also does consider problem 
solving, compliance and normative aspects of effectiveness, however, it puts emphasis on 
behavioral changes and their positive impact on achievement of positive outcome. In more 
concrete terms, effectiveness in political sense implies stimulating certain activity towards the 
attainment of the pursued objectives. It suggests that the actions that direct the system in the 
preferred direction should be seen as signs of effectiveness. Effectiveness in political sense is 
connected to the notion of effectiveness in decision making sense, so that the regimes that are 
effective in political terms also become effective in terms of decision making.179  
 
When it comes to legal or economic effectiveness, political effectiveness does not employ 
them, since a politically effective regime could be economically inefficient or have low level 
of compliance with the norms. Therefore, political effectiveness focuses on behavioral 
influences of regimes and through them, the inputs of the international institutions to problem 
solving. It is argued that a regime that changes behavior in a way as to solve or improve the 
problem that necessitated their creation is to be considered as an effective regime. On the 
contrary, a regime that has achieved marginal behavioral change is an ineffective regime.180 
 
                                                 
178 Ibid., 5-6. 
179 Ibid.,6. 
180 Ibid.,1-6. 
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My analysis will mostly avail of the suppositions of decision making and political 
effectiveness, since they posses the relevant tools for appraising the effectiveness of the 
researched institutions – the UN, the OSCE and the CIS in the chosen issue area. Normative, 
legal and economic interpretations do not seem to present suitable framework in this regard.  
 
While evaluating the regime effectiveness, some scholars also propose to be less demanding 
and introduce the concept of “relative improvement”, which is thought to estimate to what 
extent the regime has actually made difference in the solution of the given problem and came 
closer to the solution of the problem. There is also a measurement of regime performance 
against the hypothetical ideal solution – a collective optimum181 which indicates to what 
extent a given collective problem is resolved by the regime. Hypothetical measurements does 
not end in there and according to it, it is also useful to evaluate the hypothetical state of affairs 
if regime did not exist at all (the noncooperative situation).182 
 
Another important evaluation of effectiveness is its measurement in terms of behavioral or 
functional effectiveness.183 It is established that most regimes that make a positive change in a 
given problem, in fact fail to provide functionally optimal solutions and therefore, the two 
standards are proposed to be distinguished from each-other. Most regimes are estimated to do 
well on attaining behavioral effectiveness, rather than achieving functional effectiveness.184 
 
1.1. Actors’ interests (concerned powerful actors).  
 
The first hypothesis as described above in the section, will explain the research question from 
the prisms of actors’ interests determinant of effectiveness. Regime theory presupposes that 
regimes are influenced by environment and factors that surround them, inasmuch as they do 
not exist detached from socio-economic determinants. Their capacity to solve given problems 
                                                 
181 Thought to be a common (defined as satisfying or maximizing) achievement based on the accommodated 
interests of the parties. Emphasis is mine. 
182 Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” in Edwards L. Miles, Arid Underdal et al. (eds.),  
Environmental regime effectiveness: Confronting theory with evidence, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA, 
2002):8-9. Emphasis is mine. 
183 Emphasis is mine. 
184 Behavioral effectiveness is defined as a behavioral change of the actors due to regime’s performance and 
functional effectiveness as a real outcome attained by the regime. (Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 
435.) 
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is also effected by the external factors, the existence of tensions among the key players being 
also in the list.185   
 
Furthermore, power seems to be a decisive element in addressing malign problems and 
coercion based solutions could bring to and even surpass technically optimal solutions. 
Institutional capacity of the given organization is more result oriented when the power is 
amassed in the hands of pushers [author: for solution], than the opposite. When the capacity 
of the institution is low, power is more important in leading to behavioral change, and when 
the capacity is high, power is good at bringing to functional effectiveness. Against this 
backdrop it is argued that institutions are more dependent on powerful actors that the other 
way around.186 
 
Power of a given actor embodies it with the capacity to impose its will on others disregarding 
what the wish of others. In this context two categories are distinguished: benevolent and a 
coercive hegemony.187 A benevolent hegemon is the actor that is able and willing to extent 
collective benefits at its own expense, while coercive hegemon is the actor that influences the 
events that are important to others due to its control and makes the others to subdue to its 
control. The likelihood that a certain course of action or a decision will be taken and 
implemented is dependent on the extent to which it is perceived to serve the interests of 
powerful actors.188 A powerful actor may be able to change the particular positions of other 
players by means of different strategies – such as persuasion, manipulation, coercion, or by 
surreptitious interferences into “foreign games of domestic politics”. 189   
 
1.2. Problem solving capacity.  
 
Some theorists suggest that certain problems are so difficult that procedural regimes cannot 
address them effectively in an international society, with the exception of solving some trivial 
concerns.190 Problem solving capacity is regarded as one of the key determinants of regime 
effectiveness. It is maintained that some problems are resolved more effectively than others 
                                                 
185 Oran Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, in Peter J. 
Katezenstein (ed), Cornell Studies in Political Economy, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994): 
123. 
186 Arid Underdal, “Conclusions,” Edwards L. Miles, Arid Underdal et al. (eds.), Environmental regime 
effectiveness: Confronting theory with evidence, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA, 2002): 450. 
187 Emphasis original. 
188 Emphasis original.  Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 29-30. 
189 Ibid.,34. 
190 Oran Young, Governance in world affairs, 43. 
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due to the fact that they are tackled by more potent institutions and because greater efforts are 
directed to their solution. By making this argument, it is established by some authors that the 
problem solving capacity is defined by three determinants: 1) the institutional setting or the 
rule of the game; 2) the distribution of power among the actors involved; 3) efforts directed to 
achievement of cooperative solutions.191 Although the linkage between the actors’ interests 
within certain institutions and their impact on the decision making capacity of the 
organizations is also generally acknowledged in the given work, nonetheless, actors’ interests 
and their effect on the performance of the institutions will be considered as a separate 
hypothesis in the current thesis, for the purposes of clarity and owing to the potency of the 
powerful actors’ influence.  
 
Decision making rule is considered to be one of the significant factors in the capacity of the 
organization to accommodate differing positions. Consensus decision making is more 
widespread in international organizations, but some organizations also have some provisions 
for taking decisions by majority (or qualified majority) voting on important issues. Other 
conditions taken as equal, it is generally conceived that in the organizations with stronger 
hierarchy the capacity to accommodate differing positions is higher than in the structures, 
which operate on unanimity rule. Departing from this premise, it is established that decision 
rule and procedures are the most important factors accounting for the institutional capacity of 
the organization to combine different actors’ preferences into relevant decisions.192  
 
After unanimity rule, consensus decision making is considered to be the most challenging rule 
in terms of achievement of concrete results. The requirement of inclusiveness,193 which 
implies that in order for a certain decision to be implemented all members must participate, 
brings to the “law of the least ambitious program”, or the minimum threshold which could be 
accepted by the most disinterested party. Since the consensus decision making rule gives 
every participating actor a right to veto unfavorable or uninteresting decisions, this rule is 
considered to be a chief limiting factor for achieving international cooperation and adoption 
of effective solutions. 194 It is argued that number of international regimes turn to weighted 
majority rule in order to take significant decisions.195 Use of majority voting is considered to 
lead to the achievement of more outstanding outcomes. However, since the majority voting 
                                                 
191 Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 23. 
192 Ibid., 24. 
193 Emphasis original. 
194 Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 26. 
195 Oran Young, Governance in world affairs, 43. 
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decisions are taken by largely disregarding the interests of other players, the compliance 
towards the implementation of the adopted decisions will be undermined.196    
 
It is theorized that if the system has greater decision making capacity, it has more chances to 
bring to successful outcome. Nonetheless, even high decision making capacity might not be 
enough for solving deeply malign problems, while benign problems could be addressed even 
with moderate problems solving capacity.197 The mixture of a badly perceived malign 
problem with the institution that has low problem –solving capacity is expected to bring to 
less effective results.198 Even the effectiveness of the institutions with strong problem solving 
capacity is often dwindled when they are encountered with malign problem coupled with 
uncertainty about their nature. The chances for success of a certain regime are higher when 
the system with high decision making capacity tackles the benign problem that is well 
understood.199  
 
According to regime theorists, all organizations can be arenas, but only little number of 
organizations could also be characterized as actors200 in their own rights. In order to be an 
actor, the organization must possess a minimum of an internal coherence (unity), autonomy, 
resources and external activity. In the absence of a necessary minimum of coherence an 
organization cannot be taken as a unitary actor. Without certain minimum of autonomy (vis a 
vis its members) the organization will be manipulated by its members. Without a certain 
minimum of activity in its environment and possession of some resources, actors’ capacity of 
the organization will be diminished. Possession of actor capacity increases the regime 
effectiveness and its effect in this context, ceteris paribus is greater in addressing malign 
problems than benign problems.201  
 
1.3. Nature of the problem (problem structure) 
 
The third hypothesis of this work will be developed around nature of problem (problem 
structure) determinant of regime effectiveness. Regime theory suggests that problem structure 
the regime is dealing with impacts its effectiveness. According to regime theory, some 
                                                 
196 Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 26. 
197 Ibid., 64. 
198 Ibid., 309. 
199 Edwards L. Miles, Arid Underdal et al. (eds.),  Environmental regime effectiveness: Confronting theory with 
evidence, 443-444. 
200 Emphasis mine. 
201 Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 27. 
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problems on international stage are much more difficult to be solved than others and 
therefore, problem structure is a significant factor influencing the effectiveness of 
international regimes.202 Mainstream approaches to the problem regime is dealing with 
explain the problem structure from different angles. For example, Tübingen approach, 
identifies the following types of conflicts: conflict about means, conflict about values and 
conflict about interests. In conflict about means the parties have a common objective, but are 
at dissonance on how achieve it. In conflict about values strong and incongruent views of the 
actors about the validity and plausibility of given action or a practice is the main culprit. And 
last, but not least, in conflict about interests, the actors clash over the same commodity which 
is in deficiency.203 According to this approach, among the three types of conflicts serious 
value conflicts are harder to solve and labeled as “intractable”.204 
 
Another approach, called the Oslo/Seattle approach to problem structure is more 
parsimonious and classifies the given phenomenon as being “malign” or “benign” according 
to the degree of their solvability.205 The coordination problem which generates no conflict of 
interest among the involved actors is seen as being benign problem. Malign problem is the 
ones which involve “multiple equilibrium” and the actors have cross cutting opinions and 
preferences with regard to this equilibrium. In the light of this approach’s assumptions, 
problem malignancy increase with the decrease of the parties incentives to achieve and uphold 
the cooperative solutions and the gear to maximize their unilateral benefits though 
uncooperative actions.206  
 
It is established that the regimes dealing with malign problems could be effective only when 
the following factors are present: 1 – selective incentives for cooperation; 2- linkages for 
more benign issues and 3 – a system with high decision making capacity. When none of these 
factors are present, then the success rate of a given organization is equal to naught. However, 
when at least two of the mentioned elements are present, then the chances for success get 
higher.207 
                                                 
202 Oran Young, Governance in world affairs, pp. 77 and 117. 
203 Andreas Hasenclever et al, 62-64. Emphasizes are original.  
204 Oran Young, Governance in world affairs, 55. 
205 Arild Underdal (Department of Political Science, University of Oslo) and Edward L. Miles (School of Marine 
Affairs, University of Washington), “Explaining Regime Effectiveness: Combining “Soft” and “Hard” 
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When a given institution deals with a malign and poorly understood problem, then the 
effectiveness rate tend to ebb further. The mixture of a problem malignancy with a degree of 
uncertainty over the actual nature of the problem is a strong hurdle on the way of obtaining 
functional effectiveness. Therefore, for malign problems the vagueness in the perception of 
the issue tends to further complicate the attainment of effectiveness.208  
 
Some regime theorists also argue that problem malignancy is caused and incremented by the 
divergences in actors’ interests and preferences. The closer the interests are to one common 
denominator, more benign the problem becomes and vise versa – the farther the preferences 
get apart, more malign the problem turns out to be.209  
 
Malign problems demand more intensive level of cooperation and relevant arrangements, plus 
more focus on monitoring and enforcement.210 Malign problems are also characterized as an 
interaction of incongruity, asymmetry and cumulative cleavages. Problems of incongruity are 
described to be the problems where cost-benefit calculations of a given actor are continuously 
being partial for either the costs or the benefits of a certain course of action. Asymmetry 
characterizes the problem in which the involved parties are grouped (or perceive themselves 
to be) in such a way that their interests and values are fundamentally different. In dealing with 
multidimensional problems when parties feel themselves to be in the same condition in all 
dimensions, i.e. -  winners (or losers) in one dimension will also win (or lose) in other 
dimensions – cumulative cleavages come to the fore. 211 
 
Judging from specter of the “effectiveness” concept of the regime theory, I will try to appraise 
the impact of the immediate nature of the conflicts in the South Caucasus on the effectiveness 
of the discussed four organizations. Below follows a description of theoretical approaches to 
international mediation, which will be utilized while evaluating the OSCE Minsk Group 
effectiveness.  
 
2. Theoretical approaches to international mediation  
 
Beyond the suppositions of the regime theory, which is the principal skeleton of the analysis, 
while examining the effectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group I will resort to mediation 
                                                 
208 Ibid., 456-457. 
209 Oran Young, Governance in world affairs, 58. 
210 Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 14-15. 
211 Emphasizes are mine. (See: Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 19-20.) 
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theories. More specifically, in the course of evaluation of effectiveness of the OSCE Minsk 
Group, I will benefit from the analytical framework that was developed by Jacob Bertcovitch 
and Allison Houston in their work “The study of international mediation: theoretical issues 
and empirical evidence”, 212 and apply the ideas therein to my analysis wherever appropriate.  
 
Theoretical approaches to international mediation which are to be employed in order to 
explain the OSCE Minsk Group effectiveness suppose that the effectiveness of the OSCE 
Minsk Group is contingent upon the following factors: 1) previous relations between the 
conflicting parties; 2) nature of problem; 3) mediation strategies; 4) impartiality/or perceived 
bias of the mediators.  
 
The reason why I chose the mentioned work by the authors is mainly due to the fact that the 
authors have laid out quite a comprehensive approach to the analyses of the success of the 
mediation by considering variety of relevant factors. In their work the authors define 
meditation as being successful when it has made a considerable and positive difference to 
conflict resolution and interaction between the parties. Mediation is considered to be partly 
successful when it has initiated dialogue and negotiations between the conflicting states and it 
is deemed to be of limited success when it has achieved a cease-fire.213 
 
The authors enumerate several factors that influence the success of mediation. For the 
purpose of my analysis I will focus on the most relevant ones in this context: characteristics 
of the parties (previous relations between the conflicting parties), 214 nature of the conflict and 
the strategies of mediation. Other elements, such as the nature of the mediator, mediation 
environment will not be discussed, since, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, they 
have less impact on the outcome of the negotiations compared to the elements above, which 
constitute the core, in this context. Firstly, according to the authors, the previous relations 
between the conflicting parties matter in defining the success of mediation. If the previous 
relations between the warring sides were friendly, then there are more chances for the 
mediation to be successful than in the case if the parties had a troubled past.215  
                                                 
212 Jacob Bertcovitch and Allison Houston, “The study of international mediation: theoretical issues and 
empirical evidence,” in Jacob Bertcovitch (ed.) Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of 
Mediation, (USA, Lynne Rienner Publishers, inc.1996). 
213 Ibid.,19 
214 In “Characteristics of the conflict” I will focus only on the previous relations between the conflicting parties, 
leaving aside parties’ political context and parties’ power, since they will require more in depth analyses, which 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
215 Ibid.,22 
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Secondly, the nature of the dispute is defined by the authors as one of the important factors 
impacting the outcome of the mediation. According to the authors, when vital interests such 
as sovereignty and territorial integrity are affected, it is much more difficult for the mediators 
to succeed. Ideology disputes, disputes over the issues of resources and ethnicity have greater 
possibility to be resolved through successful mediation than security and sovereignty 
disputes. It is argued that the “the success or the failure of mediation is largely determined by 
the nature of the dispute”. The nature of problems and their perception have significant 
impact on chances of achieving effective or ineffective results.216 
 
Finally, the third element is the strategies of mediation. According to the authors, there are 
three main strategies that lead the mediation behavior: communication-facilitation strategies, 
procedural strategies and directive strategies. In communication-facilitation strategies 
mediators mainly execute the function of communication between the parties with a little 
control over the substance of the issues. In procedural strategies mediators have a more 
formal control and may define the technical factors such as mediation environment, number 
and type of meetings, agenda of the meetings, etc.. Directive strategies though, are more 
advanced in a sense that the mediators influence the content, substance as well as the process 
of the mediation. In directive strategies mediators provide incentives, issue ultimatums, offer 
rewards and punishments, and introduce new proposals. It is argued that the directive 
strategies are the most successful among others.217   
 
As was noted above, mediation theories do not constitute the main framework for analysis, 
however, the author decided to interject the presuppositions of the mediation theories to the 
course of analysis as well in order to have a comprehensive picture of the process of 
mediation by the OSCE Minsk Group in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At some 
relevant occasions [nature of problem] assumptions of mediation theories will be employed in 
conjunction with regime theory suppositions.  
 
3. Theoretical approaches to explaining the EU role 
 
In an attempt to explain the EU approach to the conflict resolution in South Caucasus region, 
this work will refer to the relevant assumptions of two theoretical approaches to the study of 
the European integration - intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, which will be used to 
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in explaining different aspects of EU stance towards conflict resolution in the region and 
overall EU approach to the region.218 Without going into too much detail on the formation, 
nature and the critiques of each approach, in the following paragraphs I will focus on the 
relevant assumptions that might be useful in analyzing the EU policy towards the conflict 
resolution in South Caucasus.  
 
Intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist approaches to the study of European integration 
will explain the EU involvement in the South Caucasus region and its role in facilitating 
conflict resolution in the following way: 1) distant EU approach towards conflict resolution 
and its indirect role in facilitating conflict resolution is due to the lack of interest on the part 
of EU members states to dedicate attention to the region [intergovernmentalist assumption]; 
2) subsequent increase of the EU profile in the region after August 2008 events was due to the 
initiative and a leading role of the EU member state [intergovernmentalist assumption] 3) 
EU’s emphasis on the necessity of regional cooperation on practical issues [economy, border 
issues] and its belief that favorable grounds for conflict resolution are created though 
economic assistance and stabilization aid instead of a direct involvement in the mediation of 
the conflicts is generated by the EU conviction that cooperation/achievement on more 
practical issues [like economics] will lead to expansion of cooperation on issues of high 
politics, which subsequently will bring to the attainment of peace in the relevant conflict cases 
[neofunctionalist assumption].  
 
3.1. Intergovernmentalism 
 
According to the assumptions of intergovernmentalist approach, states cooperate amongst 
themselves on the issues of common interest and in doing so, they retain degree of control 
over the extent of such a cooperation, which enables them to step back whenever they feel 
that their national sovereignty is compromised.219 From the perspective of European 
integration, intergovernmentalism explains the dynamics and the nature of the integration 
process from prisms of decisions and policies adopted by the respective EU member states. 
The focus of intergovernmentalist approach is mainly on the states and their national 
interests, which they assiduously defend, especially in specific highly political issue areas 
                                                 
218 It should nonetheless be noted that the application of integration theories to the EU policy towards conflict 
resolution in South Caucasus is conditional and different from the EU case. In application to South Caucasus 
word “integration” is to be interpreted as “cooperation”. 
219 Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, (Duke University Press, 2006): 558. 
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such as foreign policy, security and defense. Intergovernmentalists do accept that other actors 
within and outside the states can also have certain impact on issues, but they are not as potent 
as the influence exerted by states.220 
 
In the EU context, the most important expressions of intergovernmentalism are the following: 
- in majority areas of public policy, such as foreign affairs, defense, fiscal policy, education, 
health, social welfare, justice and home affairs decisions members states try to keep their 
national authority for certain decision to be taken; - almost all major decisions and policy 
priorities of the EU are adopted within the European Council, which is composed of the most 
high-level senior representatives of the respective national governments. European Council 
refers to majority voting on rare occasions, and all the significant decisions in the field of EU 
legislation have to be approved by the ministers in the Council of Ministers, including those 
relating to constitutional and fiscal issues, which require unanimity voting.221 
 
Whenever the qualified majority voting is possible, however, if any member state expresses 
that it has national security concerns, efforts are directed to reach a consensus on the given 
issue; - the supranational222 EU structures - Commission and the European Parliament are not 
able to impose any decisions or policies on respective member states, if they are unwilling to 
accept so.223 Although Lisbon Treaty reforms were expected to strengthen EU’s 
supranational nature, still, planned institutional reforms cannot address or fully eliminate 
divergences of national interests of EU member states. 
 
According to the theorists of intergovernmentalism, rational social behavior, national 
interests and preferences matter in adopting supranational decisions on community level and 
national governments play important role in European integration.224 One of the leading 
theorists in the field, Andrew Moravcsik and his “liberal intergovernmentalist” theory defines 
the European Community as a “unique, multileveled, transnational political system”, where 
the national sovereignty of member states have been converted to the European level, while 
                                                 
220 Ibid., 565. 
221 Ibid., 559. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Supranationalism is suggests that in the process of integration states are not able to keep full control over the 
degree of integration. They might be compelled to accept certain decisions against their will, because they have 
already delegated part of their sovereignty to institutions. Supranationalism, therefore, asserts that integration 
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importance of nation state in bargaining for economic benefits through the EU is still 
emphasized. He argues that the options to pool or to delegate their sovereignty to 
international institutions are to be seen as attempts by the national governments to control and 
restrain each-other.225  
 
Intergovernmentalism is considered to be useful in exploring the behaviors and policies of the 
EU member states with regard to the depth and the extent of EU integration process. Three 
main assumptions of intergovernmentalist theory are emphasized: states are rational actors; 
they aim at economic gains; and their cooperative arrangements with other states bring to 
conflict resolution in international relations.226  
 
Intergovernmentalists argue that the EU is in fact a fora for interstate bargaining and 
therefore, the member states remain to be the key players at the European level. Policy-
making in the EU is also contingent upon the negotiations among the member states or is 
made “through carefully circumscribed delegations of authority”. In general, 
intergovernmentalists accept the interests of EU members states as given and focuses on the 
issue of how these states try to advance their interests through the EU. They argue that 
member states are extremely careful in delegating their sovereignty and are very particular 
about keeping their sovereignty vis-a-vis the institutions.227  
 
3.2. Neofunctionalism 
 
Neofunctionalism is a theoretical approach, which explains the dynamics of European 
integration, where the interested national and supranational elites stimulate the integration 
processes. Interests in this case are not taken as given and eternal and could be altered in the 
process of integration, since the relevant actors also can draw lessons from the advantages of 
integration and their experiences from mutual cooperation and decision making.228 
Neofunctionalists argue that supranational institutions and non-governmental actors gain 
                                                 
225 Ludger Kühnhardt, European Union – the second founding: The Changing rationale of European Integration, 
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increasing authority in the integration process, when nation states and governmental actors 
tend to lose a degree of their influence.229  
 
They also argue that membership in such common arrangements change the way national 
interests are understood in the relevant interest groups and governments. Moreover, after the 
initiation, institutions turn into supranational entities which become the driving force of 
further integration and can have an effect on the perception of national interests. 
Neofunctionalists suppose the predominance of “pluralist politics with multiple and diverse 
actors”, which do not only act within the confines of their domestics politics, but get into 
contact with other actors in order to establish common coalitions.230  
 
One of the important tenets of neofunctionalist approach is the concept of spillover that refers 
to dynamics and development of further integration processes, which maintains that regional 
integration in one area would lead to the integration in other fields.231 Most importantly, it is 
assumed that once the process is set, spillover becomes automatic and not geared to other 
extraneous factors. 232 It is noted that a certain action in respect to a particular goal brings to a 
situation where the initial objective could be attained only by undertaking subsequent actions, 
which further creates situation where more integration is needed.233 
 
Decisions to embark on economic integration bring to economic and political spillovers, 
which might be “unintended or unwanted consequences of earlier decisions” and become the 
driving force for subsequent integration processes. Several types of spillovers are 
distinguished by different authors,234 however, the most prevalent ones, which are also 
relevant to our research are functional, political and cultivated spillovers that will be briefly 
described below.  
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According to functional spillover effect cooperation in some areas of economy generates 
certain necessity for expanding cooperation in other relevant fields, thus, further inciting 
future cooperation. Political spillover mostly becomes the consequence of economic 
integration. It happens when cooperation in some areas enables the relevant supranational 
officials to undertake a role of “political entrepreneurs” in other realms. Political spillover 
also denotes that in the consequence of enhanced degree of elite integration and socialization 
slow but steady approximation of interests and expectations occur.235 Cultivated spillover 
suggests that once established, supranational institutions turn into the propellants of 
integration, since they are interested in further development of the process.236 
 
4. Summing up  
 
This Chapter aimed to introduce the theoretical framework, which is utilized by the author as 
an analytical tool of the dissertation. The theoretical framework –the “effectiveness” concept 
of the regime theory – was illuminated in the first Section, where the relevant suppositions of 
the chosen theoretical framework that are applicable in the explanation of the three 
hypotheses to the research question were highlighted. However, since regime theory cannot 
explain the patterns of effectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well as the role of the EU 
in facilitation of conflict resolution, more theories were incorporated as analytical 
frameworks. Some assumptions from the mediation theories that will be useful in evaluation 
of the OSCE Minsk Group mediation activity and the suppositions of theoretical approaches 
to the study of European integration – intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, which 
will be refereed to in the analysis of EU role in facilitation of conflict resolution in the region 
of South Caucasus have also been interjected into the work.     
 
In the next Chapter I will focus on explorations of effectiveness of the UN and the CIS 
through the prisms of regime theory and its first and second hypotheses 1 - Interests and 
preferences of the concerned powerful states influence the effectiveness of the UN, and  the 
CIS to facilitate the achievement of a final solution to the conflicts in the South Caucasus 
republics; 2) Problem solving capacity of the UN and the CIS influence their effectiveness to 
facilitate the achievement of a final settlement to the conflicts in the South Caucasus 
republics. Since the UN and the CIS both are involved Abkhazian conflict and their activities 
are at some occasions very interrelated, these two organizations are analyzed together. 
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Moreover, the aforementioned two hypotheses are also interconnected, i.e. problem solving 
capacities of the institutions are to a great extent influenced by actors’ interests, therefore, 
these two hypotheses will be considered in conjunction with each-other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
IV. ROLES of the UN and the CIS: ANALYSIS of THEIR EFFECTIVENESS  
This Chapter aims to explore the roles of the UN and the CIS in South Caucasus conflict 
resolution process and the factors that influence their effectiveness to facilitate the 
achievement of a final settlement. For this purpose the roles played by the UN237 and the CIS 
in the resolution of Georgia’s Abkhazian conflict. The reason why this chapter discusses the 
two mentioned institutions in conjunction is due to the fact that activities of the two actors – 
the UNOMIG and the CIS PKF - were interrelated with each other. At the outset, the chapter 
will focus on some empirical data in order to give an introduction to the functions of the said 
organizations, which subsequently will be followed by the analysis of their effectiveness 
through the first and the second regime theory hypotheses.  
1. United Nations contribution to conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region: 
the case of Abkhazia. 
One month after the hostilities were unleashed, the first UN fact-finding mission was sent to 
Abkhazia in September of 1992. The second mission followed in October of 1992, and in 
November of 1992 an interim UN office was established in Tbilisi in order to provide contacts 
between the conflicting parties and keep abreast of the situation.238 The UN Secretary General 
appointed his Special Envoy to Georgia, a Swiss diplomat Ambassador Edward Brunner in 
                                                 
237 The UN became actively involved in mediation only the Abkhazian conflict; it was not involved in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetian conflicts, leaving it for the CSCE/OSCE, which first took the initiative. 
Thus, the UN and the OSCE implemented a burden sharing with regard to the Georgian conflicts and the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The UN despite adopting some resolutions on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, in general, left the leading role to the CSCE/OSCE, a regional body under the Article VII of 
the UN Charter. However, the UN did still have some role to play in finding solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, although it could be estimated as being rather perfunctory compared to active mediation efforts of the 
OSCE Co-Chairs. The most prominent contribution made by the UN in the conflict resolution were the UN 
Security Council resolutions 874, 822, 853 and 884 adopted in 1993 during the active military hostilities 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All those resolutions demanded the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces 
from the occupied Azerbaijani territories, which have not been implemented though. Likewise, the recent 
resolutions initiated by the Azerbaijani side in 2006 during 60th session of the UN General Assembly about the 
fires in the occupied territories and the resolution called the “Situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan,” 
which was adopted during 62th session of the UN General Assembly in March 2008, could also be taken as UN 
contribution to conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the initiation of the latter resolution by 
Azerbaijan and achievement of its adoption derived rather from Azerbaijan’s motivation to exert some sort of a 
pressure on the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs in order them to hasten their mediation activities out of caution 
that Azerbaijan might become adamant and demand for the change of a negotiation format. In general, UN role 
in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has always been confined to supporting OSCE activities. Even most of the UN 
fact-finding missions that were sent to Nagorno-Karabakh in the early years of the conflict – in March, May, 
July and October of 1992, were meant to contribute to the OSCE work to find a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict.237 (See: Oliver Paye and Eric Remacle, “Contested borders in the Caucasus: UN and CSCE policies in 
Transcaucasia,” online, available from (http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0401.htm). Accessed on 
September 25, 2010), unpaged. In the coming chapters the effectiveness analysis will be applied only to those 
organizations, which were implementing the mediation/facilitation activity. 
238 Oliver Paye and Eric Remacle, unpaged. 
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May 1993, and in 1997 the Special Envoy was substituted by Special Representative Mr. 
Liviu Bota, who was a Romanian diplomat.239  
About nine months after the end of active military hostilities, the UN Security Council 
adopted its first resolution, number 849, on Abkhazian conflict on July 9, 1993 in the context 
of the increasing tensions among the conflicting parties. This resolution entitled the Secretary 
General and his Special Representative to facilitate the achievement of a cease-fire agreement 
between the warring parties. This first resolution was followed by other resolutions,240 and 
with the resolution 858 of August 24, 1993, the UN Military Observer Mission (UNOMIG) 
was established.241 Initially its mandate envisaged verifying the compliance with the 27 July 
1993 ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia, and was subsequently expanded 
after the signing of Moscow agreement on May 14, 1994.242  
The revised mandate of the UNOMIG increased the number of its military observers up to 
136 and tasked it with monitoring the Moscow cease-fire agreement, observing the CIS 
peacekeeping force,243 patrolling the Kodori valley, and assisting in the safe return of refugees 
and IDPs.244 In 1996 upon the UN Security Council resolution and an agreement reached 
between the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights and Abkhaz authorities, UN 
Human Rights office in Abkhazia was opened in Sukhumi.245 
As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia rejected the deployment of the UN 
Peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia and therefore, the UN presence in the region was confined 
to the mentioned unarmed observer mission–UNOMIG. CIS peacekeeping forces, however, 
which the UNOMIG monitored, consisted only of Russian forces.246 Nonetheless, sending an 
observer mission instead of a peacekeeping force was mostly due to the loath on the part of 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council to question Russian monopoly over its 
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“near abroad”. Plus, this was also stipulated by the perception that UN’s peacekeeping 
capabilities could not be overstretched by adding one more commitment.247 
After UNOMIG’s establishment, efforts were made to launch the civilian police component 
within it. Abkhazian side, however, retorted it, out of fear that this could help in the 
establishment of an international civil administration in the Gali region and thus, limit 
Abkhazia’s control over what it perceived to be its territory. Against this backdrop, UNOMIG 
proposed to set up a Community Police Training Program in 1998. However, having done a 
security assessment of the Gali district, with the resolution 1494 of July 30, 2003 of the UN 
Security Council, a civilian police component was added to the UNOMIG with the aim to 
contribute to the refugee and IDP return. In 2003 civilian police was deployed only on 
Georgian side of the ceasefire line and starting from 2007 Abkhazians also agreed to accept 
them.248 
In 1997 the parties started to meet in the framework of the UN-led Geneva process, with the 
participation of the OSCE, which was facilitated by Russia, and observed by Group of Friends 
(see below). Since 1997 Secretary General’s Special Representative was based in Tbilisi. It 
was chairing the Geneva Process and directing the UNOMIG. The Geneva process envisaged 
establishing three working groups – on non-resumption of violence, refugee and IDP return 
and socio-economic issues. 249 
One of the landmarks of the UN contribution became the formation of the Group of Friends of 
the Secretary General including the representatives from Germany, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States in 1997, with the purpose of balancing Russia’s influence in 
the process. Nonetheless, these western powers had only consultative role within the Group of 
Friends, while Russia was a facilitator.250 The Group of Friends became more active in 2003-
2006 and by conducting regular meetings in Geneva under the UN chairmanship it offered 
recommendations for the solution of the conflict. It gathered at Ambassadorial level in Tbilisi 
and at expert and ambassadorial levels in Moscow and New York. France and Germany held 
the positions of coordinators and the Group usually drafted Security Council resolutions251 
                                                 
247 S. Neil MacFarlane, “The role of the UN,” Conciliation Resources, September 1999, online, available from 
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and presidential statements on Georgia.252 Nevertheless, this group was regarded by Abkhazia 
as being strongly pro-Georgian biased, which supported Georgia’s territorial integrity. 
Therefore, Abkhazian authorities very frequently refused to meet with the representatives of 
the group.253 
Another negotiation framework of the UN was the Coordinating Council, established in 1997 
and tasked to detect the possible areas on which the progress could be achieved until a final 
peaceful settlement is reached. Within the Council working groups were created on the 
following issue areas: preventing the resumption of hostilities and addressing security 
questions, helping in the return of refugees and IDPs and improving economic and social 
conditions.254 However, its working groups could not give impetus to the activities on the 
areas they were created, due to persisting disagreements among the parties on the issues of 
principled importance. Nonetheless, meetings on confidence-building measures, which were 
held in Athens and Istanbul with the facilitation of the Coordinating Council, achieved good 
results in terms of fostering the direct bilateral contacts between the warring parties and 
working out some projects for interaction and cooperation in different issue areas.255 
In 2001 the Coordinating Council ceased its activity and did not function for about five 
years.256 Although in 2006 there were some attempts to reactivate the work of the 
Coordinating Council, they were not successful. After Georgian operation in upper Kodori 
valley in 2006,257 Abkhazia refused to continue the negotiations until the situation of pre-July 
2006 was re-established and Georgian forces relinquished the Kodori valley. Situation with 
preservation of the ceasefire worsened and in its September 2006 report, the UN Secretary 
General noted thirteen violations by Georgia and two violations by Abkhazia of the Moscow 
cease-fire agreement.258 With that, the chances of reinvigorating the work of the Coordinating 
Council had vanished.  
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Against the backdrop of rising perturbations in the conflict zone and the waning role of the 
existing frameworks, Georgia started to question the effectiveness of the functioning 
mechanisms and enunciated more and more openly its desire to change the negotiation 
format. Like in the case of South Ossetia,259 Georgian authorities insisted on the necessity to 
engage on a direct dialogue with Abkhazia and to involve more actively the international 
players, this time also including the EU, alongside the UN and Russia.260 However, there was 
another reason beyond Georgia’s wish to change the negotiation format. By doing so, the 
country wanted to neutralize Russia’s share in peacekeeping as well as in mediation process, 
which seemed to stay largely unchallenged in view of the cautious position chosen by the 
international community, especially the UN, to play a stronger role and undertake more result-
oriented measures. Tbilisi deemed that international actors were silently approving Russia’s 
assumption of a prominent role in the peace process out of considerations of the shared 
responsibility in Abkhazian conflict resolution. 
The period of 1995-1999 was a difficult one for the UNOMIG in terms of achievement of 
tangible results in Georgia-Abkhazia conflict settlement. Irrespective of the attempts made on 
the part of the UN towards conflict resolution, progress seemed to be remote. One of the 
reasons was that the UNOMIG in its actions favored greatly the solution of the issues related 
to Abkhazia’s political status and IDP return to Gali district. Abkhazian side, having a UN 
perception as being primarily pro-Georgian was therefore intransigent to negotiate over, let 
alone accept any proposal.261 
One of the UN initiatives to facilitate peaceful solution to the conflict became a draft paper on 
the “Basic Principles for the Distribution of competence between Tbilisi and Sukhumi”, 
otherwise known as “Boden paper” initiated by the UN Secretary General’s Special 
Representative Dieter Boden in December of 2001. This document defined Abkhazia’s status 
on the basis of Georgia’s territorial integrity and gave the region vast powers within a 
federative state that Georgia would look like. Georgia accepted the proposal; nonetheless, it 
was adamantly rejected by Abkhaz authorities, who refused the idea of existence within 
Georgia.262 Therefore, the “basic principles” failed to serve as a basis for future conflict 
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settlement. One of the reasons why this document sank into oblivion was the fact that it 
emphasized the necessity of a comprehensive settlement, which implied the achievement of 
parallel results on status issue, the issue of IDP return and socio-economic questions. 
Moreover, this was done in the light of overt UN support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, which aggravated Abkhazia’s animosity towards the proposal.263 
 
There were also proposals for the solution of the conflict coming from the warring parties 
themselves. For example, in 2006 Georgia worked out a “Road map for a comprehensive, 
peaceful, political settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia”, which stipulated that any solution 
should be based on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, and Abkhazia should 
be granted wide powers within Georgia. In March of 2008, Georgia prepared another 
proposal, which envisaged great autonomy for Abkhazia, and the establishment of a jointly 
controlled economic zone, gradual unification of law enforcement and customs agencies with 
the region. This proposal considered Abkhazia’s right to veto the laws concerning the 
constitutional structure of the region and the issues related to its culture. Abkhazia, on its part 
disagreed with Georgia’s proposals, which eliminated independence for Abkhazia and in its 
2006 “Key to the future” document noted that Georgia should be ready to recognize 
Abkhazia’s independence and start a regional cooperation on security, stability and economic 
development. However, none of these proposals became the basis for continuation of 
negotiations, neither were they endorsed by the UN.264 
 
While concluding the description of the UN role in the Abkhazian conflict some elements 
need to be underscored again. As the example of the “Boden paper” has also revealed, the UN 
seemed to prefer to address conflict related issues first and leave the status question for the 
later stage, which in fact coincided with Georgia’s position. This largely hindered the whole 
process, since Abkhazian side was widely averse to such an attitude, which they conceived as 
being pro-Georgian.  
However, after the tragic August 2008 events, the UN Mission had encountered the same 
notorious fate as the OSCE Mission.265 When the fighting broke out between Russia and 
Georgia in August 2008, the UN force – the UNOMIG had to withdraw from Kodori Valley, 
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on which it was implementing a monitoring activity between Tbilisi and Abkhazia.266 With its 
resolution 1839 the UN Security Council extended the UNOMIG mandate for about four 
months in the conflict zone.267 Nonetheless, in June of 2009, the UNOMIG had to cease its 
activity by virtue of the Russian veto on the resolution submitted by Austria, Croatia, France, 
Germany, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States to the UN Security Council’s 
6143rd session,268 which aimed to extend the mandate of the mission. Russia was discontent 
with the fact that the said resolution reemphasized Georgia’s territorial integrity and therefore, 
refused to endorse the document which it described as disregarding the new changes and 
being “based on old realities”.269  
Although UNOMIG’s 115 unarmed observers, who did the patrolling of the border between 
Abkhazia and Georgia, were at time criticized for not being effective, they were nonetheless, 
the only security institution on the ground, which was monitoring the situation. Its closure had 
actually created a security void.270 However, other UN agencies like UNDP, UNICEF and 
some others still do some activity in Georgia, although the UN is no more involved in active 
conflict resolution activity. It is now, one of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva talks271 and chairs 
the so-called Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) for Abkhazia.272   
1.1. UN role in IDP return 
One of the areas where the UN was involved as a facilitator and an assisting force was the 
IDP and refugee return to Abkhazia. In the same year the ceasefire agreement was reached in 
1994, a Declaration on measures for a political settlement and Quadripartite Agreement on 
“Voluntary Return of refugees and displaced persons” was signed between Abkhazia, 
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Georgia, Russia and the UNHCR.273 In line with the latter agreement a commission was set 
up in order to “formulate, discuss and approve plans to implement programs for the safe, 
orderly and voluntary repatriation of the refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia from 
Georgia” and start the repatriation in the Gali region.274 This agreement in fact laid the ground 
for the UN involvement in IDP return and the UNHCR undertook a role in facilitating the 
return of IDPs to their places of residence. In its biannual resolutions,275 which note the 
necessity to work out a timetable for voluntary return of all the refugees and IDPs to the 
places of residence, the UN Security Council urged Abkhaz authorities to create the favorable 
conditions for their return.  
However, the instability in Gali sector in 1998, caused by criminal and terrorist activities 
against civilians, peacekeepers and also Abkhaz militia seriously deteriorated the situation in 
the region, thus also undermining the necessary condition for refugee and IDP return. 
Although there were some efforts on the part of Abkhaz authorities to stabilize the situation, 
still they were unable to neutralize the criminal elements, such as robbery, kidnapping for 
ransom and other criminal acts, which largely disrupted the security environment for the safe 
return of the expelled population. This condition was also worsened by the fact that the 
UNOMIG patrolling was limited in the wake of the continuing instabilities in the region.276 
Following the turmoil of May 1998,277 as a result of which the population that had returned to 
Gali district behooved to flee their homes again, the UNHCR moved its personnel from 
Sukhumi office and focused its activities in Zugdidi.278 However, despite of the mobilized 
efforts of the UN, hindrances brought by the lack of security preconditions still remained for 
the return of the population.  
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The UNOMIG in cooperation with the CIS peacekeeping force was unable to take proactive 
measures against the likely Abkhazian attack, and hence was unable to render a substantial 
assistance in the process of IDP and refugee return. This was perhaps partly because of the 
fact that the UN and its specialized agencies involved in assisting returning population were 
not favorably inclined towards the spontaneous return of the IDPs and refugees without 
achievement of a political settlement to the conflict. This view stood on apprehension for the 
security of the returning population in the absence of a comprehensive peace deal.279 
However, upon the failure of this planned return more unorganized and spontaneous return of 
refugees and IDPs took place in 1997. This was partly assumed to be due to the spring 
planting season; however, most of the IDPs were afterwards estimated to stay and the 
numbers spoke of about 50, 000 civilians to live in the Gali district at that time.280   
Continuing situation in the Gali district as well as the inability of the parties, especially the 
Abkhazian side to implement the provisions of the 1994 Quadripartite Agreement on the 
return of the displaced population and create the required conditions, had made the return of 
the majority of the population to the Gali district impossible. Abkhazia was immensely 
reserved and cautious about the returnees in order not to let in anyone who were suspected in 
fighting on Georgian side. Against the backdrop of these developments, the work of the 
Commission was deadlocked and IDP return to Abkhazia was trivial. Only 311 IDPs were 
registered to return.281 Despite all the shortcomings though, the return to Gali region was 
considered to be one of the areas where some progress was made, although a very slim one. 
2. Commonwealth of Independent States in Abkhazia282 – convoluted assistance 
 
While considering the role played by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 
conflict resolution in the South Caucasus republics, it is impossible to bypass the specific 
circumstances and conditions influencing the nature of its involvement. At the outset, it 
should be noted that the CIS was not involved in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetian 
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conflicts, although occasionally some positions and statements were expressed on declaratory 
level.283 Its role in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region was mainly confined to 
the peacekeeping activity in Abkhazia, which will be depicted in the given section. 
 
On October 23, 1993, Georgian President Shevardnadze agreed to Georgian membership in 
the CIS and on 1 December of the same year “Mutual Understanding Agreement” was signed 
between Georgia and Abkhazia, which envisaged the necessity of deployment of 
peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia.284 A status of force agreement was signed between 
Georgia and Russia in October 1993,285 and with that, a prerequisite for deployment of the 
CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia was created. However, Georgia did not forego its quest 
for an international force to be deployed in conflict zone. In the Communiqué adopted as a 
result of the negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia in Geneva on 11-13 January, 1994, 
parties to the conflict also agreed to let into the zone of conflict the UN peacekeeping forces, 
or other forces sanctioned by the UN. However, given Russia’s readiness to provide such a 
force and the ambiguity in UN’s position as for the possibility to deploy the UN sponsored 
forces, the parties expressed their agreement to using Russian military contingent as a part of 
such a force.286 Afterwards, an agreement to deploy a peacekeeping force in the conflict zone 
with the participation of Russian forces, which would also be tasked with  repatriation of the 
IDPs, was reached between the parties by the “Declaration on measures for a political 
settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict” on April 4 1994.287 
 
However, due to the differences on the matters of financing of such a force as well as its 
location, the agreement reached in April was not duly implemented. Only after concluding the 
14 May 1994 Moscow ceasefire agreement, the details of the peacekeeping force became 
known. In May of 1994, in the report of the UN Secretary General to the Security Council, it 
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was stated that there were no auspicious conditions in Georgia for the deployment of the UN 
forces and therefore, this function could be fulfilled by the Russian forces, which could then 
be integrated into a possible UN force if the latter is stationed. After the hostilities were 
stopped upon mutual agreement, it was decided that this peacekeeping force would work 
under the CIS auspices, with UN sanctioning and subsequent monitoring. Russian forces 
under the CIS umbrella started to operate in Abkhazia from July 26 1994.288 As a regional 
organization under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the CIS peacekeeping force was thus 
deployed in Abkhazia. 
 
Russian military presence in Abkhazia was legitimized by the decision of the Council of the 
CIS Heads of States on the “Usage of Collective Forces to maintain peace in the conflict zone 
of Georgia-Abkhaz conflict” of August 22, 1994. This agreement stipulated that the military 
contingents of the CIS member states, which are interested to provide such a force should be 
deployed in Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone and that Russian military contingent, which was 
already stationed in the conflict zone shall be taken as a basis for future collective force in the 
conflict region.289 The mandate of the peacekeeping operation was approved later with a 
separate decision of the organization, which was adopted on October 21, 1994.290 
 
In the resolution of the UN Security Council (UN SC - S/RES/937) of July 21, 1994, the UN 
SC noted that the stationing of the CIS peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia was implemented 
according to the request and approbation of the conflicting parties. The resolution also 
assessed the efforts of the CIS, especially Russia, positively in maintenance of the ceasefire 
and the facilitation of the return of the refugees.291 One of the reasons why the UN endorsed 
the CIS peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia was due to its own limitations, while for CIS 
(although mostly Russian) this undertaking in Abkhazia under the UN umbrella had the value 
for legitimizing its role as a reliable regional organization capable of contributing to 
international and regional peace and stability.292 
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However, it appeared that some provisions of the 1994 Moscow ceasefire agreement were not 
implemented. This was primarily because of the fact that regardless of the agreement’s 
provision that invited all of the CIS members to contribute with their troops, Russia became 
the only country which actually did so.293 The CIS itself, failed to participate as an entity, 
since its other member states did not send any troops and did not render any material 
assistance to formulate the peacekeeping force under the Russian lead.294 Therefore, Russian 
soldiers constituted an absolute majority in the composition of the CIS peacekeeping force. 
The number of the Russian peacekeeping force was about 3000 at the onset, which gradually 
was reduced to 1800-1100 men.295 
 
The mandate of the CIS peacekeepers was to observe and maintain the ceasefire on both sides 
of the conflict zone and to assist the safe return of the refugees and IDPs to their places of 
residence in Abkhazia.296 As was described in the Section I above, the UNOMIG observes 
monitored the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force on behalf of the international 
community and in order to support the CIS peacekeeping force, the UN Security Council 
expanded the mandate of the UNOMIG to entitle it with the task of monitoring the CIS 
peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping forces like the 
mandate of the UNOMIG was confined to observing the implementation of the case-fire and 
other similar tasks for conflict resolution, which would correspond to the objectives of the 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and did not entail any enforcement measures under the Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.297 
 
It was decided that alongside monitoring the ceasefire, the CIS peacekeepers would also 
render their assistance to the return of the IDPs by implementing the policing in “security” 
and “restricted” weapons zones298 and other areas agreed upon by the parties. When Abkhaz 
authorities were creating obstacles for the rapid return of the IDPs to their places of residence, 
Georgia asked for the expansion of the CIS peacekeeping forces mandate in order to enable 
them to police the entire Gali district. This was rejected by Abkhazian side, with the argument 
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that the 1994 agreement obliges the parties to coordinate any decision regarding the extension 
of the mandate of the peacekeeping force with all the parties involved.299  
 
When it came to assisting the returning IDPs, unfortunately, in the absence of security 
preconditions for their proper return, the CIS peacekeepers could not be of a big help. The 
CIS force although performing its tasks with regard to monitoring ceasefire, was seemingly 
eschewing the involvement in the issue of IDP return, despite that fact that this was a part of 
its mandate. In spite of the presence of the peacekeepers, there was a trivial return of the 
IDPs. 300 As the Section 1 of this Chapter described, Abkhazian authorities instead of 
guaranteeing the security preconditions for the return of the Georgian IDPs, further hampered 
the return process by attacking the population and threatening their security. In such a 
situation, the CIS peacekeepers failed to act and end the harassment of the returning IDPs. 
This inaction was on some occasions justified by the CIS force stressing the absence of a 
policing mandate for the peacekeeping forces.301 
 
In fact, Georgian side since 1995 was trying hardly to achieve the extension of the CIS 
mandate to also include policing functions. Nonetheless, this was rebuffed by Abkhazia, 
which wanted no inclusion of policing functions into the peacekeepers mandate. They were 
assured that the returning population should be protected by the local Abkhazian police forces 
and external interference on this issue was not needed.302 
 
However, Georgia persisted on its request that the peacekeeping force patrols the areas, which 
lie outside the borders of security and restricted zones in order to create security conditions 
for the returning IDPs in Gali and Southern Ochamchire district. In doing so, Georgia put it 
clearly that if the CIS fails to do the patrolling of the said zones, Georgia would veto the 
extension of the peacekeeping forces’ mandate after the January 1997. Tbilisi also warned to 
replace the CIS peacekeeping force with the UN or the OSCE mandated forces, or even to 
consider replacing them with Ukrainian peacekeepers if the CIS fails to provide the 
repatriation of the IDPs.303  
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In view of this recalcitrance on Georgia’s part, Russia agreed to the patrolling of Gali and the 
southern Ochamchire by the CIS peacekeeping forces with the decision of the CIS Summit of 
March 28, 1997. However, this decision was never implemented, mostly owing to the fact that 
the CIS peacekeeping force did not have sufficient capacity to undertake the mission of 
monitoring of wide and troubled areas like Gali district and the southern Ochamchire. Against 
this picture, Georgia threatened to withdraw from the CIS. However, under Russia’s pressure 
it again agreed to extend the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force under the pretext that 
regardless of anything, the peacekeeping force was assisting in the return of Georgians to 
Abkhazia.304  
 
Georgian position towards the CIS peacekeepers was never unambiguous. Disappointed with 
the evinced partiality of the peacekeepers, Georgia was criticizing their activity at every 
auspicious point, demanding their withdrawal and replacement with the international 
peacekeeping force. This position also poured into the resolution of the Georgian Parliament 
of 11 October 2005, by which the Parliament called for suspension of the CIS peacekeeping 
operation in Abkhazia, to withdraw the forces and replace them with international police 
forces.305 
 
However, the UN was in favor of keeping the CIS presence in Georgia and on April 13, 2007, 
it adopted a resolution 1752, which underlined the stabilizing role of the CIS peacekeeping 
force.306 UNOMIG wanted to keep CIS force also because its observer mission was unarmed 
and keeping the CIS peacekeeping force, which possessed weapons was necessary for the 
UNOMIG observers to operate. Therefore, the extension of the UNOMIG mandate by the UN 
was partly also conditioned upon the extension of the mandates of the CIS peacekeepers by 
Georgia.307 
 
Apart from implementing a peacekeeping function, the CIS occasionally undertook some 
political steps overall influencing the peace process. For instance, expressing their support to 
the UN and Russian efforts to facilitate the achievement of a political settlement to the 
conflict, on January 19, 1996 the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS adopted a 
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resolution on “Measures for the settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia” of January 
19 1996, which banned official trade, economic, financial and any other interactions with 
Abkhazia.308 In the said resolution, CIS criticized Abkhazian side for “setting obstacles to 
achieving mutually acceptable agreements to political settlement of the conflict, secure 
dignified return of refugees and IDPs…”309 In this decision the states-members to the CIS 
also committed themselves to refrain from any trade-economic, financial and other similar 
activities with Abkhazia and from keeping any contacts with the de-facto authorities in 
Abkhazia without the consent of Georgia.310 
 
UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends had on several occasions recommended to lift the 
sanctions and the UN Security Council supported this recommendation in its resolution 1781 
of 15 October 2007. On March 6 2008, Russia declared that it no longer considered itself to 
be bound by the provisions of the decision, which imposed sanctions on Abkhazia. On 29 
April 2008 in the statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Russia announced its decision 
to increase the CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Abkhazia. This was done against the backdrop of 
Russian claims about augmenting Georgian military budget, deployment of additional 
Georgian troops in the conflict zone and “increased pressure from the Georgian authorities on 
Russian peacekeepers”.311 In doing so, Russia noted that this was within the limits maintained 
in the decisions and documents of the CIS Council of Heads of States.312   
 
In the next section, I will explore the effectiveness of the UN (UNOMIG) and the CIS based 
on the empirical facts provided in the preceding paragraphs. 
 
3. Analysis of effectiveness from the prisms of regime theory 
 
The section above focused on the description of the work done by the UN and the CIS in 
practical terms. This part will make an attempt to analyze their performance and look into the 
factors influencing their successful activity. For this purpose, the first [powerful actors’ 
interests] and the second [problem solving capacity] hypothesis will be tested where 
appropriate. 
                                                 
308 “Situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” unpaged. 
309 See: Decision of the Council of the Heads of States of CIS of 19 January, 1996, Civil Georgia, online, 
available from (http://www.civil.ge). Accessed on October 21, 2010, unpaged. 
310 See: Decision of the Council of the Heads of States of CIS of 19 January, 1996, unpaged. 
311 “Russia increases number of peacekeepers in Abkhazia,” April 29, 2008, online, available from 
(http://www.gerogiandaily.com). Accessed on October 21, 2010, unpaged. 
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  3.1. First hypothesis: powerful actors’ interests  
 
- Interests and preferences of the concerned powerful states influence the effectiveness 
of the UN and the CIS to facilitate the achievement of a final solution to the conflicts 
in the South Caucasus republics.  
 
For the beginning it should be emphasized that both organizations have been extremely fragile 
to the influence of its actors pursuing their separate national objectives and the “interest gap” 
between the actor eager to play very strong role in the conflict resolution and those who 
lacked any incentive whatsoever to display similarly higher profile was very big. Lack of 
parity between the interested and disinterested parties led to the assumption of the major role 
by a single but a powerful actor – in this case Russia, capable of influencing the effectiveness 
of organizations and the final products they were to deliver. The nature of Russia’s interests in 
South Caucasus was described in the Section 2, Chapter I, which focused on the reasons of 
Russia’s strong feelings for controlling the region. 
 
Russia- UN. Russia had played significant role in influencing the work done by the UN. Being 
the permanent member of the UN Security Council (UN SC), it had become the participant of 
each and every UN framework that was developed within the context of UN efforts to 
facilitate the conflict resolution. For instance, Russia was the main facilitator of the UN 
Group of Friends of the Secretary General, the UN-led Geneva process, and holding a veto 
power in the UN SC could influence any resolution on Abkhazia taken within this body.  
 
In fact, it was due to Russia’s rejection as a permanent member of the UN Security Council 
that the initial plans over the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia was 
changed and was confined to the deployment of unarmed observer mission–UNOMIG. Plus, 
the CIS peacekeeping forces, which the UNOMIG monitored, consisted only of Russian 
forces. However, sending an observer mission instead of a peacekeeping force was also 
because of the fact that some of the permanent members of the UN Security Council were 
unwilling to counter Russia over what they also saw to be Russian “sphere of interest”. 
 
Moreover, the UN SC had number of resolutions on Abkhazian conflict, which in general 
called for the resolution of the conflict and supported Georgia’s territorial integrity. Russian 
role in the Abkhazian conflict and its support to Abkhazia of course has never been mentioned 
 
103 
 
in the resolutions, and the language of the resolutions are rather vague, which was designed to 
accommodate the interests of Russia, a strongly interested party to the conflict and whose 
support as a permanent member of the Security Council was indispensable for adoption of the 
relevant resolutions.313 Russia by all means tried to block any resolution within the UN that 
would mention the respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity. No sanctions had ever been 
employed by the UN for the proper implementation of the resolutions. 
 
A blatant mistake on the part of the UN was the disregard of the fact that Russia was a 
strongly interested party in the Abkhazian conflict and its role. This therefore, negatively 
affected overall UN performance towards the conflict resolution. Plus, due to the fact that the 
role of the Russian peacekeeping force was usually positively assessed in the UN Secretary 
General’s reports and the UN resolutions, their mandate were as a rule extended. 314 No other 
UN member state came to contribute with their forces, which preferred to leave this task on 
Russia, who was keen on carrying out this role.  
 
Against the backdrop of the Russian factor one should not forget that the UN was acting in an 
environment which could be characterized as being competitive. That said, for years Russia 
held an influential position in acting as a mediator and facilitator between the Abkhazian and 
Georgian sides and especially from 1992-1997 it had led the peace process, which later 
dwindled until 2000 and again reinvigorated in 2003. In this situation, the UN did not seem to 
be able and even willing to own the mediation process, inasmuch as at numerous occasions it 
even seemed to be contempt with active Russian involvement, which shared the burden of 
mediation. From 2006 Security Council’s role in Abkhazian conflict resolution has decreased, 
which to some extent happened under Russia’s influence.315 The UN had provided only good 
offices and facilitation without making any attempt to influence the parties. It monitored 
about 1500 peacekeepers from the CIS by about 120 UN observers and did not have the right 
instruments to enforce peace.316  
The existence of potent Russian factor in every aspect of the UN mediation and plus, the 
unwillingness of the UN to challenge Russia in this regard, if on one hand created an image of 
Russia’s debilitating influence, on the other hand, could also be estimated as an attempt by the 
                                                 
313 Gocha Gvaramia, “Russian policy in Abkhazia and a role of the UN in the conflict resolution process,” 
online, available from (http://tsxinvali.blogspot.com/2010/01/russian-policy-in-abkhazia-and-role-of.html). 
Accessed on October 23, 2010, unpaged. 
314 Ibid. 
315 “Abkhazia: ways forward,” 10. 
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104 
 
UN to save its face in view of its own reluctance or incapacity to be more active in the 
Abkhazian conflict resolution process and leaving a carte blanche for the implementation of 
Russia’s targeted objectives. However, this way or the other, the effect of Russian influence 
on UN’s performance was the same. 
Russia-CIS. Russian influence on CIS does not probably need additional descriptions, expect 
mentioning that it was for Russia that the organization was instituted at first place upon the 
collapse of the USSR, as a new Russian attempt to pull together the newly independent 
republics of the former soviet bloc. In reality, through the time that has elapsed since the 
disintegration of the USSR and almost immediate creation of the CIS in December of 1991, 
the latter became the most potent tool for the advancement of Russian interests in the former 
USSR area, including the South Caucasus.  
 
As it was described in details above in the current work, the CIS involvement in the South 
Caucasus conflict resolution mostly was confined to its peacekeeping function in Abkhazia 
and the only force contributing state to the CIS in this context was Russia. The participation 
of the CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia with Russia being the only contributing state was highly 
controversial and some viewed it as in fact implementing a “border guard” role instead of the 
functions of a classic peacekeeping mission.317 
 
The presence of vested Russian interests to guard its influence over the South Caucasus 
region created visible ambiguities in the role and function of the peacekeeping force. In some 
instances Russian forces seemed to ostensibly lean towards Abkhazians. Russia’s biased 
interests and the existing problems with the fulfillment of the CIS peacekeepers’ tasks, like 
corruption among the personnel and the inability to provide the security of the returning IDPs 
spread skepticism and mistrust for the Russian role in Abkhazian conflict and spurred doubts 
about the effectiveness and impartiality of the Russian peacekeeping forces.318 In fact, the CIS 
was often seen as an instrument for Russian policy to prevent the diffusion of its political 
leverage in the former Soviet states and therefore, its peacekeeping role under the CIS 
umbrella was heavily marred by Russian Realpolitik. 
 
                                                 
317 “Situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” Historical Overview, online, available from 
(http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/warfare/statement051208en.htm). Accessed on October 13, 2010, 
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Rightly so, it is a hard task for any analyst to talk about the effectiveness of the organization, 
which is largely manipulated by a single actor with its own national security agenda. The facts 
that Russian forces had their own agenda beyond the peacekeeping function and were accused 
by Georgian authorities of actually helping Abkhazia to advance its plans instead of 
maintaining security in the region, were subject to corruption and unwilling to help in the 
return of the IDPs to the designated areas, made the thoughts about the purported 
effectiveness of the CIS irrelevant. Given the broader setting in which the CIS had to operate 
and the dominant role of an openly partial player, the entire performance of the organization 
is affected and therefore, its ability to effectively contribute to the peace process in Abkhazian 
conflict is highly questionable. 
 
The UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeepers were mandated to cooperate; however, strong 
Russian factor impeded the CIS to act as a multilateral organization, instead it turned into an 
entity, which was deeply utilized for political purposes. This also created problems in the 
interaction between the UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeepers, since Russian forces were 
mostly after their national interests, which was opposite to the interests of the international 
presence, like the UNOMIG. The differences between the understanding of the concept of 
peacekeeping and the rules of engagement was also the source of controversy. Contrary to 
traditional concept of peacekeeping and the limited rules of engagement that international 
forces like the UN usually has, Russian forces had wide rules of engagement and were armed 
more than it was required.319 It was implied that since the UNOMIG was unarmed, the CIS 
peacekeeping force was to be armed, in order to provide the security of the UNOMIG and its 
personnel on specific missions.320 However, this too at times seemed not to be a valid reason 
for the CIS peacekeepers to be armed more than it was required.  
 
The apex of demonstration of how the organizations are influenced by actors’ interests 
became the closure of the UNOMIG in June of 2009 after the closure of the OSCE Mission in 
Georgia. As the preceding section illustrated, Russia using its veto power in the UN SC 
vetoed the resolution by number of western states, which aimed at extending the mandate of 
the mission. Russia was unhappy that the said resolution underlined Georgia’s territorial 
integrity and therefore, refused to accept the document, which it considered as reflecting the 
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old realities that existed before the August 2008 and did not take into account the existence of 
two new independent states in the South Caucasus. This ended the UN presence in Georgia 
and became another vivid paradigm of how actors’ interests could wreck havoc with the 
performance and effectiveness of the organizations to make difference in conflict resolution. 
Russia’s role was enhanced also due to the fact that other UN members by displaying 
continuing disinterest in taking active stance inadvertently or purposely encouraged Russia’s 
activism in the region and in the peace process. Russia’s actions and its participation in 
August 2008 events had undermined its role in the Group of Friends. However, the credibility 
of other members of the group – Germany and France due to their strong affiliation with 
Russia because of their energy dependence, also became questionable. This became vivid 
after the act of abstention by the United Kingdom, France and Germany from the UN General 
Assembly resolution (GA/10708), which reinstated the right of refugees and IDPs to return to 
Abkhazia.321 Since none of the above states wanted to undermine their relations with Russia, 
which is their economic partner, they rather preferred to abstain.  
 
The Georgian-Russian conflict of August 2008 has actually demonstrated how unprotected 
and incapable the UN SC could be in the face of diverging interests of its permanent 
members. On August 7 before entering the Georgian territory itself, Russia urged the Council 
to respond to Georgian entry into South Ossetia and issue a statement that criticized Georgian 
action. This proposal was rejected by the western states (the US, UK and others), who wanted 
to have a language in the text, which would reassure the UN’s support for Georgia’s territorial 
integrity. As a result, the process of adoption of the UN resolution or any position on the 
August conflict was seriously hindered by Russia’s position. The inability of the Security 
Council to pass a resolution on the happenings in Georgia was hopelessly tried to be 
compensated by the issuance of numerous statements by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon, which called for the respect for territorial integrity, withdrawal of forces and return to 
negotiations.322  
 
Having sketched Russia’s behavior in the given context and referring to the assumptions of 
the regime theory about usage of power by the actors and the notion of coercive hegemony323, 
it could be assumed that Russia was acting as a powerful actor and a coercive hegemon, who 
                                                 
321 David L. Phillips, 10. 
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tried to impose its will on others, or at least influence the situation in such a way as to serve 
its interests. Since the regime theory also presupposes that the likelihood that a certain course 
of action or a decision to be taken and implemented is dependent on the extent to which it is 
perceived to serve the interests of powerful actors, the above conclusion seems to be correct 
in this context.  
 
However, Russia’s effect had not always been negative. Russia itself, as a sole actor has 
managed to achieve quite a lot in the resolution of the conflict. It should not be omitted that 
Russia has been active facilitator and a mediator between Georgia and Abkhazia and 
especially in 1992-1997 it had led the peace process. Beyond providing its forces to the CIS 
peacekeeping force, it has also mediated the signing of the ceasefire agreement in 1994, 
pulled the parties together when they had negotiated an agreement on non-use of force in 
1997, discussed the possibilities to reopen of the railway line linking Sochi to Tbilisi in Sochi, 
conducted talks over the modernization of the hydroelectric power station at the Inguiri River 
and the return of IDPs to Abkhazia.324  
 
In such a competitive external situation, the UN with all its internal complications had little 
chance to maintain its positions and be able to make more effective contribution to conflict 
resolution. Despite of the fact that Russia fulfilled a facilitating function between the 
conflicting parties and some significant breakthrough [i.e.; the achievement of a ceasefire] 
had anyway happened thanks to Russia, even these efforts were not freed from national 
security interests of Russia and served its objective to be deeply fortified in the region by 
monopolizing the peace process. Strong UN in the field did not in fact serve Russia’s national 
interests in the given context. 
  
While evaluating the UN effectiveness from the perspective of the first hypothesis- actors’ 
interests it is natural that our analysis was mainly confined to the description of Russian role 
in the given premise. Although Georgia has many supporters among the western states – the 
US and mostly the EU members support Georgia and its position in the Abkhaz conflict and 
many of them express their unambiguous support for Georgia’s territorial integrity – when it 
came to taking certain specific actions within the UN framework, many of the actors preferred 
to ascribe main role to Russia.  
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This statement found its proof in the fact that despite Georgia’s will to replace CIS PKF with 
a more multinational force none of the western states was willing to provide troops for 
peacekeeping force under the UN mandate to provide a more direct UN peacekeeping role 
and Russia therefore undertook this role. Moreover, when Russia held uncompromised 
position within the Security Council by opposing to emphasize Georgia’s territorial integrity, 
none of the western states was interested in openly challenging it by perhaps employing the 
same kind of tit-for-tat approach on the issues that are important for Russia, for example 
initiating the resolution on situation in Chechnya and not indicating the respect for Russia’s 
territorial integrity. But, obviously, other players avoided the risk of ruining their relations 
with Russia, especially UK and France, who are permanent members of the UNSC and 
preferred to choose cautious and ambiguous positions on the relevant issues.  
 
Regarding the US, despite of the fact that Georgia is its strategic partner, and unlike the 
previous two actors the US is not so thrifty to address criticism towards Russia’s policies in 
Georgia, it could also hardly change anything within the UN given the fact that Russia could 
veto any resolution if it wanted. Perhaps understanding the fact that another UN resolution in 
a situation where Russia has the most of the control over the situation would not be able to 
make much difference, the US preferred to focus more on its bilateral contacts with Georgia 
and on maintaining its own influence in the region than spending energy and resources on 
achievements of concrete results through the UN framework. 
 
When it comes to the CIS, Russia’s dominance in this organization is indisputable. If within 
the UN other actors at least expressed their divergent positions at times, even if they were not 
followed by actual deeds, in the CIS (CIS PKF) no actor was even willing to challenge Russia 
or at least propose another formula for making difference in the solution of the problem. 
Russia’s actions through the CIS could also be qualified as a coercive hegemony from the 
prisms of the regime theory, but on my part I would also add that in this particular case, 
Russia was acting as an absolute hegemon, since no actor had ever challenged it on the given 
issue area.  
                                                                                      
3.2. Second hypothesis: problem solving capacity 
 
-  Problem solving capacity of the UN and the CIS influence their effectiveness to 
facilitate the achievement of a final settlement to the conflicts in the South Caucasus 
republics.  
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It is established by the regime theory scholars that the problems-solving capacity is defined by 
three determinants: 1) the institutional setting or the rule of the game; 2) the distribution of 
power among the actors involved; 3) efforts directed to achievement of cooperative 
solutions.325 It has been maintained at the outset of the work that although “actors’ interests” 
element is often seen as one of the determinants of organizations’ problem solving capacity, 
in the current work it is taken as an independent variable influencing the effectiveness of the 
institutions due to its potency. However, considering the linkage between actors’ preferences 
and institutions problem solving capacity, these two hypotheses are thought to be explored in 
conjunction. 
 
Looking into the problem solving capacity of the UN from the prisms of first determinant of 
problem solving capacity -institutional setting – rule of the game – one observation should be 
reinstated. The fact that in the UN Security Council each of its members holds a veto power 
greatly impairs its ability to take effective decisions. As it was seen from the suppositions of 
the regime theory in the Chapter III, the requirement of inclusiveness [which implies that in 
order for a certain decision to be implemented all members must participate] brings to the 
“law of the least ambitious program”, or the minimum threshold which could be accepted by 
the most disinterested party.326  
 
Since the consensus decision-making rule gives every participating actor a right to veto 
unfavorable decisions, this rule is considered to be a chief limiting factor for achievement of 
international cooperation and adoption of effective solutions.327 Based on these assumptions it 
could be inferred that the existence of the consensus decision making rule in the UN SC has 
indeed impaired greatly its capacity to take effective decisions and made it susceptible to the 
advancement of interests of a powerful actor or a coercive hegemon – Russia in this case – 
who was able to block any decision that did not serve its own national interests, greatly 
undermining UN effectiveness and to the detriment of the overall peace process. 
 
This is to propose that to advance its interests within the UN SC was easier for Russia 
compared for example, in the OSCE328, where Russian position were often challenged by 
other OSCE member state, including Georgia, with which Russia had an equal status without 
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a privileged “veto” power due to consensus formula. That was greatly different from the UN, 
where Russia actually had veto power within the Security Council and that is impossible to be 
altered by other smaller UN members, including Georgia, unless they are protected by other 
power with a similar prerogative. The strong Russian factor was again the main reason why 
Georgia was continuously insisting on changing the negotiation format and talking to 
Abkhazia directly without Russia, plus, also involving more actively other international 
players, like the EU.  
 
The CIS did not take any political involvement in the conflict resolution, except the activity of 
the CISPKF. Among the cautious political steps taken by the CIS were the mentioned 
decision of the CIS member states of January 19, 1996 when the Council of the Heads of 
States of the CIS adopted a resolution on “Measures for the settlement of the conflict in 
Abkhazia, Georgia”, which banned official trade, economic, financial and any other 
interactions with Abkhazia, and which was later unilaterally denounced by Russia.329 Since 
the CIS as an entire organization was not involved in conflict resolution this element of the 
problem solving hypothesis is not applicable to the analysis of the CIS effectiveness. 
 
Even though the UN involvement in conflict resolution no doubt made difference, it was 
nonetheless, remembered with its ups and downs, where much depended not only on UN’s 
ability to implement the effective mediation, but also on working and finding a common 
denominator with the actors involved in conflict resolution, such as Russia, the CIS 
peacekeeping force, as well as the conflicting parties. The degree of importance attached by 
the UN to the process of conflict resolution in the South Caucasus republics, definitely had an 
impact on its policy in the given security context. The preferred UN policy was the avoidance 
of hard security measures, like UN sanctions or peacemaking operations, hence largely 
practicing “soft actions” (fact-finding missions, political statements), normative actions 
(resolutions adopted by the Security Council). Operative measures (diplomatic, economic 
sanction) were also not undertaken. In the whole history of UN involvement in conflict 
resolution in the South Caucasus region, Security Council did not impose any diplomatic or 
economic sanctions on the parties to the conflict.  
While analyzing the problem solving capacity of the two organizations from the prisms of the 
second element, distribution of power among the actors involved - the dominant role played 
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by Russia and the lack of incentive on the part of other actors to openly challenge it - should 
be kept at the thrust of the analysis. Based on the description and findings of the empirical 
data provided in the relevant section as well as the analysis about the impact of actors’ 
interests on the effectiveness of the explored two institutions, it could well be asserted that the 
balance in power distribution among the actors in the given context was heavily shifted 
towards Russia, whose actions often remained unchallenged and even sometimes tacitly 
connived at by the less interested parties. This became one of the elements debilitating the 
effectiveness of the UN and the CIS. 
 
However, before judging too negatively the fact of deployment of only Russian forces within 
the CIS peacekeeping force, one should not forget that when Georgia requested for the UN 
peacekeeping force, the UN was reluctant to provide it. Since the OSCE also did not provide a 
peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia, Georgia had to opt for the Russian choice, with all its pros 
and cons.330 
 
This element is especially vivid in the case of the CIS which is fully dependent on Russian 
interests, who held absolute power within this entity and there was no other interplay of 
interests by other relevant CIS members. The problem solving capacity of the organization is 
fully geared to the activities and plans of the powerful actor –Russia. The fact that other CIS 
members did not provide any troops to the CIS peacekeeping force testifies to the fact that the 
organization in no way addressed the issue with high problem solving capacity. The only 
actor in the town was Russia-whose biased interests hindered from reaching any functionally 
optional solutions. In fact Russia well utilized its power and a role of a coercive hegemon in 
order to control the situation and the events that are important to others. It is argued that 
institutions are more dependent on powerful actors that the other way around.331 The case of 
Russia’s manipulation with the CIS is good proof to this statement.  
 
When evaluating the effectiveness of the two entities from the spectrum of the third element - 
efforts directed to achievement of cooperative solutions – one cannot defy the fact that such 
efforts were made on the part of the UN and the CIS, even if in the latter’s case they were 
limited to its function as a peacekeeping force. 
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Despite all shortcomings, no doubt the UN presence and the CIS PKF made some positive 
contributions to the overall security situation on the ground. The presence of the UNOMIG 
and its monitoring of the CIS PKF contributed to transparency and restricted the CIS PKF to 
advance a unilateral agenda and as was noted above, was instrumental in helping to supply 
humanitarian aid to the needed areas by providing secure transportation in difficult 
situations.332 Also, UN agencies were helpful in delivering stabilization aid.  
 
The presence of CIS PKF and UNOMIG forces was also positive in terms of addressing the 
needs of the many IDPs in Zugdidi, Kobi and Senakia areas of Mingrelia, which had been in 
anarchy during and after the defeat of Georgian forces in Abkhazia in 1993. They have 
considerably helped the stabilization of the situation since 1994 with no major outbreak of 
violence among the conflicting parties. 333 
The establishment of the security zone up to 12 km along the Inguiri river and de-
militarization of the area had good impact on stabilization of the situation. UNOMIG and CIS 
PKF were also useful in delivering humanitarian assistance help, although this was not the 
direct responsibility of the given entities. The UNOMIG and the CIS PKF Urals battalion 
helped with medical assistance and protected to victims of who were expelled by Abkhaz in 
March 1995. CIS PKF also helped in medical evacuations with providing necessary vehicles. 
The UNOMIG conducted human rights monitoring and shared information with the UNHCR. 
However, although they made positive contribution in the overall context, those were the 
mundane daily functions that were implemented by these entities, which as some analysts 
estimate, were fulfilled as the expense of their actual tasks, in order to fill the void.334   
 
CIS PKF and UNOMIG were also not able to help in creating conducive conditions for the 
safe return of the refugees and IDPs and the burden for his failure was to be carried mainly by 
the CIS PKF than the UNOMIG, since the latter was not a peacekeeping force, but a 
monitoring force. When the IDPs were facing violence by Abkhaz military during their return 
to Gail district neither CIS PKF, nor the UNOMIG made any effort to solve this problem. The 
interviews with CIS PKF personnel indicated that the understanding of this aspect of the 
CISPKF mandate on the assistance to the IDP return was very parsimonious and did not 
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consider the meddling with the work of the local authorities which are processing the relevant 
documents [author: on the basis of which they were allowing some IDPs to return and some 
were denied from their right to return]. The absence of common understanding of the relevant 
mandate and the differences in interpretation from one unit to other caused a feeble central 
command and controls of the CIS PKF units in the relevant fields.335 This in fact showed that 
the given problem – the return of the IDPs - was not addressed with high problem solving 
capacity. Although the IDP return cannot be qualified as a fully malign problem336 and with a 
little cooperation and energy it could have been addressed effectively. 
 
The UNOMIG operations were also hindered by the absence of necessary security guarantees 
from Georgian and Abkhaz police forces, and therefore, unarmed UN observes were obliged 
to rely mainly on the CIS peacekeeping force for proper protection. UNOMIG observes often 
had to restrict their movements when they were not extended the proper protection.337   
 
General conclusions 
 
Thus, based on the analysis above, several findings are to be underlined: 
 
- Influence of coercive hegemons greatly impair the effectiveness of the UN and the CIS 
[first hypothesis]; 
 
- Judging against the determinants of problem solving effectiveness, the UN and the 
CIS could be considered as organizations with low problem solving capacity given the 
features of the institutional settings [consensus/unanimity rule]; disparity of power 
distribution and shortcomings [although relatively better than the previous two 
determinants] in their efforts directed to achievement of cooperative solutions. 
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UN338 could be blamed incessantly for its inactions and failures in the context of conflict 
resolution in Abkhazia and Russian-Georgian war, for its inability to prevent the emergence 
of the conflict, for leaving the leading conflict mediation role on Russia and etc. But it should 
not be forgotten that the UN is not a unitary entity – an actor in its essence and its actor’s 
capacity339 is greatly reduced by the presence of divergent and often conflicting interests of 
its members, mostly by the coercive hegemons, which seek to fulfill their objectives by 
influencing others, or at least blocking any decisions that are cutting across with its interests. 
Moreover, since the UN does not possess autonomy vis-à-vis its members and internal 
coherence, this further diminishes its capacity as an actor, although it has some external 
activity. The fact that Russia was able to block the resolution, which envisaged the extension 
of the UNOMIG’s mandate and with that to end the UN presence in the country, became the 
vivid proof of the assertion that the UN effectiveness in facilitating a conflict resolution is 
extremely fragile vis-a-vis the preferences and interests of its powerful players.  
 
Moreover, by employing the regime theory assumptions we would argue that even if the 
organization was not helpful in reaching collective optimum – a commonly accepted solution 
to the problem, in a hypothetical noncooperative situation –if the UN did not exist on the 
ground at all, - it could be inferred that the UN involvement nonetheless, brought some 
positive input by monitoring the situation and extending at least some stabilization aid, which 
alleviated the possible extremeness to which the situation could get in the absence of the 
given regime. 
 
In the chapter III, it was described that behavioral and functional effectiveness [Behavioral 
effectiveness is defined as a behavioral change of the actors due to regime’s performance and 
functional effectiveness as a real outcome attained by the regime] of the organizations should 
be differentiated, since most regimes that make a positive change in a given problem, in fact 
fail to provide functionally optimal solutions. Based on this criterion and on our empirical 
findings it could be maintained that although in terms of behavioral effectiveness the UN role 
                                                 
338 Mostly the UN Security Council, since majority of discussions regarding Abkhazian conflict were conducted 
in the Security Council. In UN General Assembly the decisions are taken by majority, not by unanimity like in 
the UNSC.  
339 In order to be an actor, the organization must possess a minimum of an internal coherence (unity), autonomy, 
resources and external activity. In the absence of a necessary minimum of coherence an organization cannot be 
taken as a unitary actor. Possession of actor capacity increases the regime effectiveness and the effect in this 
context, ceteris paribus is greater in addressing malign problems than benign problems. (See: Chapter III, (Arid 
Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 27). 
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could somehow be estimated relatively positively, in terms of attainment of functional 
effectiveness the UN did worse due to the factors that were considered above.  
 
The same also holds true while evaluating the relative improvement, [the extent to which the 
regime has actually made difference in the solution of the given problem and came closer to 
the solution of the problem] attained by the UN efforts. Our empirical findings suggest that 
the determinants, which could be evaluated as relative improvement, such as achievement of 
ceasefire agreement, organization of bilateral negotiations between the warring parties were 
achieved by Russia’s unilateral efforts rather than by the UN as an actor. Therefore, it could 
be inferred that only some relative improvement was attained. 
 
The similar analysis as conducted above in respect to the UN could also be applied to the CIS 
PKF except the application of actor capacity element. Since the CIS participation was 
confined only to CIS PKF and hence did not contain a stronger political role in conflict 
resolution, it will not be analyzed in terms of the presence of actor capacity in a given 
organization.   
 
The entire analysis above enables to assume that in presence of certain factors that decreased 
the problem solving capacity of the organizations and hence diminished their effectiveness, 
we had the case of regimes with low problem solving capacity vs. a malign problem.340 
According to regime theory, the mixture of a badly perceived malign problem341 with the 
institution that has low problem–solving capacity is expected to bring to less effective results, 
and our entire analysis enables us to suggest that the UNOMIG and the CIS PKF in fact had 
little problem solving capacity in their task to deal with the problem that is malign in nature, 
and therefore their effectiveness was largely weakened.  
 
Although the UNOMIG and the CIS PKF could bring some improvement to the situation on 
the ground, they as institutions both came to end their activities being in a far cry from 
achieving any relative, functional effectiveness or providing a collective optimum. Behavioral 
effectiveness could be considered to be the only relative progress attained by the two 
institutions, however, even this achievement was not a full-fledged result given the fact that it 
                                                 
340 This is the part of the third hypothesis and is described in Chapter VII.  
341 In this case badly perceived malign problem is the debate over the principles of territorial integrity and self-
determination and the existence of omissions in international law regarding the correlation of the said two 
principles. This issue will be described in detail in the Chapter VII. 
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was mostly owing to Russia’s efforts that the warring parties agreed on cease-fire and 
conducting negotiations.  
 
Therefore, having analyzed the effectiveness of the UN and the CIS from the prisms of the 
first and the second hypotheses, it could be concluded that the two institutions were not 
effective in finding a final and optimal solution to the Abkhazian conflict that they were 
dealing with. Their capacity was greatly limited by the interests of the involved actors and 
their low problem solving capacity with has encountered the malign problem. However, 
having scrutinized the conflict case and considered some improvements in providing security 
on the actual conflict site, the role played by the UN and the CIS could still be evaluated 
positively assuming that in a hypothetical nonregime counterfactual, the situation could have 
been worse.  
 
Therefore, after analyzing the factors influencing the effectiveness of the two actors, it should 
be emphasized that although actors’ interests and low problem solving capacity affect the 
effectiveness of the two entities to deliver final peace, they were nonetheless, able to 
contribute positively to the overall peace process and facilitate the achievement of a final 
settlement. Therefore, despite of the fact that they were not able to attain a final solution to the 
conflicts, their activity cannot be labeled as “ineffective”. Having considered all the positive 
and negative factors, their effectiveness could be graded with “low” mark in the “low, 
medium and high” measurement scale. 
 
4. Summing up 
 
This Chapter intended to explore the roles of the UN and the CIS in South Caucasus conflict 
resolution process and the factors that influence their effectiveness to facilitate the 
achievement of a final settlement. It focused on the previous two institutions due to the fact 
that their activities were tightly interconnected with each other. Having provided empirical 
data about their conflict resolution activities in the first section, in the second section, analysis 
of their effectiveness was conducted testing the first [actors’ interests] and the second 
[problem solving capacity] hypotheses, which were formulated on theoretical assumptions of 
the regime theory. The conducted analysis suggested that the interests of coercive hegemons 
[actors] and low problem solving capacity [met with malign problem] of the institutions 
diminished the effectiveness of the two entities to attain final peace. Further, from the 
spectrum of some general regime theory suppositions it was inferred that the organizations 
were able to attain some behavioral effectiveness, while functional effectiveness remained 
 
117 
 
remote. They brought some relative improvement and in a hypothetical noncooperative 
situation their presence had positive effect, although they could not reach collective optimum. 
Despite of the fact that they managed to make some positive changes to the combustible 
security context in the given conflict case, their overall effectiveness was evaluated with 
“low” grade in the “low, medium and high” measurement scale. 
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V. INVOLVEMENT of the OSCE and ANALYSIS of ITS EFFECTIVENESS  
 
Current Chapter is targeted to assess the role of the OSCE in South Caucasus conflict 
resolution process and the factors that influence its effectiveness to facilitate the achievement 
of a final settlement. After the membership of the South Caucasus republics in the 
CSCE/OSCE in 1992342, the CSCE/OSCE also became involved in conflict resolution in 
Caucasus, mainly focusing on South Ossetian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. In Abkhazian 
conflict the OSCE committed itself to supportive role to that of the UN, which holds primacy 
in mediation of this conflict. In South Ossetia as a regional organization the CSCE/OSCE 
took a leading role in mediating conflict settlement among the warring parties, which was 
supported by the UN. On December 3, 1992, the CSCE/OSCE established a mission in 
Georgia, for particularly focusing on the conflict in South Ossetia. To mediate and seek the 
ways for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the CSCE/OSCE created 
the so-called Minsk Group in 1994. The CSCE/OSCE activity at the early stages of the 
conflicts was characterized by “soft actions” like sending Rapporter Missions to the conflict 
zones.343 The sub-sections below will illustrate the OSCE role in the Nagorno-Karabakh and 
the South Ossetian conflicts respectively. 
1. OSCE as a mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan 
Prior to the CSCE/OSCE involvement in the conflict, there were several mediation attempts, 
by individual states. In 1991-1992 Russia, Kazakhstan and Iran made the first mediation 
attempts.344 The authors of the first plan for conflict resolution became Yeltsin and Nazarbaev 
who proposed a cease-fire and the creation of the constitutional government in Nagorno-
Karabakh. However, the plan ended in failure, since at the initial stage both of the warring 
states were trying to maintain their positions through military force.345 International 
involvement, particularly by the UN was not possible at the outbreak of hostilities, since the 
conflict started before the breakdown of the USSR. This situation excluded any initiatives by 
international actors, since it could be interpreted as the interference into the internal affairs of 
                                                 
342 The CSCE/OSCE membership-Armenia, Azerbaijan (30 January 1992), Georgia (24 March 1992). 
(http://www.osce.org/). 
343 The Chairman-in- Office of the CSCE/OSCE, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier sent the first 
Rapporteur Missions to Armenia and Azerbaijan on February 12-18, 1992, to Georgia in 5-22 May 1992. (Oliver 
Paye and Eric Remacle, unpaged). 
344 Ibid. 
345 David D. Latin and Robert Grigor Suny , “Armenia and Azerbaijan: thinking a way out of Karabakh,” Middle 
East Policy Council,  (Volume VII, October 1999, N 1):unpaged. 
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a sovereign state. Financial difficulties and workload with regard to other conflicts around the 
world (mainly in Africa: Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, etc.) further 
complicated the UN involvement in the conflict.346 Therefore, the UN role was not in any way 
visible until 1993.347 It mandated the CSCE to mediate the conflict, and by doing so, 
legitimized the CSCE claims for a primary role in solving the regional conflicts under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.348 
Thus, the CSCE involvement in the conflict mediation became real, however, it was possible 
only after the two republics’ membership in the CSCE in January 1992.349 At the beginning, 
the CSCE sent a special mission of rappourters under the leadership of Czech diplomat, Karel 
Schwarzenberg to collect the information about the conflict. Another mission following the 
first one was led by Mr. Dienstdier, the CSCE Chairman in Office. 350 After the Khojaly 
massacre351 on February 26, 1992,  the CSCE intensified its involvement in the conflict, 
which led to the decision of the  Ministerial Council dated on March 24 1992, to convene a 
conference in Minsk on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, to work out the a final settlement for 
the conflict.352 However, because of the failure of this initiative, due to the lack of the 
agreement between the conflicting parties, the idea of  Minsk Conference was replaced with 
“Minsk Group”, which comprised of  eleven participating states (Belarus, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, the US, Armenia and Azerbaijan).353 
Later, on 23 March of 1995, the mandate of the Minsk Group co-Chairs was adopted, who 
were tasked with the actual work of mediation/facilitation between the parties.354 
                                                 
346 “Nagorno-Karabakh- Pawn in the major power game,” online, available from 
(http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/guides/surveys/arm.at.htm). Accessed on November 15, 2007, unpaged. 
347 In 1993 UN adopted four resolutions: N 822, 853, 874 and 884 on Nagorno-Karabakh, which confirmed 
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and demanding the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied 
territories, online, available from (http://www.un.org).  
348 “Nagorno- Karabakh- Pawn in the major power game,” unpaged. 
349 David D. Latin and Robert Grigor Suny, unpaged. 
350 Erjan Kurbanov, “The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and Prospects for OSCE  
Mediation,” in  S. Neil MacFarlane and Oliver Tharanert, (eds.) Balancing Hegemony: The OSCE in the CIS, 
(Queen’s University Kingston, Ont. Center for International Relations, 1997): 87. 
351 At night from February 25 to 26 the Armenian armed forces occupied the Azeri town of Khojaly. The 
occupation was carried out with active support of several units of the Russian Army's 366th regiment. In a few 
hours 613 innocent and unarmed were killed. Among them were 106 women, 83 children. 8 families were totally 
exterminated. 25 children were totally, and 130 children were partly orphaned. 476 people became disabled 
persons (of them 76 were minors). 1275 people were taken into hostage and even though afterwards most of the 
hostages were released from captivity, the fates of 150 of them are still unknown. (http://www.khojaly.org/). 
352 OSCE Handbook, 2000:65. 
353 At the beginning the Minsk Group consisted only of the nine participating states, excluding Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, however, later in the year the two parties to the conflict joined the Group. 
354 In the Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE 
("Minsk Conference") adopted on 23 March 1995, it is stated that: “The Co-Chairmen are appointed by the 
Chairman-in-Office; The Co-Chairmen will in their work be guided by the objectives of the Minsk Conference, 
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Perhaps it would be legitimate here to ponder about the reasons that made excluding 
Nagorno-Karabakh issue out of the CSCE framework as an organization and establishing a 
separate group to deal with the conflict. One speculation in this regard could suggest that the 
reason lied in the need to make the process of conflict resolution more effective, which would 
be exempted from larger discrepancies during the discussion process in the CSCE.  Taking 
into account the consensus decision making within the CSCE, the Minsk Group was deemed 
to carry out the process more effectively, since it was easier to reach consensus among 11 
states than among 50. Therefore, this arrangement seemed to be a more favorable option. To 
make things even more efficient, there were attempts to change the consensus rule within the 
Minsk Group for the “consensus minus one formula”, however, the idea was not supported by 
Armenia and hence, was given up. 
However, starting from the earlier days of the OSCE involvement in the conflict, number of 
events negatively influenced its effective functioning. In November 1992, an agreement-in 
principle which implied the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh was 
reached within the framework of the Minsk Group. The outcome implied the establishment of 
the special planning group in Vienna, which had to create the Advance Monitoring Group to 
be deployed in the region. Furthermore, at the Rome meeting of the Minsk group in 1992 it 
was decided to send a group of special observers consisting of 600 unarmed military 
personnel to the region to monitor the situation. However, Armenian attacks in Nagorno-
Karabakh at the time complicated the success of the plan. As a contravening measure the 
                                                                                                                                                        
i.e. promoting a resolution of the conflict without the use of force and in particular facilitating negotiations for a 
peaceful and comprehensive settlement, according to the rules of procedure as these are stated in the decisions of 
the 10th meeting of the CSO of the CSCE. The Co-Chairmen will realize full co-ordination in all mediating and 
negotiating activities, harmonizing them into a single coordinated effort within the framework of the 
OSCE….The Co-Chairmen will:  - jointly chair the regular consultations of the Minsk Group, dispatch jointly to 
the Minsk Group members, documents, information and proposals, including proposals on the dates and venues 
of the Minsk Group meetings and the set of issues to be discussed; - jointly and continuously inform and consult 
with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and jointly; - inform, on a regular basis, the Permanent Council of the OSCE 
on the progress of their work; - after consultations with the CiO, jointly inform, the President of the United 
Nations Security Council and the United Nations Secretary-General on the progress of the Minsk process and on 
all aspects of the situation on the ground, on the implementation of its relevant resolutions as well as on the 
present and future co-operation between the OSCE and the United Nations in this regard; when necessary, and 
after appropriate consultation with the CiO, present to the United Nations considerations and proposals 
concerning new resolutions that might be adopted by the United Nations Securiiy Council in the interests of the 
peaceful settlement of the conflict; - visit jointly, or when appropriate separately, on an agreed basis, the region 
of conflict to maintain contacts with parties to the conflict concerning the above-mentioned and other related 
issues; - upon consultation with the CiO, maintain necessary contacts with the ICRC, the UNHCR and other 
relevant international and regional organizations and institutions; - jointly chair the Minsk Conference and the 
preparatory meetings leading to it; - The Co-Chairmen will co-operate with the Personal Representative of the 
Chairman-in- Office in accordance with provisions contained in the Mandate of the Personal Representative. 
(See: (DOC. 525/95, Vienna), from the OSCE Delegation Website 
(http://www.delweb.osce.org).RESTIRCTED). 
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CSCE Committee of Senior Officials emergency meeting of April 1992, proposed to adopt a 
statement condemning Armenian actions. However, the initiative failed due to Armenia’s 
objections, which blocked the decision making using the consensus rule.355 
Other reasons halting the OSCE mediation process at this stage were related to the political 
tensions in Azerbaijan caused by the change of the government, and further activation of the 
Armenian military operations on the front line.356 This brought to the growing feeling of 
skepticism in the CSCE Minsk Group’s capacity to mediate the process as a whole. Therefore, 
at this stage the preference of the conflicting states - especially Azerbaijan - for the mediating 
party shifted from the CSCE to the individual actor, in this sense Russia, which was interested 
in strengthening her role in conflict mediation.357 Moreover, Azerbaijan’s membership in the 
CIS in the same year created more favorable conditions for the increased Russian mediation 
efforts in conflict resolution.358  
In fact Russian activation in the mediation process did not stem from bona fide intentions. For 
Russia this was a good opportunity to maintain her position in the South Caucasus. Without 
coordination with the CSCE, Russian government headed by Victor Chernomyrdin became 
engaged in the unilateral initiatives by organizing meetings with the conflicting parties and 
making proposals for a cease-fire. As  it also became clear from the President Yeltsin’s 
statements, Russia was trying to pursue its ”vital interests” in the territory of the former 
USSR, therefore active engagement in the Karabakh conflict was a good precondition for the 
maintenance of Russian position in the Caucasus, part of the post Soviet space.  
The former superpower has interest in the outcome of the conflicts in the post-Soviet space. 
Russian support for territorial separatists has been a major factor in enabling them to fight the 
legitimate authorities.359 In the period of the decreasing trust in the CSCE mediation, Russia 
went even further by trying to compartmentalize the mediation of the conflict only in her 
hands. Instead of the international “monitoring force” with the authorization to use force, she 
                                                 
355 Erjan Kurbanov, 89. 
356 In July 1993 Armenian forces captured further Azerbaijani territories, also the city of Aghdam, which was not 
the part of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region. 
357 Russia also was one of the Minsk group co-chairmen, however, it wanted to take unilateral initiative in the 
mediation process, since it still viewed the conflicting parties as being in the sphere of its vital interests  
358 Erjan Kurbanov, 89. 
359  Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, Taming intractable conflicts: mediation in the 
hardest cases, (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C, 2004): 57. 
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wanted to organize and control the CIS “separation force”, though under CSCE control, which 
would be able to use weapons for the maintenance of the cease-fire.360 
However, since the US was also interested in the international peacekeeping force, they 
wanted to find a compromise variant which would be acceptable also for Russia. Therefore, 
US ambassador to the CSCE John Maresca offered to Kasimirov, Russian ambassador in the 
CSCE seven conditions to supervise a case-fire361 by an international force which would also 
include Russian forces. Russia’s attitude towards the proposal was ambiguous, which 
subsequently was evaluated in the West as a “bad faith, which intended to supplant the 
international negotiating process”.362 Nevertheless, political turmoil in Russia in the fall of 
1993 put the Karabakh issue off the political agenda for a time being. This opened a path for 
the new CSCE initiative under the Swedish co-chair of the Minsk Group, Jan Eliasson, whose 
main strategy in the conflict was a shuttle diplomacy instead of the organized meetings. 
However, the revival of CSCE mediation was again halted by the new Armenian attacks on 
two regions, Zangelan and Goradiz. The primacy in the mediation process again shifted to 
Russia, who finally brokered the cease-fire, which was signed in May 12, 1994.363  
Although after the cease-fire Russia was trying to dominate in the mediation process, the new 
balance of power in the region stemming from the new geopolitical realities changed the flow 
of events. After the signing of the so-called “Contract of the Century” in September, 1994 
between the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and foreign oil 
companies on the exploration of the oil resources of the Caspian basin, 364 the Western 
interests in the mediation of the conflict started to increase.365 Also the positive change in 
                                                 
360 David D. Latin and Robert Grigor Suny, unpaged. 
361 Cease-fire was not achieved by that time; it was only a project which was prepared by the mediators to cease 
the hostilities.  
362 David D. Latin and Robert Grigor Suny, unpaged. 
363 Ibid. 
364 In September of 1994 Heydar Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, issued a decree to allow the 
State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) to sign a contract with the International Consortium of 
oil companies. The Consortium consisted of oil companies like "AMOCO Caspian Sea Petroleum Ltd".," 
"British Petroleum Exploration (Caspian Sea) Ltd., "Den Norske Stats Oleselskap A.S", "LUKoil" joint stock 
company, "Mc Dermott Azerbaijan Incorporated," "Pennzoil Caspian Corporation", "Ramco Khazar Energy 
Ltd.", "Turkish Petroleum A.O." and "UNOCAL Khazar Ltd". The contract provides oil developments in the oil 
deposits "Azeri", "Chirag" and "Guneshli" in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea, with reserves estimated 
over 500 million tonns, with the International Consortium of oil companies for the term of 30 years. (Available 
from (http://president.gov.az/oil2.htm)).  
365 Since the Western investments were at stake, stability and the security in the region were of enormous 
importance for Western powers. 
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Russia’s attitude towards the CSCE366  in view of the NATO’s eastern expansion created 
fertile grounds for the strengthening of the CSCE’s role in the mediation of the conflict.367 
1.1  Nagorno-Karabakh and the CSCE Budapest Summit  
These changes opened a new stage in the CSCE Minsk process. During the CSCE Budapest 
Summit on December 5-6, 1994, the CSCE participating states except declaring their 
commitment to the four UN resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, decided to send a 
multinational peacekeeping forces to the region. The Chairman in-Office was entitled to 
develop the composition of such a force.368 In order to assist in organizing such a force, 
Budapest Summit authorized the establishment of a High Level Planning Group (HLPG) “to 
make recommendations concerning the modalities of such a force”.369  
The interesting issue was the change in Russia’s stance towards the composition of the 
peacekeeping forces. If before that date Russia was insisting on deployment of  predominantly 
CIS forces in the conflict zone, at the Budapest summit she agreed to participate in 
multinational peacekeeping forces to be deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh, after the 
achievement of political agreement. Nevertheless, the absence of the political settlement to 
the conflict that has not been achieved so far became the harshest hindrance on the way of the 
immediate deployment of the peacekeeping forces.370 Therefore, although at the Budapest 
Summit Minsk process seemed to achieve a breakthrough in the mediation process, especially 
in view of Russia’s acceptance to participate in the multinational peacekeeping forces, this 
decision could not provide substantive progress to the process.  
1.2.Nagorno-Karabakh is on the agenda of CSCE Lisbon Summit 
Following years, especially 1996-1997 became a period of very important events in the Minsk 
process.  At the next CSCE Lisbon Summit of 1996, the Member States laid down very 
important three as a legal basis for the peaceful settlement process. The principles are as 
follows: 
                                                 
366 In view of NATO’s eastern expansion, Russia, feeling insecure started to attach more importance to CSCE as 
a pan-European security organization; therefore she took more positive stance towards the CSCE and decided to 
refrain from unilateral initiatives in the conflict mediation, for closer cooperation with the CSCE. 
367  Erjan Kurbanov, 90. 
368 “Intensification of the CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,” CSCE Budapest 
Document, 1994, from http://www.osce.org. 
369 OSCE Handbook, 2000, 65. 
370David D. Latin and Robert Grigor Suny, unpaged. 
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• Territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan  
• Legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, defined in an agreement based on self-
determination, which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule  within 
Azerbaijan 
• Guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its population, including mutual 
obligations to ensure the compliance by other parties with the provisions of the settlement.371  
However, the problem at this stage was again caused by the CSCE consensus rule. At the 
beginning of the summit, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was one of the issues to be included 
into the agenda. All these three accepted principles therefore, had to be reflected in the main 
Lisbon Document. Nevertheless, although 53 out of 54 participating states accepted the 
principles, Armenia’s rejection to give its consent made the inclusion of the above states 
principles into the main Lisbon document impossible. In fact Armenia from the beginning 
was opposing to the adoption of the principles, let alone their incorporation into the main 
document. Feeling isolated at the thought that the process was being blocked only because of 
Armenia’s intransigence, which was impossible to overcome due to the consensus rule, 
Azerbaijan took the counter position using the same method. It declared that, in case Armenia 
would object to the adoption of the principles, Azerbaijan would paralyze the whole process 
by vetoing the adoption of the Final Lisbon Document.   
The tension stemming from the conflicting positions of the warring parties was eventually 
solved by a compromise which was not to satisfy the interests of either party. The 
compromise was to include the principles, however, as an Annex to the document in form of 
the statement of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE.  Since the major issue in the conflict is 
the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the opinions of both parties greatly diverge in this 
regard, it was crucial to find a mutually agreeable solution on this issue, although this solution 
was not of help on the way of peaceful resolution of the conflict.  
Subsequent flow of events in the mediation process attested to the fact that Lisbon Summit 
also could not lay reliable grounds to reach a peaceful solution. The adopted at the Lisbon 
Summit principles are of declaratory characters that do not have legally binding power. 
Despite of Azerbaijan’s strong support to the Lisbon principles, Armenia’s dissatisfaction 
with the principles excluded the achievement of any mutually agreeable arrangement on their 
                                                 
371 Statement of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Annex 1 to the Lisbon Document, December 2-3, 1996. 
(Available from (http://www.osce.org)).   
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basis. Therefore, regardless of the fact that the adoption of the Lisbon principles was a visible 
success of Minsk process, it failed to reach any constructive solution to the conflict. Thus, this 
protracted Inter-State conflict was left in anticipation of the next steps for the peaceful 
resolution. 
1.3. Next stage in the mediation process: The Minsk Group proposals for peaceful resolution. 
 In 1997 the composition of the Co-Chairmanship of the Minsk Group, was enlarged372 in 
accordance with the Chairman-in-Office’s decision to include France, the Russian Federation 
and the United States, which remains unchanged till present time. Immediate result of the 
change in composition of the chairmanship became the Minsk Group’s famous three 
proposals envisaging possible ways for peaceful solution of the conflict. All three proposals 
aimed at finding mutually acceptable solution to the conflict, without favoring any of the 
conflicting parties.  
The first proposal called “Comprehensive Agreement on the Resolution of the Karabakh 
Conflict”373 was prepared in May and submitted in July 1997. This proposal, which also was 
known as a “package” variant for the resolution of the conflict, in fact separated the issues of 
cessation of hostilities374 (Agreement I) and the agreement on the final status of Karabakh 
(Agreement II). The interesting moment in the proposal was that, both agreements were 
supposed to be reached in one stage, without dividing the issues into two different stages. 
However, the achievement of any solution on this proposal became impossible, since the 
parties shared different views on the importance of the two Agreements (Agreement I and 
II).375 Although Azerbaijan favorably accepted the proposal, hoping to achieve any progress 
in the process, Armenia’s position towards the proposal remained somehow ambiguous. 
While on the one hand demonstrating some inclination to continue negotiation on the basis of 
the proposal, on the other hand Armenia distanced itself from the further discussions, stating 
that the proposal was unacceptable for the interests of the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”.376 
                                                 
372 Between 1992 and 1997 Italy, Sweden, Finland and Russia assumed the chairmanship. Today the co-
chairmen of the Minsk group are: Robert Bradke (USA), Igor Popov (Russia) and Bernard Fassier (France). 
373 “Minsk Group Proposal (“package deal”) July 1997,” Conciliation resources, online, available from 
(http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/keytexts18.php). Accessed on December 7, 2007, 
unpaged. 
374 The Agreement I stated: “Armenian armed forces are kept within the borders of the Republic of Armenia, 
while Nagorno-Karabakh takes its armed forces back to the limits which existed till 1988.” 
375 Azerbaijan was demanding the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories before bringing 
the status issue under discussion, while Armenia was insisting on the definition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status 
before any withdrawals from Azeri territories. 
376 In 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh still being an autonomous republic within Azerbaijan, declared its independence 
with Armenia’s active support. Although Armenia claims that Nagorno-Karabakh is an independent legal entity, 
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This strong position by Armenia halted the progress of the mediation process, which 
subsequently brought to the failure of the first proposal. 
The unsuccessful result of the first proposal brought some unanimity to the positions of the 
co-chairmen and the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments about the fact that the 
complexity of the issue excludes the possibility of its settlement within one stage.377 
Therefore, in the same year the Minsk Group came out with the second proposal for the 
peaceful settlement. The proposal called “The Agreement on the end of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Armed Conflict” was also known as “stage by stage” or “phased” solution of the 
conflict.378 Although this proposal in fact incorporated the two main issues reflected in the 
first proposal379, the difference was in the structure of the settlement process. According to 
the proposal, first of all, the Agreement I380 had to be reached after which the negotiations on 
the Agreement II381 would be started at the second stage. The proposal also implied the 
creation of the inhabitant-free buffer zone within the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Region of 1988 and the northern and southern parts of the boundary Lachin 
region of Azerbaijan where OSCE peacekeeping forces should be located. Internally 
displaced persons of Azerbaijan would return to the territories, which had to be monitored by 
the multinational forces after the completion of the first stage.382 
This proposal was welcomed by the government of Azerbaijan, which saw the liberation of its 
occupied lands and the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as an encouraging 
starting point for further discussions on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Somehow 
surprisingly, Armenia was also close to the compromise, which was due to the moderate 
changes in the Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s position towards the ways of 
conflict resolution. Ter-Petrosyan started to adopt the idea that Nagorno-Karabakh had to be 
recognized by Armenia as de-jure part of Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan had to assure the 
                                                                                                                                                        
it is not recognized by the international community. (See UN resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884; OSCE Lisbon 
Document of 1996).   
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rights of Karabakh Armenians for self-government.383  
This drastic change in the position of Armenian leadership for the first time spurred hopes for 
the success of the mediation process which could lead to the anticipated peace. However, a 
new tune in the official position of Armenian government triggered upheavals in Armenia’s 
political apex, which ended in Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation. A new government was 
formed by Robert Kocharyan, the former “president” of Nagorno-Karabakh, who in 1997 was 
appointed as a prime-minister of Armenia. Few weeks later, after Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation 
Kocharyan became an elected president of Armenia, who immediately took a hard-line 
position excluding any chance for compromise.  
After the fiasco of the second architecture for the peaceful solution, in November of 1998 the 
OSCE Minsk Group prepared the third, the most famous “common state” proposal which was 
called “On the principles for a comprehensive settlement of the armed conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh”.384 This proposal was different from the two previous ones. According to the 
proposal Nagorno-Karabakh would be a state-territorial formation in the form of Republic and 
would constitute a common state with Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized 
borders. It would have its own constitution, state attributes (anthem, flag, army, state language 
Armenian being the first, Azerbaijani the second). Citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh would have 
an Azerbaijani passport with a special “Nagorno-Karabakh” stamp as a proof of their identity. 
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would sign an agreement on delimitation of the subjects 
under their jurisdiction and mutual delegation of responsibilities between the relevant bodies 
of the state power. The appropriate representative missions of Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Azerbaijan would be set up in Baku and Stepanakert to maintain contacts. Also Nagorno-
Karabakh would have the right to establish relations with political parties and public 
organizations of foreign states. Nagorno-Karabakh would participate in implementing 
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy on issues which touch upon its interests. Decisions on such issues 
should not be taken without the agreement of both sides.385 
The proposal was accepted by Armenia as a basis for the further negotiations. However, this 
time, Azerbaijan took irreconcilable stance towards the proposed deal. Azerbaijan rejected the 
proposal and called the OSCE for a more constructive approach towards the mediation 
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process without damaging the interest of either state involved in the conflict. Azerbaijan 
regarded the proposal as largely favoring Armenian interests in the conflict by offering 
Nagorno-Karabakh the status nearly equal to independence. Azerbaijan vehemently opposed 
the third proposal calling it as a precondition for its complete capitulation. Thus, the third 
proposal could not bring the conflicting positions to a zone of agreement as well. Once again 
the mediation attempts ended without any progress.  
But the next question to be addressed here is why the Minsk Group came out with such a 
proposal being aware of Azerbaijan’s strong position about its territorial integrity. Perhaps, in 
an attempt to achieve a breakthrough, Co-Chairs were hoping that Azerbaijan being squeezed 
by its refugee and IDP problem would agree to such a deal in return of the resettlement of its 
IDP population back in the occupied regions.386 However, this is only an assumption, and any 
answer to this question could be largely debatable, since for Azerbaijan, the solution of IDP 
problem could hardly be stipulated by the loss of territorial integrity. Factors for this “biased”- 
according to Azerbaijan’s view – approach could be different.  
For instance, in view of the last “common state” proposal, speculations about the increasing 
influence of the Armenian lobby387 on the work of Co-chairmen became widespread in 
Azerbaijani society. Another factor influencing the work of the Minsk Group in Azerbaijan’s 
perspective is Russia’s position in the conflict. Although she is a Minsk Group Co-chairman, 
for Azerbaijan her neutrality in the conflict was always a big question. Russia, having a strong 
interest in keeping the conflict unresolved, and thus, the countries of the region week and 
dependent, clandestinely has always been supporting Armenia, which is her natural strategic 
ally in the region.388 In consideration of these factors Azerbaijan was regarding the work of 
the Minsk Group as less effective and partial, which is shifting from neutrality to side-taking. 
1.4.  Tet-a-tet:  where is the solution? 
After the failure of all three proposals, the Minsk Group stopped preparing new proposals, 
and the next strategy became the organization of tet-a-tet negotiations between Armenian and 
Azerbaijani leaders to discuss again all three proposals individually. In 1999-2001 the 
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387  In the US and in France Armenian lobby is very strong. 
388 Armenia shares common borders with Turkey, which is a NATO member. Therefore, Russia sees Armenia as 
a favorable strategic location to secure its southern borders against NATO. Also, among the countries of the 
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presidents met several times in Washington, Istanbul, Geneva, Davos, Moscow, Yalta, Paris 
and Key-West to discuss the ways of peaceful solution of the conflict on the basis of all three 
proposals. The conspiracy of the negotiations between the Presidents was to be followed until 
the achievement of a peace deal. In fact the peace deal could comprise of the elements of two 
or more proposals if the Presidents could succeed to achieve any progress.  
However, the negotiations were not going smoothly and none of the tet-a-tet talks could 
produce any result. On the contrary, the parties were diverging from the agreement zone even 
further, which blocked the progress of individual Presidential meetings as well. One of the 
immediate factors complicating bilateral negotiations was unequal positions of the parties. 
The parties were not negotiating on level playing field, with Azerbaijan being in “lose”, 
Armenia in “win” situation. Therefore, the achievement of a compromise in this “win-lose” 
situation seemed to be even more protracted process.  
One of the shocking events at this stage became the publication of the texts of three Minsk 
Group proposals, which had been kept in secret. At first the peace proposals leaked in 
Azerbaijani press in February, 2001, which was followed by similar action in Armenian 
press.389 However, only the text of the “common state” proposal that was brought to 
discussion in Azerbaijani parliament in February, displayed the Azerbaijani opposition’s great 
outrage and dissatisfaction with the provisions of the proposal, which was unveiled to them 
till that date. The parliamentary discussions of the common state proposal were not of much 
help, except displaying the increasing tension. After this event, both parties - Armenia and 
Azerbaijan started to make belligerent statements about the possibility of new military 
operations, which for them appeared to be the only solution to the conflict, after all mediation 
and negotiation remedies seemed to exhaust. The parties began to express different views 
about the overall effectiveness of the Minsk process. 
However, despite these crucial changes in the process, the tet-a-tet strategy was not given up. 
One of the conspicuous meetings between the parties was in Key West, Florida in April 2001, 
with the mediation of the United States. Nevertheless, optimistic expectations from this 
meeting were not justified, and it did not produce any tangible results.  
After the failure of Key-West talks and subsequent elections in both countries in 2003, the 
mediators employed a new approach towards the negotiations by establishing contacts mainly 
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on ministerial level in order to build proper environment for further negotiations by the 
presidents. Starting from 2004, the Prague Process, which envisaged direct bilateral 
negotiations between the Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers, was initiated. The 
Foreign Ministers have met several times; however, little progress is made. In February 2006, 
the two sides met near Paris with the mediation of French President Jacques Chirac, 
nevertheless, they could not agree on anything.390  
In 2004-2006 there were optimistic opinions about the window of opportunity to achieve a 
settlement between the election cycles in both countries (parliamentary elections in 2005 and 
the presidential elections in 2008 in Armenia and Azerbaijan). In 2005 during the presidential 
meeting in Kazan the Co-chairs proposed the so-called “basic principles” for further 
negotiation. However, during the meetings of Presidents in Rambuillet in February 2006, 
Bucharest in June and Minsk in November the same year, they failed to reach agreement on 
the proposed list of principles.391 In 2007, the two Foreign Ministers have met five times,392 
and the last one was their meeting at the couloirs of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, which took place in 
November in Mardid. This meeting was remembered with the introduction of the so-called 
“Madrid principles” that were presented to the parties by the Co-Chairs. These principles, in 
fact were slightly revised version of the basic principles, which were submitted to the parties 
in 2006. 
In 2008 - 2010 – two Ministers of Foreign Affairs have met in Strasbourg, Moscow, New-
York, Paris and within the framework of OSCE Ministerial Meetings in Helsinki and Athens, 
United Nations General Assembly in New York, World Economic Forum in Davos, during 
the OSCE Informal Ministerial meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, at the couloirs of the 65th 
session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, and the last one being their 
short meeting on the margins of NATO Lisbon Summit.  
Similarly, in 2008-2010, the Presidents met in Sankt-Petersburg, Moscow, within the 
framework World Economic Forum in Davos, at the couloirs of the Summit dedicated to 
Eastern Partnership held in Prague, Kishinyov, Munich, Sochi and in Astrakhan, Russia, with 
the mediation of Russian President Medvedyev. The planned meeting of the two presidents 
                                                 
390 Armenia/Nagorno-Karabakh/Azerbaijan, Global Guide, available from 
(http://www.countrywatch/com/facts/facts_default.aspx?type=text&topic=SEANA). Accessed on January 12, 
2010. unpaged. 
391 “Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War,” Crisis Group Europe Report, N 187, (November 14, 2007):.2. 
392 Ibid. 
 
131 
 
during the OSCE’s Astana Summit, which took place on 1-2 December 2010, eleven years 
after its penultimate Istanbul Summit, did not unfortunately, happen. In 2011, meeting 
between the Foreign Ministers, with participation of Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov 
happened in Moscow on January 24-25, and the meeting of the two Presidents took place on 
March 5, in Sochi with no concrete result either.  
The basic principles presented in 2006 and later revised as “Madrid principles” in 2007 are 
based on a compromise which envisages the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the 
occupied territories that are adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh region with special modalities for 
Lachin and Kelbajar districts and the establishment of interim international security 
arrangements for the region until the voting on status is conducted. 393 The main controversial 
elements are the status of Lachin corridor, liberation of Kelbajar district394 and the modalities 
of a vote on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. In general, this plan addresses the issues that are 
immediately solvable, and postpones some most difficult ones to future, including status 
issue.395 
According to the basic principles proposed by the Co-Chairs, the modalities of a referendum 
or a population vote for defining the future legal status of the region is to be agreed and 
conducted as a result of a negotiated agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and this 
vote should be conducted in a non-coercive environment in which all the citizens have 
opportunity to envisage their positions after public debate.396  
Nevertheless, the biggest problem with the status issue is the opposing views of the 
conflicting parties. Azerbaijan generally accepts the idea of a vote, however, it stipulates that 
all the expelled Azerbaijani IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh should equally participate in the 
vote and therefore, should previously be returned to the occupied areas. Also, Azerbaijan 
argues that according to Azerbaijani Constitution any vote which could result in independence 
of Nagorno-Karabakh should be a nationwide referendum, since Article 3 of the Azerbaijani 
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394  Lachin and Kelbajar are the closest to Armenia western districts of Azerbaijan. Without the guarantees for 
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district which directly links Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. This district is considered to be vital for Armenia in 
maintaining its unlimited contacts with Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, it is usually called as “Lachin corridor”. 
Azerbaijan insists on withdrawal of Armenian troops from Lachin and on common use of the corridor, while 
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Constitution states that any change in country’s borders needs to be endorsed by a nationwide 
referendum. Therefore, a population vote only in Nagorno-Karabakh will not have a legally 
binding effect for Azerbaijan.397 Azerbaijan, instead of solving the status issue through 
independence is ready to give the Nagorno-Karabakh region the highest degree of autonomy 
within its internationally recognized borders. 
Armenia, however, views this proposal positively, since the outcome of such a referendum 
would likely produce the option of independence due to the fact that the region is populated 
by Armenians. It suggests that the result of the referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh could be 
any, as well as independence, and Azerbaijan, once being engaged in the peaceful 
negotiations based on the principles proposed by the mediators should also be ready to make 
necessary amendments to its Constitution.398   
These are the most complicated issues that constitute main stumbling blocks in peace 
negotiations. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Co-Chairs will come up with new proposals. As 
they have admitted themselves: “We have reached the limits of our creativity in the 
identification, formulation and finalization of the principles. We do not believe that additional 
alternatives advanced by the mediators …will produce a different result”.399  
Another issue that should not be overlooked is Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 
February 17, 2008 and its recognition by many states, including first and foremost, USA and 
the EU. Even before that Kosovo’s’ independence become a fait accompli, Armenia was 
referring to Kosovo case as a possible future precedent for the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, while Azerbaijan was ardently denying any link between Kosovo and Nagorno-
Karabakh issues. Although international community keeps repeating that Kosovo is a “sui 
generis case” and will not be accepted as a precedent for the solution of other conflicts in 
other regions, the dilemma between pros and cons of this argument will be hard to eliminate 
or ignore. This will surely be reflected in the positions of the Armenia and Azerbaijan in 
future negotiations and no doubt, will further complicate them.  
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2. OSCE role in South Ossetian conflict  
2.1.  Negotiation formats and peacekeeping 
Upon the division of labor between the UN and the OSCE, the latter undertook the 
responsibility for conflict resolution in South Ossetia, while in Abkhazia the UN became the 
lead organization.400 The OSCE involvement in the South Ossetian conflict started after the 
establishment of the OSCE Mission in Georgia in 1992. Mission was tasked with intensifying 
the consultations among conflicting parties in finding a durable solution to the conflict, 
encouraging dialogue among the parties, monitoring the cease-fire, military situation on the 
ground and the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) to which al the parties – Georgia, Russia and 
South Ossetia – have made their force contributions. 401 The initial mandate of the Mission 
focused on four areas – securing peace, promoting the practical cooperation between the 
conflicting parties, regulating the future status of South Ossetia; providing humanitarian and 
other aid and coordinating international contacts for South Ossetia.402 
As a part of conflict resolution activity, the OSCE Mission was organizing the negotiations 
with the leaders of Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia and Russia. OSCE’s eight unarmed 
officers (Military Monitoring Officers - MMO) regularly monitored the zone of conflict 
independently, as well as together with the JPKF, and gathered information on the military 
situation on the ground and the violations of the 1992 Sochi ceasefire agreement. Often the 
MMOs alongside the JPKF undertook the intermediary role in order to diffuse tensions in the 
zone of conflict.403Five out of eight unarmed officers were based in Tskhinvali and in 2005-
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2007 MMO activities were hampered by South Ossetian security forces, mostly due to the fact 
that Ossetians view the OSCE as largely favoring Georgian stance in the conflict.404 
In order to promote confidence and security building measures, in 1993, with OSCE’s efforts 
the conflicting sides agreed to create three Joint Control Commission (JCC) and three 
working groups within it on separate issues areas – assisting in the return of refugees and 
IDPs; addressing military and security issues; and contributing to economic and financial 
activities. The JCC format included the representatives from Georgia, Russia, North and 
South Ossetia and the OSCE. This body has been instrumental in achieving certain progress 
on some fields, such as combating organized crime, restoring transport communications 
between Tskhinvali and other towns, and establishing cooperation on economic, agricultural 
and social reconstruction areas.405  
The JCC was also entitled with administering the observance of the 1992 cease-fire 
agreement, initiating and implementing conflict resolution measures, fostering mutual 
contacts and dialogue plus also coordinating the activities of the JPKF.406 According to 
Georgia’s perspective, the JCC should have focused on four priority areas: 1) to reduce the 
security threat in the region and in this context establish joint control over the Roki Tunnel 
and the Didi Gupta bridge; 2)  to take measures to strengthen the prospects for legal 
movement of people and goods; 3) to prevent the unilateral and illegal smuggling of different 
goods, including energy, into the separatist areas from the Russian Federation; and 4) to 
provide an unbiased framework for dialogue and to this end, to initiate direct dialogue 
between the local communities in the conflict region.407 
Nonetheless, as a consequence of negotiations within the JCC by the end of 1990s, 
agreements on the return of refugees and IDPs to their expelled lands and implementation of 
economic rehabilitation programmes were achieved. However, this progress was stalled at the 
early 2000, when the return of refugees and IDPs had ceased and economic situation in the 
region had considerably deteriorated. From 2003, Georgians started to observe and report the 
military build-up in South Ossetia, which was taking place with intense Russian assistance.408  
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Noticeable progress in negotiations was achieved at the OSCE’s Fourth Meeting of Experts, 
which was held in Baden, Austria on 11-13 July, 2000. At this meeting “Draft Intermediary 
Document”, which contained the basic principles for streamlining political and legal 
interactions between the conflicting sides was agreed upon. According to these principles, 
territorial integrity of Georgia, as well as the existence of special links between South and 
North Ossetia was recognized, plus the issues such as granting high level of autonomy and 
international security guarantees for South Ossetia to ensure the implementation of the 
agreement, were addressed.409 Unfortunately, that agreement remained only on paper and was 
not implemented. 
Georgians viewed the JCC as a biased formation where the three other members of the 
commission pursued similar objectives, thus constituting cross purpose with Georgia’s 
national security objectives. Georgians insisted on limiting Russia’s role in negotiations, since 
they saw it not as a tendentious party. Therefore, Georgia not once insisted on changing the 
negotiation and peacekeeping formats to a direct dialogue with South Ossetia, where the 
OSCE, the US and the EU would also take part and Russia would cease to be the main 
facilitator. Moreover, Georgia highly questioned the mediator’s role of North Ossetia after the 
joint statement of the Heads of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of South 
Ossetia on 18 September 2005, which underscored the importance of “integration” of the two 
entities. Georgia, therefore, demanded the exclusion of North Osstian battalions from the 
JPKF since its personnel solely consisted of South Ossetian soldiers.410 
Conversely, South Ossetians regarded Tbilisi as the main danger to their interests and 
objected to any format changes, since it could diminish Russian support and increase the role 
of western countries through the OSCE and the EU, which do not hide their unequivocal 
support for Georgia’s territorial integrity. They wanted formal guarantees on non-use of force 
by Tbilisi, however, with no result. Therefore, it repeatedly accused Georgia of not working 
intensively though the existing negotiation formats and blocking the peace negotiations.  
Since 2004 escalation of tensions between the parties411 the JCC mechanism has been less 
efficient with none of the conflicting sides implementing its decisions. From 2006 several 
informal talks were held, however, without producing any document and result. After 
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Moscow meeting of JCC in August 2006, the positions became tougher with Georgia insisting 
event strongly on the necessity of changing the negotiation format.412 Russia on the other 
side, considered the JCC as an important format which decisions should have been 
implemented and blamed Georgia for attempting to abolish the JCC and avoiding organizing 
any further JCC meetings even at informal level. It did not accept Georgia’s proposal for a 
new 2+2+2 format for further negotiations, substantiating that such a proposal clearly lacks 
any legal basis.413 Nonetheless, in 2007 Georgia agreed to continue some negotiations within 
the JCC format. 
With the lapse of time, previously discussed wide range of issues within the JCC, such as 
security, refugee/IDP return, economic cooperation and to some extend also the status issue 
became overshadowed by a single set of issue – economic rehabilitation – on which the 
parties seemed to be more able to communicate.414 In such a situation, Russia, on numerous 
occasions before the August 2008 events, did not hide its fears that the absence of a proper 
negotiation process would sooner or later bring to the realization of desires of the militant 
forces in Tbilisi to solve the conflict through the use of force.415 
As was noted above, the OSCE also monitored the activity of the JPKF, which was composed 
of Georgian, Russian and Ossetian battalions. The units counted up to 1, 100 troops – 530 
Russians, 300 North and South Ossetian brigades and 300 Georgians.416 Operations within the 
JPKF had to be considered and approved within the JCC. From the date of its institution until 
2003, the JPKF did some noticeable work on the ground and the security situation was 
relatively stable. However, 2004 clashes became a test case for the effectiveness of the JCC 
and the JPKF, when these mechanisms displayed their ineptness to prevent confrontations and 
attached to the interests of their states of origin, rather than serving the interests of one joint 
command for the achievement of common objectives. Since that date, the JPKF remained 
passive with increasing Georgian mistrust in its capabilities. Georgia’s dissatisfaction with the 
existing JCC framework was also extended to the JPKF format, which Georgia believed, was 
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abused by other sides to the conflict.417 South Ossetia, on the contrary, supported the JPKF as 
the security provider and accused Georgia of breaking its operation and slowing down its 
effectiveness. 
Georgia insisted that the JPKF should fulfill its immediate objective, which was the full 
demilitarization of the region and be consistent in doing so. Due to Georgia’s claims there 
was a massive flux of illegal weaponry and ammunition into the conflict zone from the north 
of the country, mostly from the Georgian-Russian state border at the Roki tunnel. Therefore, 
in order to maintain joint control over this portion of the border, a joint JPKF-OSCE 
checkpoint at Didi Gupta should have been established. In this context, Georgia also proposed 
to increase the number of OSCE MMOs in the region in order to bolster OSCE’s monitoring 
capacity.418 This proposal, nonetheless, had repeatedly been retorted by Russia before the 
August 2008, which wanted to confine OSCE’s role only to its share within the JCC and keep 
the JCC as the only valid format for the conduct of negotiations on South Ossetian conflict. 
However, after the break of August 2008 conflict the OSCE decided to increase the number of 
its MMOs in Georgia up one hundred, (twenty MMOs to be deployed immediately in the 
areas adjacent to South Ossetia), in order to contribute to the implementation of the 
Medvedyev-Sarkozi six-point cease-fire agreement.419 Lamentably, they could not perform 
any monitoring operations in South Ossetia due to Russia’s opposition to let them into the 
region.  
 
In the resolutions of Georgian Parliament of 11 October 2005, and February 15 2006, it was 
noted that in case the peace-keeping forces in the territory of South Ossetia do not properly 
implement their direct obligations, the Parliament of Georgia would demand the cessation of 
the peacekeeping operation, termination of the relevant international agreements and the 
closure of the existing structures since February 2006.420 Thus, Georgia has never hidden its 
dissatisfaction with the existing negotiation format and its desire to change it for a more 
                                                 
417 It considered the JPKF as an additional chance for Russia to equip the South Ossetian military forces and a 
possibility for South Ossetians to get advance notice of JPKF or JPKF/OSCE monitoring patrols. (See: Georgia’s 
South Ossetia conflict: make haste slowly,” 18). 
418 Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Gela Bezhulashvili at the OSCE Permanent Council 
Meeting, Vienna 14 June 2007, (PC.DEL/572/07, 14 June 2007):6.  
419 See: OSCE Permanent Council decision No. 861, of 19 August 2008, on increasing the number of military 
monitoring officers in the OSCE Mission to Georgia, (PC.DEC/861, 19 August 2008):1. Medveydev-Sarkozi 
agreement, August 12, 2008 ceasefire deal will be addressed in the Section 4 devoted to the EU role. 
420 See: Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia regarding the current situation in the conflict regions on the 
territory of Georgia and ongoing peace operations, October 11, 2005; and the Resolution of the Parliament of 
Georgia on the Current Situation in the Former Autonomous District of South Ossetia and Ongoing Peace 
Process, February 15, 2006, online, available from (http://www.parliament.ge), unpaged. 
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neutral or “unbiased” one for achieving progress in peace negotiations. Calls for 
internationalization of the negotiation format as well as the peacekeeping structure, which 
were named as ‘ineffective’, plus the necessity to ensure transparent international monitoring 
of the Roki tunnel, were ubiquitous slogans in the statements of Georgian officials.421 
 
During the subsequent JCC meetings in Istanbul on Mach 21-22 and Tbilisi 23-24 October in 
2007, although the sides discussed some security and economic issues, they still could not 
come to an agreement on the change of the format.422 Until October 2007 this body had met 
about 52 times423 and held number of informal meetings. On October 23-24, 2007, the JCC 
met in Tbilisi after more than one year’s break and the issues related to the security situation 
in the zone of conflict, the OSCE-led Economic Rehabilitation Programme,424 law 
enforcement co-operation as well as next steps in the negotiation process were discussed.425 
This became the last JCC meeting before the unleashing of notorious August 2008 events. 
With that, the OSCE led negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia broke down. 
 
2. 2. Initiatives for peaceful settlement of the conflict 
 
After the events of 2004 when the situation around the South Ossetian conflict worsened, 
President Saakashvili initiated peace plans for South Ossetia that offered wide autonomy for 
the region within Georgia. The first peace plan, which was presented by President Saakashvili 
at the 59th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2004, 
considered carrying the peace process in three stages: demilitarization, economic 
rehabilitation and political settlement. Later, Prime Minister Nogaidely prepared and 
presented a detailed road map for the implementation of this plan. At that time, during the 
meeting with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Minister Rupel held on October 17 2005, at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, South Ossetian leader Edward Kokoity expressed his 
support for this plan noting that “he was ready to make further efforts towards 
demilitarization and he was not against examining the status issue”. The plan was also 
                                                 
421 Report by the chairman of the Permanent Council on the visit to Georgia by OSCE delegations from Vienna 
23 – 29 July 2006, Vienna 7 August 2006, (CIO.GAL/147/06, 8 August 2006, RESTRICTED):2. 
422 Georgia’s South Ossetia conflict: make haste slowly,” 10. 
423 Some examples of the most recent JCC meetings - 16-17 March, 14-15 July 2004, 24-25 October, and 27-28 
December 2005, and 17-18 August 2006 in Moscow; 27-29 March and 12-13 October 2006 in Vladikavkaz; 30-
31 May 2005, 22 June, 14 September, and 28 December 2006 in Tskhinvali; informal JCC on 23 March 2007 in 
Istanbul, 20 April 2007 in Tskhinvali. (OSCE Delegations Website, https://delweb.osce.org, RESTRICTED). 
424 Will be covered at a later stage. 
425 “OSCE Mission to Georgia, Spot Report: JCC meeting in Tbilisi,” Documents of the Conflict Prevention 
Center, Vienna, October 25, 2007 (SEC.FR/412/07, 25 October, 2007, RESTRICTED):2. 
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supported by other members of the JCC, including the Russian Federation.426 On December 6, 
2005 during the Ljubljana Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE, the peace plan by the Georgian 
President received wide approval among the OSCE member states.427 After this plan’s general 
acceptance among the OSCE community, Georgia repeatedly called for the implementation of 
this plan and in this light, also stressed the need to increase the OSCE military monitors in the 
region.428  
 
However, upon the plan’s endorsement by the OSCE community, South Ossetian leader Mr. 
Kokoity proposed his alternative peace plan on 12 December 2005 that likewise presented a 
phased approach for conflict resolution. His proposed stages were however, slightly different: 
demilitarization, confidence building and security guarantees; social and economic 
command.429 At the JCC meeting held in Moscow on December 28-29, 2005, the parties 
agreed that the two initiatives – by Georgian President and the South Ossetian leader – 
contained some common points, since they both proposed a three-staged approach to the 
conflict settlement process – demilitarization and confidence-building measures, economic 
rehabilitation, and political issues. There was a general agreement that on the basis of the two 
initiatives a joint peace plan could be worked out. To this end, the parties proposed to 
establish a working group, which would draft such a joint peace plan by the beginning of 
February 2006. However, the idea could not materialize since the JCC Co-Chairs did not 
reach an agreement over the composition and mandate of such a working group. 430 
 
On April 23 2007, Georgian President submitted to the National Security Council of Georgia 
a new plan for the peaceful resolution of the South Ossetian conflict. This plan envisaged 
some real steps for setting up a temporary-administrative unit on the territory of the former 
autonomous district of South Ossetia. Although the plan itself was not made public, in 
general, the objectives of creation of such an administrative-territorial unit were said to be the 
                                                 
426 “OSCE Mission to Georgia: Spot report: Major outcomes of the JCC Meeting in Moscow 24-25 October, 
2005,” Documents of Conflict Prevention Center, Vienna 27 October 2005 (SEC.FR/456/05, RESTRICTED):2. 
427 See: Statement on Georgia, Ministerial Council, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
Ljubljana, 6 December, 2005, (MC.DOC/4/05, 6 December 2005), unpaged.  
428 “Georgian prime minister calls for implementation of South Ossetia peace plan, suggests increase of OSCE 
monitors,” Press-release, OSCE, (SEC.PR/460/06, 27 October, 2006), unpaged. 
429 Georgia’s South Ossetia conflict: make haste slowly,” 11. 
430 “OSCE Mission to Georgia , Spot Report: Major results of the JCC Meeting in Moscow, 27-28 December 
2005,” Documents of the Conflict Prevention Center, Vienna, January 3, 2006 (SEC.FR/3/06, 5 January 2006, 
RESTRICTED):2. 
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promotion of human rights, coordination of reconstruction efforts and elaboration of a final 
status for South Ossetia within Georgia.431 
 
According to this plan, the future members of this unit would get the positions of Deputy 
Ministers in Georgian Ministries of Interior, Economic Development, Finance, Education and 
Sciences, Health and Social Welfare, Culture, Justice, Agriculture and Environment. These 
deputy ministers would be given a specific mandate to manage the relevant issues in the 
territory of the former autonomous district of South Ossetia. Georgian President mentioned 
that this initiative was made in the context of the necessity to restore the rights of all ethnic 
Ossetians for self-governance and participation in political life of the country.432 After the 
establishment of the said provisional-administrative territorial entity in the South Ossetian 
territory, Georgian plan considered the appointment of Kurta based Dimitri Sanakojev, who 
was loyal to Tbilisi, to the position of the Head of the Provisional Administration.433 
 
In July 2007, President Saakashvili issued a decree on the establishment of a commission to 
work out proposals on South Ossetia’s status within Georgia. The Commission included all 
the interested parties – Georgians and Ossetians living in Georgia, also invited Russia and the 
South Ossetian leadership to participate. The work of the Commission was divided into five 
working groups, which were entitled to present recommendations on constitutional, financial, 
economic, educational and cultural matters.434 Nevertheless, despite the obvious attempts to 
find a peaceful resolution to the South Ossetian conflict and the initiation of peace plans, 
these plans failed to serve as a basis for further work and achievement of progress in conflict 
resolution. 
 
2.3. OSCE contribution to economic development of the region  
One of the areas where the OSCE contribution was the most visible was the economic 
rehabilitation programs for the region of South Ossetia. OSCE officials have also 
acknowledged the positive role of economic rehabilitation in the process of conflict 
resolution. OSCE Head of Mission to Georgia Ambassador Roy Reeve also noted that 
                                                 
431 Ibid. 
432 “OSCE Mission to Georgia, Spot Report: New plan by Georgian President towards the peaceful resolution of 
the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict,” Documents of the Conflict Prevention Center, Vienna, April 26, 2007 
(SEC.FR/168/07, 26 April, 2007, RESTRICTED):2. 
433 Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Gela Bezhulashvili at the OSCE Permanent Council 
Meeting, Vienna 14 June 2007, (PC.DEL/572/07, 14 June 2007):4.   
434 Remarks by Zurab Nogaideli, Prime Minister of Georgia at OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 30 October 
2007, (PC.DEL/1044/07, 1 November, 2007):10. 
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economic rehabilitation was able to strengthen confidence building between the sides, and 
facilitate the dialogue.435  
 
The OSCE Mission to Georgia had been instrumental in implementation of various economic 
rehabilitation programmes in South Ossetian region as well as in coordination of foreign 
assistance for the economic revitalization of the region. The Mission had held numerous 
workshops and events devoted to the return of refugees and IDPs and the economic 
rehabilitation of South Ossetian region. For instance, on 6-7 November 1997, the OSCE held 
a workshop on property rights in cooperation with the OSCE/ODIHR, the UNHCR and the 
Council of Europe in order to help the Georgian authorities to lay legal foundations for the 
return of refugees and IDPs to their homes.436 This event was one of several, which were 
realized by the OSCE efforts. 
Economic Rehabilitation Progarm (ERP) was endorsed by the Georgian-South Ossetian 
agreement signed in Sochi in 2004 and subsequently was also approved by the JCC in 2006.  
It focused mainly on economic development by helping to train local farmers in modern 
agriculture techniques, plus infrastructure rehabilitation.437During his appearance at the 
Vienna headquarters of the OSCE, on October 30, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli 
announced that his government had decided to contribute an additional 250,000 euros to the 
OSCE-ERP for South Ossetia.438 
 
One of the prominent OSCE contributions to economic rehabilitation in the South Ossetian 
region became the Needs Assessment Study in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and 
adjacent areas that was conducted at the end 2005 and beginning of 2006 the OSCE. The 
mission that was composed of the international and local Georgian and Ossetian experts 
examined the projects for the period of mid-November 2005 – February 2006 in the areas of 
agriculture, energy, social infrastructure, business development, finance and roads. This 
became the first international assessment mission, and its goals and objectives were defined 
                                                 
435 “OSCE Mission holds meeting to discuss rehabilitation projects for Georgia-Ossetia zone of conflict,” Press-
release, (SEC.PR/591/05), 16 December 2005, unpaged. 
436 Ermina Van Hoye, “The OSCE in the Caucasus: long-standing mediation for long-term resolutions,” OSCE 
Yearbook 1999, (OSCE Center for Research, Hamburg): 254. 
437Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Georgia Pledges More Aid to Promote South Ossetia's Reconstruction,” November 4, 
2007, online, available from (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110507a.shtml). 
Accessed on Novemver 11, 2010, unpaged.  
438 Remarks by Zurab Nogaideli, Prime Minister of Georgia at OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 30 October 
2007, (PC.DEL/1044/07, 1 November, 2007):9. 
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by the concept developed by the OSCE and approved by the JCC at the Moscow meeting on 
22-23 June 2005.439 
 
On June 14, 2006, Donors’ Conference was held in Brussels, which aimed at undertaking 
certain responsibility by other members of international community alongside the OSCE for 
the social and economic rehabilitation of the region. The rehabilitation projects were actually 
the ones which were identified by the mentioned OSCE-led Needs Assessment Study. The 
participating states of the conference promised to donate 10 million for the economic 
rehabilitation in the zone of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict.440 This conference in fact 
was the first one of its kind for the OSCE where the four Co-Chairs of the JCC also took 
part.441 Georgia itself donated 7.8 million euro for the economic rehabilitation of the region 
and had also initiated a State Commission which was responsible for considering financial 
and economic plans for the integration of South Ossetian region into Georgia as well as its 
economic development.442  
 
In general, economy seemed to be the only area on which Georgians, Ossetians, plus Russians 
seemed to be able to come to an agreement. Nonetheless, not everything was smooth on this 
field either. Both Georgia and Russia launched their own economic rehabilitation assistance to 
South Ossetia and at times, the two appeared to be at race over who would make the biggest 
contribution to the economic rehabilitation of South Ossetia and hence gain bigger influence 
in the region. There were some accusations towards Georgia that in its economic policy, it 
was predominantly favoring the Kurta based – Sanokaev administration, while Russia was 
rendering its own economic assistance to the region bypassing any international – including 
the OSCE framework, which occasionally caused enragement on Georgia’s part.443 
                                                 
439 The OSCE-led Needs Assessment Study in the Zone of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict and Adjacent Areas, 
Summary Report, April 2006, (OSCE Mission to Georgia, Press and Public Information Office):1. 
440 The pledges were: European Commission (two million euros), the United States (two million US dollars), 
Sweden (one million euros), Belgium (one million euros), Germany (500,000 euros), the Netherlands (500,000 
euros), Norway (about 250,000 euros), Spain (200,000 euros) and Finland (200,000 euros). Estonia, Turkey, 
France, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Italy, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland and Andorra 
pledged amounts up to 150,000 euros, making a total of about 7.9 million euros. See: “OSCE donors pledge 
more than 10 million euros for economy in Georgia/South Ossetia,” Press release, (SEC.PR/233/06, 14 June 
2006). 
441 “OSCE donors pledge more than 10 million euros for economy in Georgia/South Ossetia,” press release, 
(SEC.PR/233/06, 14 June 2006), unpaged. 
442 Remarks by Zurab Nogaideli, Prime Minister of Georgia at OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 30 October 
2007, (PC.DEL/1044/07, 1 November, 2007):14. 
443 For example, at 2006 donors’ conference, Russia promised to allocate about $ 3 million for economic 
rehabilitation of South Ossetia. On Georgia’s part it was understood that this aid would be given under the 2000 
bilateral Russia-Georgia agreement on economic rehabilitation and in coordination with the OSCE. However, 
Russia referring to the delays on OSCE part, had directly financed seven projects by the end of 2006, which 
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After the bloody war between Russia and Georgia and the recognition by Russia of South 
Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence, the OSCE was entangled with a thorny task of 
keeping its presence and role in Georgia in the situation of complete loss of control by the 
Georgian authorities over the security balance in the country and in its breakaway regions. 
The mandate of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, which expired at the end of 2008, was not 
further extended due to a strong opposition of the Russian Federation to give its consent to the 
continuation of this mission in Georgia, without opening the same representations - in 
Russia’s parlance - also for newly established states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia444.  
 
Upon OSCE’s rejection of Russia’s calls “to recognize the new realities” and pursue the 
policy of “equal representation” in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia became 
more intransigent to agree to the extension of the organization’s mandate and hence, the 
OSCE Mission in Georgia had to put up with its closure starting from the beginning of 2009. 
Consequently, all the activities implemented by the OSCE Mission in Tbilisi, including its 
military monitoring activities in the region had to be terminated. Ultimately, following the 
cessation of the JCC activity at the late 2007, August 2008 clashes and the subsequent closure 
of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, OSCE’s sole mediation of the South Ossetian conflict came 
to an end.  
 
Subsequent to these dramatic developments, new negotiation format – Geneva talks - which 
was launched in November of 2008 and hosted by the European Union, became the main 
forum for the discussion and interaction among the parties to South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
conflicts, once the UN and the OSCE led processes came to an end. This format, alongside the 
EU also included the representatives from the UN, OSCE as well as Georgia, Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Russia. About fifteen rounds of talks have been held so far, the last one on March 
4-5, 2011, and those talks addressed wide range of issues such as stability and security in the 
region, return of IDPs and refugees, non-use of force and international security guarantees etc. 
One of the stumbling blocks of the talks became the status issue, since Tbilisi completely 
retorts to recognize the independence of the two regions and therefore, denies signing any 
international agreements with them, including the agreement on non-use of force.  The 
necessity of signing such an agreement had been advocated by Russia and South Ossetia, 
                                                                                                                                                        
caused opposition by Georgia, who also blamed Russia in increasing the payment of salaries and pensions to 
South Ossetians after the closure of Ergeni market, which was the main market for Ossetians to maintain their 
economic interactions with Georgia. (See: Georgia’s South Ossetia conflict: make haste slowly,” 23).    
444 Emphasis mine. 
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inasmuch as they consider Medvedyev-Sarkozi agreement not to be sufficient for the 
independent republics’ security from future possible offensive of Tbilisi. Tbilisi on its part 
maintains that this kind of non-use of force agreement could be concluded only with 
Russia.445 
In sum, OSCE’s leading role in mediating the South Ossetian conflict came to an end after the 
August 2008 events, and with the initiation of multi party Geneva talks it started to act as one 
of the three joint Co-Chairs who undertook the task of mediation of South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian conflicts. This change of format was actually what Tbilisi was clamoring for since 
long time, feeling marginalized in the JCC format. However, the price Tbilisi paid for this 
change happened to be too expensive, since the independence of the regions and their 
recognition by Russia and few other actors of international law seems to be irreversible. 
3. Analysis of effectiveness from the prisms of regime theory and theoretical approach to 
international mediation  
 
Having provided an overview to the OSCE involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh and South 
Ossetian conflicts this section further aims to conduct the analysis of the OSCE effectiveness 
in dealing with the mentioned conflicts. For this purpose, the two hypotheses [actors’ interests 
and problem solving capacity] based on regime theory assumptions will be tested. Moreover, 
OSCE role in addressing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will also be analyzed from the 
prisms of mediation theories by virtue of the fact that regime theory cannot explain fully most 
aspects of OSCE mediation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and will largely be useful in 
highlighting the internal dynamics within the Minsk Group. This is because the Minsk Group 
cannot be regarded as a full-fledged regime given the specifics of its institutional build-up. 
 
3.1. OSCE Minsk Group activity in Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
through regime theory hypotheses 
 
3.1.1. First hypothesis: powerful actors’ interests 
 
-  Interests and preferences of the concerned powerful states influence the effectiveness of the 
OSCE to facilitate the achievement of a final solution to the conflicts in the South Caucasus 
republics.  
                                                 
445 “Geneva talks on Caucasus end in deadlock,” AbkhazWorld, Wednesday 9 June, 2010, online, available from 
(http://www.abkhazworld.com/headlines/489-geneva-talks-june-2010.html). Accessed on September 23, 2010, 
unpaged. 
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At the outset, I will focus on testing the two hypotheses in the case of OSCE Minsk Group 
activity and for this purpose, will start with illuminating the first hypothesis - the role of the 
concerned powerful actors within the OSCE Minsk Group. 
 
Russia. The impact of Russia’s interests on the effectiveness of the OSCE is more complex 
compared to its role in the CIS and the UN given the fact that the organization fundamentally 
differs from the two in terms of its reason d’etre, founding concepts, number, geography of 
its membership, and many other indicators.  
 
This is not to assert that Russia has been very successful in advancing its interests446 within 
the OSCE realm. Not in the least, provided the fact that OSCE membership also includes 
other potent actors, like the US, the EU member states, and finally, the conflicting parties 
themselves, which also hold veto power alongside Russia. However, the consensus decision 
making rule of the organization makes it possible for Russia to undermine any plans, if 
desired, for a more active OSCE involvement in the conflict resolution in the South Caucasus 
region if that is attempted by the conflicting parties themselves or by any other interested 
OSCE state, provided that the remaining OSCE participating states maintain at least neutrality 
in the given case. 
 
Russia is one of the three Minsk Group co-Chairs447 in the mediation of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict since 1992, and has been participating actively in the formulation of the 
proposals that were made by the group. As a country that shares several decades of common 
history with the parties to conflict, and having bigger input into their history and culture, 
Russia in fact has the earnest potential to make difference in the peace process, if there would 
be political willingness to do so.  
 
It takes no ingenuity to know that having such a strong economic and political influence on 
Armenia, it would cost Russia almost nothing to talk Armenia into withdrawing its forces 
from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and with that to contribute immensely to the 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and establishment of interactions between the 
two countries. Instead, visually Russia maintains an image of a third-neutral actor, which is 
                                                 
446 For more information on Russian interests in the region see Chapter I, Section 2. 
447 Minsk Group co-Chairs at times will be simply referred to as Minsk Group. In fact, Minsk Group has larger 
membership than the three co-Chair states, however, since 1997 no meeting of the Minsk Group was conducted 
and the main work is done by the co-Chairs. 
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trying to help, but expects that the solution is to be found by the parties themselves. In reality, 
though, it supports Armenia though all means, up to “granting” it with the free armaments and 
ammunition, and to Armenia’s disappointment, also sells weapons and heavy artillery to 
Azerbaijan.448  
 
Nonetheless, Russia has actually done quite a notable work of a mediator by facilitating 
bilateral and trilateral (with the participation of Russian president) meetings between the 
presidents and hosting them,449 when that did not present to be possible by the efforts made 
within the OSCE, its Minsk group in its entirety or the co-Chairs.  
 
Moreover, it was for Russia that the ceasefire agreement was finally achieved in 1994 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which ended the bloodshed. Since there are also some 
achievements that became possible owing to Russia’s participation, analysis of these and 
similar facts does not make it acceptable to unequivocally claim that Russia’s overall 
influence on the conflict resolution in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was fully biased and 
served its egoistic national interests. However, it would also be not correct and naive to 
believe that Russia’s peace activity in the given context did not have a hidden agenda. Often, 
Russian activism in the conflict resolution process was dictated by its motivation to be 
monopolize the conflict resolution process, which would facilitate the inculcation of its vision 
of the peace process or at least to be abreast of all the relevant developments in order to 
guarantee the flexibility of its policy and be able to “pull the leverage” at the right moment if 
any, or both of the parties show the signs of constructivism and the desire to agree upon a 
peace deal. 
 
Against the picture of the aforesaid, it is indeed rather difficult to give a clear cut positive or 
negative estimation to Russia’s complex game plays in the region and in the solution of its 
conflicts. Despite of some positive inputs that were possible through Russian efforts, overall, 
its role as a co-Chair of the Minsk Group has become another forum for the advancement of 
its own national security interests. Surely, the fact that one of its influential actors has such 
entrenched interests in the region and pursues a well-thought, but a disguised policy of 
Realpolitik, debilitates the effectiveness of the given institution and runs the risk of making it 
                                                 
448 Open facts about Russian sells of weapons and armaments to both countries are reflected in annual 
information exchanges conducted within the relevant frameworks of the OSCE and the UN.  
449 See the first section of the current chapter. 
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a tool, which would serve the interests of certain actors, and not the purpose of peaceful 
settlement of the conflict.            
 
United States. The US together with Russia is one of the co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk 
Group. General image that the US wants to maintain towards the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict is that of a neutral mediator, who is interested in the soonest settlement of 
the conflict and expect that the solution of the problem is to be achieved by the parties 
themselves. Although the US is interested in maintenance of security and stability in the 
region and there is a good understanding of the fact that without the solution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, this will be difficult to achieve, the US is nonetheless, is averse to 
employing any other coercive measures against the conflicting parties in order to force them 
for a speedy solution of the problem. The US has repeatedly recognized the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan and in its relevant reports450 had acknowledged the occupation of 
Azerbaijani territories by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia.  
 
Nonetheless, when it came to its function as a Minsk Group co-Chair the US had never voiced 
unequivocal support for any of the two principles: territorial integrity and self-determination 
of peoples, and chose to perform a balancing act between the two conflicting states: Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. If Azerbaijan presents to be a strategic hub for US’s economic interests in the 
region, Armenia counterweights this influence with its powerful Diaspora in the US. In this 
light, it is hard to conclude whether the US has positive or negative influence on the 
effectiveness of the OSCE in the context of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. Its influence on the effectiveness of the OSCE is more reserved compared to Russia, 
in this case. However, it is still valuable for Azerbaijan given the fact that Azerbaijan views 
the US as the only non tendentious Minsk Group co-Chair, compared to Russia and France, 
which in deeds are more pro-Armenian than the US.  
 
                                                 
450 The United States Department of State, in its human rights report on Armenia for the year 2006, states: 
“Armenia continues to occupy the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding 
Azerbaijani territories”. The similar report on Azerbaijan also emphasizes this fact: “Armenian forces controlled 
most of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as large portions of adjacent Azerbaijani territory” and “Armenia continues 
to occupy the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani territories”.(See: 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2006, Armenia, section 1 (a). Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices, 2006, Azerbaijan, introductory section). 
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France. France as one of the Minsk Group co-Chairs also has a certain role to play in the 
conflict resolution. France is one of the countries which has vast Armenian diaspora451 and 
behind scenes, its neutrality and ability for effective mediation is often questioned by 
Azerbaijan. Inclusion of France as a Minsk Group co-Chair in 1996 to replace Finland was 
met with Azerbaijan’s concern, while supported by Armenia. Besides Armenian factor France 
compared to Russia and the US does not have strong interests in the region, which would also 
influence its mediator’s role. However, the existence of vast and influential Armenian 
diaspora in France, which raises the profile of and the sympathy for Armenians is already 
estimated as a hindrance for France’s neutral mediating efforts. Like Russia and the US, 
France also prefers to keep its silence on the issue of “territorial integrity” and underlines that 
the two principles [territorial integrity and self-determination] to which the parties refer have 
to be equally respected.  
 
Turkey. What concerns Turkey, as the Section 2 of the Chapter I illustrated, this country has 
special connections with Azerbaijan and supports its position in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. It is because of the fact that Azerbaijani territories were occupied, Turkey had closed 
its borders with Armenia in 1993 and ceased its diplomatic relations with the latter. Although 
Turkey is not represented in co-Chairmanship institute, it is nonetheless known that Turkey 
tries to support Azerbaijan’s position within the OSCE whenever and wherever possible. 
Having engaged itself with the practice of joining the common EU statements that are often 
delivered at the OSCE on various issues, Turkey, however, always issues a statement in 
national capacity when it comes to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and does not join the common 
EU statements, which often omit and carefully bypass to mention the support for the principle 
of territorial integrity out of considerations to balance the interests of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Turkey conversely, always enunciates its support for the principle of territorial 
integrity in the given context. 
 
Azerbaijan not once expressed its concern about the fact that the Minsk Group co-Chairs are 
being partial in their attitude towards conflict resolution and pursuing a policy of double 
standards by implicitly approving the deeds of the occupier state. Nonetheless, it still does 
continue the negotiations within this format and has not insisted on the format change. The 
                                                 
451 The estimated number of Armenians in France differs – but the figures are around 500,000. According to 
ArmeniaDiaspora.com there are 400,000 Armenians living in France. Mostly they live in Paris (200,000), Lyon 
(100,000), Marseille (80,000) and Valence (up to 10,000). (from Wikipedia, online Encyclopedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenians_in_France). 
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only change Azerbaijan wanted to bring to the Minsk Group format was the inclusion of 
Turkey in order to somehow balance the already disturbed in Armenia’s favor equilibrium 
(with France, Russia being openly pro-Armenian countries, and the US having strong 
Armenian lobby influence). This proposal was lambasted and not accepted by Armenia, who 
on the contrary argued that Turkey does not have diplomatic relations with Armenia and 
therefore, could not be a Minsk Group member. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia does not want to 
change anything in the current format. 
 
After getting a general glance at actors that are parts of the OSCE Minsk Group co-
Chairmanship institute it is time to move to testing the two hypotheses of the regime theory. 
In the given case, the interests of powerful actors no doubt influence the effectiveness of the 
OSCE Minsk Group, in different ways though. From the Chapter III dedicated to the UN and 
CIS effectiveness analysis we came to conclude that the interests of a single actor – Russia 
was the main driving force in defining the level of effectiveness of the two institutions to 
make difference in conflict resolution. Russia’s hegemonic role was enhanced by low profile 
chosen by other members of the two institutions towards the conflict resolution in the South 
Caucasus and their tacit agreement to leave the leading role for Russia if the latter desired to 
do so. 
 
In case of the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia, however, is not the only game in town, with the 
US and France also sharing the burden of mediation activity. It is rather difficult in this case 
to assert that Russia has managed to entrench its coercive hegemony as in the case with the 
UN and the CIS in the given case, since no decisions are taken within the Minsk Group per se 
and it only fulfills a mediation activity by bringing out proposals to the consideration of 
warring parties. Surely, Russia’s intentions in respect to the region are well known, however, 
Minsk Group format is not the framework where Russia or any other Minsk Group member 
could fundamentally influence or change the outcome, due to the fact that Minsk Group is not 
vested with decision making authority. The best the Minsk Group co-Chairs declare 
themselves to be able to do is to present the peace proposals to the consideration of parties 
and shuttle between them for organization of meetings, without taking additional 
responsibilities for inducing any proposal on any party.  
 
However, in practice Azerbaijan often decries Minsk Group co-Chairs of maintaining 
unconstructive position in peace process and even conniving at Armenia [especially Russian 
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influence on Armenia in order for the latter to tighten its position], which it considers to be 
the occupying state. However, since the peace negotiations are carried out in a highly 
classified manner, it is difficult to see any real expressions of Russia or any other Minsk 
Group co-Chair influencing any of the parties to take certain actions. These phenomena is 
hard to prove, since as it was mentioned, Minsk Group co-Chairs do not have a decision 
making capacity and backstage political interactions between the co-Chair states and the 
conflicting parties are often left in the dark and unspoken side of the process.   
 
Paragraphs above lead to the thought that the first hypothesis of the regime theory – Influence 
of powerful states – although applicable to the give case, cannot really explain the 
effectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group. As it is seen from the provided empirical data, 
backstage interactions of the powerful states are not poured into the Minsk Group format, 
which tries to maintain an image of a third party mediator. It would be erroneous to look for a 
coercive hegemon within the Minsk Group co-Chairmanship, since all co-Chairs have equal 
status, and again, no decisions are made within the Group. Therefore, although the first 
hypothesis in the given case could to some extent explain the dynamics within the Minsk 
Group, it cannot explain the degree of its effectiveness. 
 
3.1.2. Second hypothesis: Problem solving capacity 
 
- Problem solving capacity of the OSCE influence its effectiveness to facilitate the 
achievement of a final settlement to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics  
 
Regarding the second - problem solving capacity hypothesis, it should be recalled that 
according to regime theory, the problem solving capacity is defined by three determinants: 1) 
the institutional setting or the rule of the game; 2) the distribution of power among the actors 
involved; 3) efforts directed to achievement of cooperative solutions.452 In juxtaposing the 
Minsk Group co-Chairs performance against these determinants, we would suggest that only 
the third element could be applicable in the given context, since the Minsk Group has been 
quite active in working out different proposals directed to final solution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. The first and the second elements are not really helpful in this case, 
because firstly, the Minsk Group is not a decision making, but a consultative body, which 
                                                 
452 See Chapters III and IV. 
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does not take decisions as such, and secondly, the power distribution in this case is not upset 
in favor of any actor.  
 
However, the first element was relevant though, when the Minsk Group attempted to operate 
on a broader OSCE level given that the OSCE is a consensus organization and any decisions 
could be blocked by opposing party. As it is seen from the section describing OSCE role in 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in the initial years of the Minsk Group  mediation this is what 
actually took place with Armenia for instance, blocking the inclusion of certain principles 
offered by the Minsk Group into the 1996 Lisbon document and Azerbaijan therefore, 
rejecting the adoption of the whole Final Lisbon Document.  
 
Perhaps understanding the limitations of a consensus rule within the OSCE starting from 1997 
the Minsk Group started to operate in a more narrow composition for facilitating the actual 
work, - only the co-Chair members, - circumscribing itself to the development of some 
proposals and submitting them to the consideration of parties. Moreover, despite of the fact 
that Minsk Group actually consists of eleven states,453 no meeting of the group took place 
since 1997 and the main work was done by the three co-Chairs. No major decision was taken 
within the larger OSCE context henceforth, despite some standard statements and positions 
expressed during the OSCE Ministerial meetings. 
 
General conclusions 
 
Hence, the paragraph above helped to clarify that although the OSCE is a consensus 
organization and regime theory assesses the consensus decision making rule as the factor 
diminishing the effectiveness of organizations, in the case of the Minsk Group [detached from 
the broader OSCE context], however, OSCE’s consensus decision making was not a 
hindrance. Thus, the two hypotheses of the regime theory are not fully successful in 
explaining the OSCE Minsk Group performance in negotiating a solution to Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, and can provide some explanations to the internal dynamics and history of 
the OSCE Minsk Group. Therefore, for analyzing the effectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group 
the assumptions of the mediation theories will be referred to. However, some general regime 
theory suppositions could still be useful in suggesting the following: 
 
                                                 
453 See the Section describing OSCE role in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
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- Like the UN and the CIS, the OSCE in dealing with Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also 
lacks actor’s capacity due to the existence of different and often opposing interests of 
its members. Therefore, in order to increase possible effectiveness, smaller institution, 
i.e. Minsk Group was created, which has consultative function. 
 
- OSCE through its Minsk Group although has not so far been able to achieve final 
solution to the conflict [like in the case with the UN and the CIS] – functional 
effectiveness, - it has however, been able to achieve some behavioral effectiveness - 
by bringing the parties to negotiation table, where they talked over the ways of 
solution.  
 
- What concerns the achievement of relative improvement,454 the OSCE Minsk group 
activity could be graded as “satisfactory” in a scale which ranges from “bad, 
satisfactory, good and excellent”. To put it in more general terms, it could be 
suggested that there has been some relative improvement.  
 
- While measuring the Minsk Group performance against the hypothetical ideal solution 
– a collective optimum [a common achievement based on the accommodated interests 
of the parties], and the noncooperative situation [or non regime counterfactual - 
evaluate the hypothetical state of affairs if regime did not exist at all], it could be 
suggested that in the first case the result is not very satisfying, while in the latter case, 
the OSCE Minsk Group had indeed made considerable difference. Had this entity not 
been in place, the current state of affairs in the peace negotiations would probable 
have been worse off, or perhaps did not exist at all. Therefore, although the Minsk 
Group failed to this day to achieve a collective optimum solution, it nevertheless, 
managed to make difference if tested against the noncooperative situation.  
 
In the next part, analysis of OSCE Minsk Group activity will be done from the prisms of 
mediation theories. 
 
 
                                                 
454 The extent to which the regime has actually made difference in the solution of the given problem and came 
closer to the solution of the problem. 
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3.2. OSCE Minsk Group effectiveness/success455 through theoretical approach to international 
mediation  
 
Having concluded that the first and the second regime theory hypotheses cannot fully explain 
the effectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group, theoretical approaches to international mediation 
were chosen as alternative instruments for evaluating the effectiveness of the OSCE Minsk 
Group. Theoretical approaches to international mediation suggest that the effectiveness of the 
OSCE Minsk Group is contingent upon the following factors: 1) previous relations between 
the conflicting parties; 2) nature of problem; 3) mediation strategies; 4) impartiality/or 
perceived bias of the mediators.  
 
Since achievement of cease-fire the situation on the ground is more or less the same, 
however, it should be noted that the possible success of the OSCE mediation activities is 
dependent on a number of different factors that I will describe below. 
 
For the beginning, I will incorporate the theoretical assumptions of mediation theories that 
were laid out in the Chapter III. One of the factors defined as influencing the success of 
mediation is noted to be the previous relations between the conflicting parties, since if the 
previous relations between the warring sides were friendly, then it is assumed that the 
mediation could be more successful than in the case if the parties had past animosities.456  
 
While sketching the success of OSCE efforts from prism of previous relations between the 
parties, one could imagine how the co-Chairs are challenged by mediating between the 
parties that share a hostile and conflicting past, when hatred and antagonism are the dominant 
features in their mutual perceptions.457 The fact the Armenians and Azerbaijanis have a 
history of ethnic clashes complicates the achievement of rapprochement on the disputed 
issues thus diminishing the chances for successful mediation.   
 
Another determinant influencing the outcome of mediation is considered to be the nature of 
the dispute. It is suggested that when vital interests such as sovereignty and territorial integrity 
are affected, it is much more difficult for the mediators to succeed. Therefore, the nature of 
                                                 
455 “Effectiveness” and “success” in the case will be used interchangeably. 
456 See Chapter III (Jacob Bertcovitch and Allison Houston, 22).  
457 See Chapter II for more information.  
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problem and its perception by the sides to the conflict have significant impact on chances of 
achieving effective or the opposite result.458 
 
Indeed, looking through the prisms of this statement, it could be argued that the successful 
mediation of the OSCE in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is to a large extent dependent on as 
many like to refer “intractable” nature of the conflict, which inhibits the chances for 
achievement of successful results. One of the reasons why the conflict is deadlocked has to 
do with the usage of two principles of international law by the parties to the conflict: 
territorial integrity and the rights of peoples to self-determination.  
The fact that the two sides to the conflict defend their positions based on these principles, 
leads to the debate about the norms of international law, inviolability of internationally 
recognized borders and legality/illegality of putting the rights of peoples (national minorities) 
to self-determination superior to the preservation of territorial integrity of a state. Before 
elaborating more on this determinant of mediation effectiveness/success, I should note that 
this theoretical assumption coincides with the third regime theory hypothesis [nature of the 
problem] and will be dwelt on in details in the Chapter VII of the dissertation.  
 
The next factor in the given context is the strategies of mediation. Three main strategies are 
believed to lead the mediation behavior: communication-facilitation strategies [function of 
communication between the parties with a little control over the substance of the issues], 
procedural strategies [mediators have a more formal control and may define the technical 
factors such as mediation environment, number and type of meetings, agenda of the 
meetings] and directive strategies [mediators influence the content, substance as well as the 
process of the mediation]. Often, in the latter case, mediators provide incentives, issue 
ultimatums, offer rewards and punishments, and introduce new proposals. It is assumed that 
directive strategies are more advanced and successful than other strategies.459   
 
Based on these assumptions, it could be seen that the OSCE mediation is in rather advanced 
stage and throughout its involvement in the mediation activity the Organization has used 
directive strategies. Perhaps, this could be evaluated as being the most important successful 
element in the overall activity of the Minsk Group. As it was highlighted before in the work, 
the Minsk Group has initiated three proposals and has elaborated the list of basic principles to 
serve as a basis for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. All of these proposals are workable 
                                                 
458 See Chapter III (Jacob Bertcovitch and Allison Houston, 22-25.) 
459 See Chapter III (Jacob Bertcovitch and Allison Houston, 30). 
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and plausible, provided that there is a political will of the parties to arrive at a solution based 
on mutual concessions.  
 
However, there is one detail in the nature of the Minsk Group affecting the outcome of peace 
negotiations, which should not be overlooked. The problem about the OSCE meditation is 
that the Minsk Group has self-confined only to working out new deals and proposals, without 
undertaking a responsibility for their acceptance by the parties. It has become a tradition that 
in case if any of the conflicting parties is not satisfied with the proposed deal, the OSCE 
Minsk Group would still leave it at their discretion, this time preferring communication-
facilitation strategy, would wait for the parties themselves to find zones of agreement. The 
OSCE does not use any other tool (such as incentives, ultimatums, rewards or punishments) 
in order to influence the position of any party. It is another question whether the OSCE is in 
possession of those necessary tools; however, this does not change the end result. 
 
Therefore, in terms of providing the parties with food-for-thought and being involved in the 
substance of the negotiations, the OSCE Minsk Group could be considered as doing a 
successful job, which, however, I argue is not a full success. Considering the overall picture 
of peace negotiations between the conflicting sides, the OSCE mediation could perhaps be 
labeled as being partly successful, since it has indeed succeeded in initiating a dialogue 
between the parties,460 nonetheless, the final peace unfortunately, is yet seems to be 
unattainable. Yes, the OSCE Minsk Group has initiated intensive bilateral talks and 
negotiations, it has used directive strategies and provided the parties with new proposals, 
however, it lacks the capacity to influence behavior of the parties and is fully dependent on 
their opinions. 
 
In fact the only OSCE structure on the site is the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-
Office, a Polish Ambassador Andrzej Kasprczyk, whose mandate does not include the 
conduct of direct negotiations. Seventeen years of mediation has been remarkable with the 
initiation of frequent and continuous bilateral Ministerial and Presidential meetings, 
preparation of blueprints of future peace deals, which most lamentably, in themselves cannot 
be taken as signs of success without being underpinned by the achievement of a final peace 
deal. 
 
                                                 
460 The most visible success during the process - the cease-fire between the parties were negotiated mainly by 
individual actor, Russia, not by the OSCE  
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The last but not the least issue that is to be addressed in the given context is the notion of 
impartiality of the mediators. Scholars researching the given phenomena maintain that in 
many mediation cases impartiality lies in the heart of the successful outcome and the parties 
tend to trust the mediator which is considered to be impartial.461  
 
Judging against the above assumptions on bias and impartiality of mediators, it should be 
recalled that occasionally Minsk group co-Chairs are mostly blamed [especially by 
Azerbaijan] for not being able to act as neutral and unbiased negotiators, and instead, acting 
as the representatives of their respective governments due to the presence of certain interests 
of the mediating states462 in one of the conflicting parties  [in this case Armenia] and 
therefore, inclination towards the position of the given state.  
 
Although the Minsk Group co-Chairs try to maintain the image of impartiality and refrain 
from apparent side-taking to a maximum extent, some concrete examples exist where signs of 
partiality were discernable. For example, the recent behavior of the mediating states during 
the discussion of the resolution initiated by Azerbaijan - “Situation in the occupied territories 
of Azerbaijan – at the 62th session of the UN General Assembly (UN GA) in 2008 attested to 
the above conjecture that the mediators might indeed be not as impartial as they intended to 
look. To start with, let me note that most analysts estimated Azerbaijan’s initiation of this 
resolution for the UNGA as an attempt to exert some pressure on the Minsk Group, which 
effectiveness was often questioned by it.  
 
Armenia spoke tirelessly against the adoption of this resolution, and described it as 
Azerbaijan’s attempt to drag the issue from the Minsk Group format. Minsk Group co-Chairs 
also did not hide their commotion with the fact that Azerbaijan tries to bring the issue to the 
UN forum. However, when it came to the process of adopting the resolution at the General 
Assembly on March 14, 2008, all three Minsk Group members actually voted against the 
resolution alongside Armenia, who was strongly against the adoption of the resolution. This 
dealt a serious blow on the image of co-Chairs as non-partial mediators.463  
 
                                                 
461 Jacob Bertcovitch and Allison Houston, 26. 
462 See Section 2, Chapter I, and the description of the interests of Russia, France and the US in the current 
section. 
463 The resolution was nonetheless adopted with 29 votes in favor, seven against [Armenia, Russia, the US, 
France, Vanuatu, Angola and India] and the most UN members abstaining.  
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The reasons for such a radical position of the co-Chairs could be numerous, but obviously, the 
co-Chairs did not want the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be discussed in a format other than 
the Minsk Group and therefore, chose to express their position in such a radical manner. 
However, for that, they could have simply abstained from voting, like many UN members 
states did, without embarking on radical side taking, which damaged their image of neutral 
mediators. Later, Azerbaijan did not hide its disenchantment with the fact that co-Chairs and 
Armenia actually appeared to be in the same front when it came to the issue of Azerbaijan’s 
occupied territories. 
Upon conducting the analysis of effectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group, firstly through the 
regime theory assumptions and secondly, through the theoretical approaches to international 
mediation, the common findings suggest that despite of certain shortcomings in the work of 
the Minsk Group, it, however, generally managed to facilitate the achievement of a final 
solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
 
Although the OSCE has the right mechanism to make difference in the conflict resolution 
process, it does not have the capacity and necessary tools to support this mechanism in 
bringing results. The OSCE mediation efforts did not in fact make any considerable or 
positive difference to the conflict resolution process, and therefore, it could not be taken as 
being fully effective/successful. Moreover, the speculations about the purported partiality of 
the mediators and the lack of confidence in their work in one of the conflicting sides do not 
surely add up to their effectiveness and inhibit the success of their mediation activity. Having 
sketched the mentioned factors, I would like to once again reiterate my evaluation of the 
OSCE mediation efforts as being partly effective/successful. 
 
3.3. Analyzing OSCE effectiveness in Georgia through regime theory hypotheses 
 
3.3.1. First hypothesis: powerful actors’ interests 
 
- Interests and preferences of the concerned powerful states influence the effectiveness 
of the OSCE to facilitate the achievement of a final solution to the conflicts in the 
South Caucasus republics.  
 
As it was described earlier, the OSCE Mission in Georgia, which was established in 1992, 
was tasked with enhancing consultations among the conflicting parties to find a durable 
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solution to the conflict, encouraging dialogue, monitoring ceasefire and the JPKF activities. 
The JCC format set up with OSCE efforts included the representatives from Georgia, Russia, 
North and South Ossetia alongside the OSCE, and was tasked with administering the 1992 
cease-fire agreement, initiating and implementing conflict resolution measures, mutual 
contacts, dialogue and coordinating the activities of the JPKF.  
In the paragraphs below I will focus on the first hypothesis - impact of the interests of the 
concerned powerful actors on the effectiveness of the functioning mechanisms on the ground 
and on the OSCE level to facilitate the achievement of South Ossetian conflict resolution.  
Russia. The fact that Russia pursues certain objectives in the resolution of the South Ossetian 
conflict within the OSCE-led peace process was the most conspicuous issue brought out by 
Georgia [during the whole period of the functioning of the JCC mechanism]. Three out of 
four JCC members (Russia, North and South Ossetia) were after the similar objective – 
achieve the independence of the South Ossetia from Georgia - and Russia in this case was 
taken as the main instigator. However, the problem with the JCC and the prospects for 
stronger OSCE role within it was hindered by the fact that Russia as a participating state of 
the consensus-based OSCE could block any decision and thus, inhibit any action that the latter 
could have taken in this regard.  
 
Therefore, Georgia was concerned about the unbalanced structure of the JCC, since the 
country was left alone against other three actors, which had coinciding interests opposed to 
those of Georgia’s.464 Georgians not once insisted on changing Russia’s leading role in 
negotiations, and changing the negotiation and peacekeeping formats to a direct dialogue with 
South Ossetia, where the OSCE, the US and the EU would also partake and limit Russian role 
to a certain extent. 
 
The same mistrust was also extended to the JPKF, which likewise, consisted of the mentioned 
four states. In fact, the OSCE was also tasked to monitor the functioning of the JPKF. 
However, often, when these mechanisms [JCC and the JPKF] displayed their incapacity to 
prevent confrontations and became manipulated by the interests of their states of origin, rather 
than serving the interests of one joint command for the achievement of common objectives, 
the OSCE was unable to make much difference and direct the efforts to the actual solution of 
                                                 
464 Svante E. Cornell et al, 47. 
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the festering issues. The JPKF remained passive with increasing Georgian mistrust in its 
capabilities, which the latter believed was largely abused by the other parties.  
 
As was highlighted in the part of the current Chapter reflecting the OSCE role in South 
Ossetian conflict, another unfortunate example of how Russia could influence the effective 
work of the OSCE and the JCC mechanism became Russia’s uncompromised opposition to 
increasing the number of OSCE MMOs in the region, which aimed at bolstering OSCE’s 
monitoring capacity. Russia repeatedly rejected this proposal, although it was brought up by 
Georgia numerous times, and the reason for Russia’s stubborn stance on this issue was its 
desire to limit OSCE’s role within the JCC and keep the JCC as the only valid format for the 
conduct of negotiations on South Ossetian conflict. However, even when after the August 
2008 conflict it became possible to increase the number of the MMOs to contribute to the 
implementation of the Medvedyev-Sarkozi six-point cease-fire agreement, they still were 
unable to perform any monitoring operations in South Ossetia because of the fact that Russia, 
having gained absolute the control in South Ossetia and Abkhazia upon the August 2008, did 
not allow their entry into the region.  
 
Having had a work experience with the OSCE, the author of this work not once had 
encountered how the initiatives and decisions furthered within the OSCE by Georgia 
concerning conflict resolution in South Ossetia met with strong Russian position. In fact, 
Georgia’s stance regarding the resolution of the South Ossetian conflict has wide backing 
among the OSCE participating states, and usually the only state which expresses opposing 
view and speaks in the name of the breakaway republics [although OSCE is not directly 
dealing with Abkhazian conflict, often Abkhazia is mentioned alongside with South Ossetia] 
is Russia. Any action that to Russia’s opinion “would jeopardize the rights and interests of 
South Ossetian people” could easily be blocked by this country, thus decelerating the pace of 
a peace process and once again proving that in an attempt to preserve its influence in the 
region Russia will be ardent to whatever extent it takes. Unfortunately, this assumption 
proved to be absolutely true during the discussions over the extension of the mandate of the 
OSCE Mission to Georgia that ended in failure after prolonged talks and efforts to persuade 
Russia to give its consent to further extend the mandate of the mission.  
 
As was depicted earlier, due to Russia’s insistence that the OSCE be equally represented in 
Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and its recalcitrance to agree to the extension of the 
organization’s mandate, the OSCE Mission in Georgia had no option but to close its office in 
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Georgia. This also meant that the OSCE MMOs, who were observing the situation in South 
Osseita had also ceased their activity. This ended the OSCE’s role as a main mediator in the 
negotiations and became a lamentable example of how the international organizations’ efforts 
could be relegated to naught and sacrificed to the maximalist interests of its influential actors.  
 
Having analyzed the performance of the OSCE and the mechanisms where the latter was 
represented, it could likewise be concluded that in the case of OSCE involvement in South 
Osseitan conflict the effectiveness of the organization was greatly defined by the interests and 
actions of a powerful state – Russia, who was again acting as a coercive hegemon465, which 
tried to influence and hinder the decisions that were not in conformity with its own national 
interests. Its biased activity in the JCC and the JPKF and efforts to limit the OSCE 
participation as an actor to a maximum extent [by blocking unfavorable decisions] attests to 
the assumption that Russia as a powerful actor might and did influence/reduced the 
effectiveness of the OSCE in the quest for the solution of the South Ossetian conflict.  
 
United States. The US position on Georgian conflicts within the OSCE is more 
straightforward compared to its role as a Minsk Group co-Chair. The US extends its 
unequivocal support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and articulates this 
position very clearly from the tribune of the OSCE whenever there are any discussions on 
Georgia. It is the foremost country in the western group of states, which blames Russia 
ardently for not fulfilling its 1999 Istanbul commitments and fully supports Georgia’s position 
on this issue. Although not exactly related to the OSCE itself, nonetheless due to the fact that 
the CFE discussions are always taking place among the delegations posted to the OSCE in 
Vienna, and Istanbul commitments of 1999466 were taken during the OSCE Istanbul summit, 
this fact may well be considered in the given context. US Mission to the OSCE have 
constantly enunciated its disappointment with the lack of progress in implementation of 
Istanbul commitments.467  
                                                 
465 It should be reminded that according to the regime theory a coercive hegemon is an actor that influences the 
events that are important to others due to its control and makes the others to subdue to its control. The likelihood 
that a certain course of action or a decision will be taken and implemented is dependent on the extent to which it 
is perceived to serve the interests of powerful actors. (See Chapter III (Arid Underdal, “One question, two 
answers,” 29-30)). 
466 Russia undertook a commitment to vacate its four military basis in Georgia by 2002, however, the process 
was prolonged which caused the aggravation on the part of Georgia, who was strongly backed by western states. 
467 Numerous statements made by the US delegation to the OSCE at the Joint Consultative Group and other 
OSCE bodies (Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation) on the issue were built on strong US 
conviction that Russia had to fulfill its Istanbul commitments (from OSCE delegations Website restricted, 
http://www.delweb.osce.org).    
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The US had also contributed financially to the OSCE Voluntary Fund for Georgia in order to 
accelerate the withdrawal process.468 In fact, the US widely buttressed the OSCE activities in 
Georgia and was determined to push for the expansion of OSCE activities in South Ossetia in 
order to press the authorities in the region to take demilitarizing steps. For that, the US widely 
backed the increasing of the OSCE Military monitors which would be able to access the 
region.469 Often, the OSCE became the battlefield between the Russian and the US positions 
(backed by the EU) over the state of affairs in Georgia. That became vividly displayed during 
the UAV incidents in April-May 2008,470 August 2008 events and in the period when the 
negotiations were carried out for the extension of OSCE Mission to Georgia.  
 
It should not be overlooked that the US maintained a higher profile towards Georgian 
conflicts within the OSCE than the UN. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that the 
OSCE as a regional organization under the Article VII of the UN Charter was mandated to 
deal with regional issues [conflict cases] and also had stronger involvement in addressing the 
outstanding regional issues, especially those related to democratic transition, state building, 
etc. Acknowledging that the OSCE possesses a more in-depth understanding of the region, 
and is not burdened with other tasks around the world, like the UN, it was regarded as an 
appropriate tool where certain inputs could be made and therefore, the US profile in the 
OSCE vis-a-vis Georgian conflicts [in this case South Ossetia] was more prominent than that 
in the UN.  
 
After sketching the position of the US within the OSCE in searching for a solution to South 
Ossetian conflict, and some examples on the nature of the US  approach towards the OSCE 
role in the given conflict, we have the picture where there are two powerful states pursuing 
opposite policies/interests in the current context.471 However, the reason why Russia had 
                                                 
468 Jaba Devdariani and Blanka Hancilova, “US involvement in Caucasian security architecture grows,” Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, online, available from (http://www.cacianalyst.org). Accessed on November 12, 
2010, unpaged. 
469 “EU, US. Back increased OSCE role in S. Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, December 5, 2006, online, 
available from (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14243). Accessed on January 25, 2011. 
470 The crisis arose between Georgia and Abkhazia when Georgian unmanned unarmed aerial vehicle (UAV) 
was shot over Abkhazia. Consequently, Georgia claimed that in fact that was not UAV belonging to Georgia, but 
MIG-29 aircraft belonging to Russia. This incident created wide debate in the OSCE, with strong US 
participation in support of Georgia’s position.  
471 While there are also other influential actors which alongside the US also largely support Georgia’s position 
against that of Russia’s, like the EU member states, it nonetheless, takes the EU longer and more difficult to 
formulate a common position within itself and many EU members [like France, Germany] do not like to make 
Russia an open adversary. Therefore, most ardent debates over Georgian issues take place between Georgia, 
Russia and the US, with EU’s acting Presidency often expressing some sort of general support for Georgia’s 
territorial integrity, without engaging on an open polemics.  
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comparative advantage over the US in this case was due to the fact that the US was not 
represented in any of the mechanisms that were created under the OSCE auspices and 
monitored by it – the JCC and the JPKF. 
  
Russia on the contrary was the leading part of each of these formations and thus, could control 
the degree of OSCE activism within the JCC by successfully manipulating with the consensus 
decision making and blocking unwanted decisions, which could increase the OSCE profile. 
Therefore, Russia in this case again qualified under the notion of coercive hegemon, while the 
US could not be named so. Neither could it act as a benevolent hegemon,472 due to the fact 
that Russia’s coercive hegemony was too potent and fortified by its relatively advantageous 
position - geographic closeness to the region and representation in every possible conflict 
resolution structure, which the US nonetheless, did not have.   
 
In conclusion, it should be reinstated that the OSCE effectiveness in dealing with the South 
Ossetian conflict is explained by the first hypothesis of the regime theory. 
 
3.3.2. Second hypothesis: problem solving capacity 
 
-  Problem solving capacity of the OSCE influences its effectiveness to facilitate the 
achievement of a final settlement to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics  
 
In analyzing the OSCE problem solving capacity through the three chosen determinants [1- 
the institutional setting or the rule of the game; 2 - the distribution of power among the actors 
involved; 3 - efforts directed to achievement of cooperative solutions], we will get the 
following picture: 
 
No doubt that the institutional setting - consensus decision making within the OSCE is the 
factor reducing the problem solving effectiveness of the organization, since consensus rule is 
accepted as main constraining factor for the achievement of effective results. Our 
observations of Russia’s role above and its ability to block the unwanted decisions using 
consensus formula actually testified to the weakness and susceptibility of the OSCE as an 
organization in face of robust position of any of its powerful members. I say “powerful 
members” referring to my own OSCE experience, since in case if any smaller OSCE member 
                                                 
472 A benevolent hegemon is the actor that is able and willing to extent collective benefits at its own expense. 
(See Chapter III, (Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 29-30)). 
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state decide to hinder some decisions that are important to others from being accepted out of 
certain considerations, that state will be persuaded and exerted a pressure upon by the 
powerful states, in order to get its consent.  
 
When it is a powerful OSCE state, which does not want the acceptance of a decision, it gets 
difficult/impossible to coax that state into an agreement. When persuasion is not helpful, 
bargaining over certain issues often takes place in such cases, however, if the given powerful 
state is absolutely against the adoption of a certain decision, then, there is nothing more to be 
done, except forgoing that decision. With this mechanism in place, enhancement of the OSCE 
role within the JCC format presented to be impossible given that Russia was not interested in 
doing so. 
 
The second determinant - the distribution of power within the JCC and the JPKF structure 
were also immensely shifted towards Russia with South and North Ossetia widely backing 
Russia’s position and Georgia left alone. This disbalance in power distribution within these 
institutions could not be altered although often challenged and criticized by Georgia, which 
strove for changing the negotiation format to include other international players and limit 
Russian influence.  
 
The third element - efforts directed to achievement of cooperative solutions – was however, 
present and became the strongest determinant of OSCE’s problem solving capacity.  A lot of 
efforts were directed towards the facilitation of conflict resolution – establishment of the 
OSCE Mission, the creation of the JCC, monitoring of the JPKF, assigning the OSCE MMOs, 
etc. The most important OSCE efforts in this filed was, however, its active participation in 
economic rehabilitation of South Ossetia through different programs and donor 
conferences.473 It appeared to be the only area, not demanding much political input and where 
the OSCE did not meet with strong opposition against its increasing role. However, as it was 
earlier narrated, OSCE had to grapple with competing interests of Russia and Georgia in this 
field each of which tried to have stronger participation in economic rehabilitation filed in 
order to further maintain their positions in the region.  
 
                                                 
473 See Section 2 of the current chapter. 
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The aforementioned factors in fact greatly limited OSCE’s problem solving capacity vis-à-vis 
a badly perceived malign problem.474 As it is assumed within the regime theory - the mixture 
of a badly perceived malign problem with the institution that has low problem–solving 
capacity is expected to bring to less effective results.475 Since it is assumed that even the 
effectiveness of the institutions with strong problem solving capacity often wanes when they 
are dealing with malign problem, the institutions with lower problem solving capacity have 
harder time in coping with a malign problem. Entrenching on these suppositions, it could be 
asserted that the OSCE had to deal with a problem that is malign in nature with a low problem 
solving capacity. Therefore, its effectiveness was greatly dwindled.  
 
General conclusions 
 
 While illustrating the OSCE role in Georgia’s South Ossetia conflict, one could easily discern 
ambivalent dynamics in positions and interactions among the conflicting parties that 
influenced deeply OSCE’s ability to make matters better. Although OSCE’s presence did 
indeed make difference in terms of the sides’ willingness to negotiate and cooperate, new 
state of affairs brought by the August 2008 war drastically changed the realities the OSCE 
was accustomed to deal with and brought to the failure of OSCE’s efforts to achieve final 
solution to the conflict. 
 
Having explored the OSCE effectiveness in South Ossetian case through the prisms of the 
first [actors’ interests] and second [problem solving capacity] regime theory hypotheses, it 
could be concluded that the first and second hypotheses were in fact able to explain the OSCE 
role and its internal dynamics in the given conflict case. The general findings of the first 
hypothesis suggest that the existence of a coercive hegemon which has vested interests in 
South Ossetia greatly marred the ability of the OSCE to achieve a final solution or at least 
increase its role in conflict resolution.  
 
The second hypothesis concluded that although there were some genuine attempts on the part 
of the OSCE to facilitate the conflict resolution, its consensus decision making rule and 
unequal power distribution within the existing conflict resolution structures such as JCC and 
                                                 
474 The mixture of a problem malignancy with a degree of uncertainty over the actual nature of the problem is 
considered to be a strong hurdle on the way of obtaining functional effectiveness. For more information See 
Chapters III and VII. 
475 See Chapter III (Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 309) and Chapter VII. 
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the JPKF greatly relegated its problem solving capacity. Provided that the OSCE had to 
address a malign problem with low problem solving capacity, its effectiveness, therefore, was 
greatly reduced. 
 
At the end of analyzing OSCE effectiveness in South Ossetian case, as usual I will utilize 
other general suppositions of the regime theory, regarding actor’s capacity, behavioral vs. 
functional effectiveness, attainment of collective optima and noncooperative situation. 
 
Given the definition of actor capacity476 of an organization the OSCE could hardly be 
considered to be a unitary actor, since the organization does not have most of the necessary 
qualifications of an actor – such as unity, autonomy, and largely depends on its members for 
possession of resources. It does have external activity though, which is also defined by the 
common denominator of its members, therefore, often being the least ambitious undertaking. 
Possessing absolutely no autonomy vis a vis its members the OSCE is always manipulated by 
its members – especially the powerful ones. It is assumed that possession of actor capacity 
increases the regime effectiveness of any organization, and since from our analysis it could be 
inferred that the OSCE falls short to qualify under this criteria, its low effectiveness could 
also be explained by this phenomenon.  
 
In terms of achievement of behavioral of functional effectiveness, it could be concluded that 
despite all drawbacks the OSCE was able to bring some behavioral effectiveness by forming 
necessary structures, bringing the parties to negotiations, etc. It was, nonetheless, surely not 
able to achieve functional effectiveness as it ended its sole mediation activity after the closure 
of its Mission to Georgia. The same finding is also valid in case of non-attainment of 
collective optima. However, when imagining a hypothetical noncooperative situation 
[nonregime counterfactual], like in the case of the UN, the CIS and the activity of the Minsk 
Group, OSCE involvement in South Ossetia doubtlessly made matters better, by at least 
keeping an eye on the developments on the site, monitoring the situation, organizing the 
negotiations, initiating economic assistance, etc., which otherwise, perhaps would have not 
been obtained.     
                                                 
476 In order to be an actor, the organization must possess a minimum of an internal coherence (unity), autonomy, 
resources and external activity. In the absence of a necessary minimum of coherence an organization cannot be 
taken as a unitary actor. Without certain minimum of autonomy (vis a vis its members) the organization will be 
manipulated by its members. Without a certain minimum of activity in its environment and possession of some 
resources actors’ capacity of the organization will be diminished. Possession of actor capacity increases the 
regime effectiveness and the effect in this context, ceteris paribus is greater in addressing malign problems than 
benign problems. (See Chapter III, (Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 27)). 
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Likewise in the case of the OSCE Minsk Group, the OSCE ability to achieve relative 
improvement could also be graded as “satisfactory” in a scale which ranges from “bad, 
satisfactory, good and excellent”. In more general terms, there has been some relative 
improvement.  
 
Having analyzed the factors influencing the effectiveness of the OSCE to facilitate the 
achievement of a final settlement to the South Ossetian conflict, my general observations 
suggest that despite of OSCE’s positive input into a conflict resolution process [like in the 
case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict], in the current case, the OSCE was also not able to 
facilitate the achievement of a final peace to the problem. It had fell into the “precipice” of the 
interests of a coercive hegemon, like in the case of the UN and the CIS, nonetheless, and its 
overall effectiveness could be graded with “low” mark in the “low, medium and high” 
measurement scale. 
 
4. Summing up 
 
This Chapter aimed at exploring the involvement of the OSCE in Armenian-Azerbaijani 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and South Ossetian conflict in Georgia.  Having provided an 
empirical-historical perspective of the OSCE involvement in two conflict cases in the first and 
the second sections, in the third section I have mainly concentrated on the analysis of OSCE 
effectiveness. In case of Minsk Group activity in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it was 
established that the two hypotheses of the regime theory cannot fully explain the Minsk 
Group work, given the fact that this institution is not a full-fledged organization. However, the 
discussed first regime theory [powerful actors’ interests] hypotheses can still explain the 
internal dynamics within the Minsk Group, while only the third determinant [efforts directed 
to achievement of cooperative solutions] of the second hypothesis [problem solving capacity] 
is applicable to this case. However, some general regime theory suppositions were used to 
suggest that the OSCE in Nagono-Karabakh case lacked actor capacity, and although the 
OSCE Minsk Group was able to achieve some behavioral effectiveness, it did not achieve 
functional effectiveness. It had brought some relative improvement and in a hypothetical 
noncooperative situation its presence brought to positive changes, but it failed to attain 
collective optimum.   
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Therefore, further analysis was conducted through the prisms of theoretical approaches to 
international mediation. This analysis has found that the activity of the OSCE Minsk Group 
could be named as partly successful having analyzed its performance from the prisms of four 
determinants - 1) previous relations between the conflicting parties; 2) nature of problem; 3) 
mediation strategies; 4) impartiality/or perceived bias of the mediators. Although it was 
concluded that Minsk Group is not a full-fledged regime, some analysis from the prisms of 
other [more general] suppositions of the regime theory was also made in respect to the OSCE 
Minsk Group, which concluded that while yet ineffective in terms of functional effectiveness, 
in terms of behavioral effectiveness, this institution still made certain difference.  
 
In case of OSCE role in South Ossetian conflict the first and the second regime theory 
hypothesis could explain the case of its effectiveness. It was established that the interests of 
concerned powerful actors do indeed affect the effectiveness of the organization [first 
hypothesis], and the problem solving capacity [second hypothesis] of the OSCE is dwindled 
in the face of its consensus rule and the unequal power distribution within the entities 
[especially the JCC] that were created with the OSCE efforts, despite the fact that there were 
some genuine efforts on the part of the OSCE directed to the resolution of the conflict. 
Moreover, OSCE’s problem solving effectiveness was diminished in face of a poorly 
understood malign problem.477 As an overall conclusion it was noted that like in the case of 
the OSCE Minsk Group, in Georgian case also OSCE was able to achieve some behavioral 
effectiveness while functional effectiveness remained an unattainable task. Although it had 
brought some relative improvement and in a hypothetical noncooperative situation its 
presence had positive effect, it could not reach collective optimum. Since the OSCE 
effectiveness in South Ossetian case was greatly influenced by the interests of a coercive 
hegemon, like in the case of the UN and the CIS, its overall effectiveness could be graded 
with “low” mark in the “low, medium and high” measurement scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
477 To be discussed in Chapter VII. 
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VI. ROLE of the EU and EVALUATION of the EU CONLFICT RESOLUTION 
POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH CAUCASUS 
This Chapter aims at evaluating the EU role, its attempts to facilitate the conflict resolution in 
South Caucasus and the nature of EU policy towards conflict resolution in region. For this 
purpose, at the outset, empirical perspective of the EU role will be given, which subsequently 
will be followed by the analysis based upon the theoretical assumptions of 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, as appropriate. Since the EU cannot be 
considered to be a single regime, instead, an aggregation of different regimes, and also it 
plays a specific and different role in the process of conflict resolution in South Caucasus; its 
role is explored detached from other three organizations. Therefore, the first and the second 
hypotheses of regime theory, which were designed to analyze the effectiveness of the 
previous three organizations, will not be applied while evaluating the EU role in conflict 
resolution.  
1. European Union – low profile vs. the necessity for stronger role  
The EU role in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region could be assessed in two 
different periods. I would suggest naming the first period as a period of “from low profile to 
increasing attention” and marking it as until the year 2003, the appointment of the EU Special 
Representative for South Caucasus. The second period I would call as the “increased 
role/facilitation-mediation activity”, which would cover the period since the year of 2003 until 
present. This is a conditional classification, which is designed by the author for better 
explaining the EU role. Since EU role in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region has 
started to slightly gain momentum after the year 2003, having a quick sketch of the EU profile 
in the security issues of South Caucasus before that date would be useful.  
1.1. First period - from “low profile” to increasing attention 
Compared to the previous two institutions, the EU through quite a long time maintained rather 
distant approach towards facilitating conflict resolution process in South Caucasus. The 
principled position by the EU towards conflict resolution in the region was mainly a passive 
political involvement, which was confined to political declarations and communications. 
Nevertheless, since the independence of these republics in 1991 and entry into force of 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in 1999, the EU actively used its different assistance 
programs aimed at promoting democracy, civil society, economy and etc. spheres. EU 
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relations with these countries were also framed by unilateral EU aid to these countries, in the 
form of financial, humanitarian, food security, rehabilitation and technical assistance.478 The 
EU programmes of TACIS, TRACECA and INOGATE were also tools of EU policy in the 
region countries.479 
 
In Abkhazia and South Ossetia the EU was particularly active in rendering economic 
rehabilitation and assistance. It aimed to become the largest donor in Abkhazia by raising 
considerable amount of money (estimated €25 million) to humanitarian, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction projects in Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The EU funded projects were 
depoliticized and were not dependant on the progress on conflict resolution field.480 In South 
Ossetia though, the EU participation was slightly more visible than in Abkhazia. The EU 
projects in South Ossetia were not limited only to infrastructure, agriculture, economic 
rehabilitation and etc. projects, which do not have direct relevance to conflict resolution 
process. In South Ossetia the EU Council adopted three Joint Actions under the CFSP 
allocating €500,000 which were intended for the OSCE Mission in Georgia, to help the latter 
to finance the JCC.481 
In order to supervise how the given money was used, the EU Commission started to attend the 
JCC negotiations since 2001. This did not mean EU’s full-fledged participation within the 
JCC format, although this was Georgia’s long time objective. However, the EU managed to 
employ its financial power to gain at least some political niche in the negotiation process 
around the South Ossetian conflict, even though rather trivial. Apart from assistance to the 
JCC activity, the EU has funded the projects in South Ossetia amounting to roughly €8 
million between 1997 and 2006, which were directed to rehabilitation activities in various 
fields.482 Nonetheless, as it was said above, irrespective of making such financial 
contributions, EU did not play a significant political role towards conflict resolution. 
In Abkhazia, EU was not involved in any similar ways in the negotiation process, although its 
three member states – Germany, France and the United Kingdom – were the members of the 
                                                 
478 Total EU assistance to Armenia in 1991-2000 was 286.13 million euro (no figures available for 2001-2004); 
to Azerbaijan in 1992-2003 – 399.674 million euro; to Georgia in 1992-2003 – 369.43 million euro. 
(http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations).  
479 EU has developed the Program of Technical Assistance for Commonwealth of independent states (TACIS) in 
1991, Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe 
(INOGATE).  
480 “Conflict resolution in the South Caucasus: the EU’s role,” International Crisis Group Europe Report N 173, 
(March 20, 2003):16-18. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Ibid. 
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UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends.483 The EU assistance in Abkhazia was not directed 
to changing the conflict settlement process or to contributing to the promotion of cooperation 
and interaction between the parties. The biggest achievement of the EU in Abkhazia was 
considered to be its assistance in civil society projects. In general, the EU seemed to attach 
more importance to having higher profile in South Ossetia, compared to Abkhazia, due to the 
reasons that the South Ossetian conflict was thought to be easier to solve than the Abkhazian 
conflict. Moreover, early resolution of the South Ossetian conflict appeared to be more 
desirable due to the region’s geographic proximity to the capital Tbilisi.484 What concerns 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the same pattern of the EU involvement through economic and 
confidence building programs was not the case, mostly due to the fact that official Baky 
rejected any such activity before the final solution of the conflict.485 
This indirect participation in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus republics probably 
served the EU conviction that fostering the economic development and civil society through 
such a policy would decrease the danger of the resumed conflicts, thus creating prerequisites 
for lasting stability. However, compared to other problem-regions, which were at EU’s 
immediate closeness, like Eastern European countries and Balkans, the region of South 
Caucasus has never been high on EU’s external political agenda. There was not a clear EU 
strategy or policy towards the states of the region, given the fact that the EU agenda has been 
overburdened with other tasks, like enlargements, EU Constitution, etc. Still, securing some 
role for itself in the conflict regions through some assistance projects, the EU, however, 
preferred to continue its political aloofness and confined its political role only to supporting 
the activities of the UN and the OSCE. 
Nevertheless, the political changes in view of the penultimate wave of eastern enlargement 
were also followed by the revisions in EU’s external policy towards South Caucasus. 
Moreover, with Turkey’s possible membership on the horizon, the enlarged EU would have 
been an immediate neighbor of the region. Therefore, easing the potential threats of the 
unresolved conflicts in South Caucasus became one of the conspicuous issues on EU’s 
external policy agenda. Increasing EU attention to the region was also conditioned by the 
presence of EU’s economic interests in the South Caucasus region that was steadily becoming 
a strategic hub due to its vast hydrocarbon resources and the position of a corridor for critical 
                                                 
483 Nicu Popescu, “Europe’s unrecognized neighbors: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, CEPS Working 
Document No. 260, (March, 2007): 13. 
484 Ibid., 16-20. 
485 “Conflict resolution in the South Caucasus: EU’s role,” 16-18. 
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energy and transportation infrastructure connecting Central Asia and Caucasus, especially the 
Caspian basin, with Europe. EU’s concern for its own energy security and a goal to diversify 
its exported source of crude energy necessitated obtaining higher EU profile in the South 
Caucasus region.  
 
Against this backdrop, the EU intermittently sent some signals to play a stronger role in the 
region. For instance, there were several debates in the EU starting from 1999 over making the 
EU role in the region more effective.486 The attempts to define the position of the South 
Caucasus region at EU’s political agenda, continued in 2001 as well. At first, the European 
Parliament called for the EU strategy towards the region under the name of “Southern 
Dimension”. Then, the Swedish presidency of the EU declared South Caucasus as one of the 
foreign policy priorities in the first half of 2001 and in the same year, the first visit of the EU 
Troika to the region took place.487  
In its Security Strategy of 2003, the EU stressed that it should “take a stronger and more 
active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a 
neighboring region”.488 Finally, the debate over the EU role in the region has finally brought 
to the appointment of EU Special Representative (SR) to the South Caucasus region in 2003. 
This decision had henceforth paved the path for a more active EU mediation/facilitation 
activity towards conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region.   
1.2. Second period - increased role: desired, but volatile 
 
As it was illustrated in the preceding section, it was not until 2003 that the EU undertook a 
more direct facilitation activity in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region. The 
mandate of the Special Representative generally included the tasks to “contribute to the 
prevention of conflicts..”, to “assist in conflict resolution..”, “intensify EU dialogue with the 
                                                 
486 For instance, a communication on EU relations with the South Caucasus states under the PCA of June 1999 
emphasized the persisting conflicts in the region as the root causes of the region’s political, economic and 
humanitarian problems. In the Commission’s view, EU assistance could be effective only if the conflicts were 
settled and the regional cooperation became possible. (Dov Lynch, “The EU: towards strategy,” The South 
Caucasus: a challenge for the EU, Chaillot Papers 65, (December 2003):181). Chris Patten and the late Anna 
Lindh published a joint article in Financial Times on February 20 saying that “the EU cannot afford to neglect 
the Southern Caucasus,” and advocating a more targeted EU political role to support conflict resolution. 
(Ibid.,184). 
198 Dov Lynch, “The EU: towards strategy,” The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU, Chaillot Papers 65, 
(December  2003):183-184. 
487 See Article 3 of Council Joint Action, 2003/496/CFSP, concerning the appointment of an EU Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus, July 7, 2004, unpaged. 
488 Dov Lynch, 183-184. 
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main interested actors concerning the region..”, “assist the Council, in further developing a 
comprehensive policy towards the South Caucasus..” and other similar tasks of assistance.489 
The institute of Special Representative was tasked to travel to the region several times in a 
year, conduct meetings with the officials of the conflicting parties, as well as the members of 
the civil society. 
 
The next milestone in EU-South Caucasus relations became the inclusion of the three 
republics into the European Neighborhood Policy in 2004. This was a long awaited decision, 
since at the inception of the ENP these counties were excluded from it and were only 
mentioned at the footnote of the policy as possible neighbors. However, one can also rightly 
assume that the decision to include Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into the ENP sooner 
than expected was to a considerable extent influenced by the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 
November 2003, which was estimated by the EU as a harbinger of strengthening democratic 
state-building process in the region. It is noteworthy to also mention that the region was 
expected to come even closer to the EU border after the membership of Romania, Bulgaria 
and possible future enlargement to the Balkans, and may be Turkey. Therefore, it could be 
assumed that the EU could not afford to overlook the South Caucasus region anymore and 
leave it outside of the EU policy frameworks offering various benefits.  
 
After the inclusion of the South Caucasus states to the ENP in 2004, ENP APs (AP) with 
these three countries were adopted on 14 November 2006 with the aim of helping them to 
move closer to European standards.490 Nonetheless, despite the obvious attempts by the EU to 
increase its profile in conflict resolution in South Caucasus, the ENP did not manage to 
deliver it. Both - the ENP Strategy paper and the individual APs touched upon the issue of 
conflict resolution, however, in all documents references to conflict resolution were quite 
ambiguous. For instance, the ENP Strategy Paper is very vague in this regard: “Increased 
efforts to promote the settlement of the conflicts in the region and to develop good neighborly 
relations are needed. Concrete steps forwards need to be made by each three countries…ENP 
should reinforce EU’s contribution to promote these objectives”.491 
 
                                                 
489 See Article 3 of Council Joint Action, 2003/496/CFSP, unpaged. With the next Council joint action 
2006/121/CFSP of 20 February 2006, the Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby has taken over Heikki Talvitye. 
(Official Journal of the EU, L 49/14, 21/2/2006), unpaged. 
490 “European Neighborhood Policy,” available from (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/enp/index_en.htm). 
Accessed in September, 2008, unpaged. 
491 “European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper,” Communication from the Commission, COM (2004) 373 
final, (Brussels May 12, 2004):11. 
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The policy could have been more effective and successful had it developed a mechanism or a 
policy how to increase the EU role in conflict resolution beyond just facilitation and leaving 
the solution of the problems to the states themselves. Nonetheless, without adding much flesh 
in this respect, the ENP simply carried on traditionally established distant attitude maintained 
by the EU towards the problems of the region. 
 
The similar pattern was followed in the ENP APs, which also fell short in making conflict 
resolution a priority in the EU relations with the involved countries. Conflict resolution was 
left on the margins of the APs with each of the republics, and was included into the list of 
many priorities under “political dialogue and reform”. Irrespective of the increasing 
understanding of the indispensability for the EU to raise its profile in conflict resolution, the 
thrust of the APs was again on factors that are believed to help with democratization and state 
building – such as economics and political change.492  
 
ENP also attributes significance to people-to-people contacts, socialization, confidence 
building measures and regional cooperation, which testifies to the thought that by focusing on 
dialogue and cooperation EU hopes to create the security environment in which the pending 
conflicts could be resolved. Therefore, the ENP is evaluated to be an “indirect conflict 
prevention policy” and another expression of the fact that the EU evades the more direct role 
in conflict resolution.493 
 
The ambiguity in the EU policy towards the issue of conflict resolution manifested itself very 
vividly in the designation of the ENP APs. For example, in the AP with Azerbaijan the EU 
emphasized the importance of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, while in the AP 
with Armenia it underlined the right of self-determination, which testifies the absence of the 
well-thought EU policy towards conflict resolution in South Caucasus.  
 
The same was also the case in Georgia. Almost in each of its statement the EU expressed 
unequivocal support to Georgia’s territorial integrity. However, it was beware of undertaking 
a direct mediation role in conflict resolution before the August 2008, and seemed to be 
content with leaving this task on other organizations and observing Russia’s growing leverage 
over the state of affairs. Thus, even if the ENP APs were supposed to make conflict resolution 
                                                 
492 “Conflict resolution in the South Caucasus: the EU’s role,” 9. 
493 Andrei V. Belyi, “EU External Energy Policies: A Paradox of Integration,” in Jan Orbie (ed.), Europe’s 
Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2009):222. 
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as one of the priorities for action, the EU at that time was still avoiding direct involvement in 
conflict resolution. It preferred the APs to focus on soft security approach as a means for 
conflict resolution - on political and economic reform issues, which would supposedly help 
strengthen the republics’ democratic state building and their ability to resolve the pending 
conflicts.494 
 
As was noted above, another milestone of the ENP is to foster regional cooperation in areas 
like economy, business, social policy, trade, environment, JHA (particularly on border 
management, migration and asylum, fight against organized crime, trafficking of human 
beings, illegal immigration, terrorism, money laundering, etc.), joint infrastructure and 
security projects in the sectors of energy and transport, civil society development and other 
issue areas,495 which are quite substantial and require strong commitment on the part of the 
relevant states. While doing so, however, proper differentiation of the relevant regions was 
not made. For instance, if the regional cooperation could be a useful exercise in the counties 
of Eastern Europe, in South Caucasus or in the Middle East the effect would be rather 
opposite, since these two regions differ from the former in terms of their security contexts.  
 
Although in the ENP APs, each of the three republics has indicated its individual priorities for 
action, and their interaction within ENP format is generally built on these priority areas, the 
EU does not miss its chance to stress the necessity of regional cooperation, especially in the 
above mentioned areas, being convinced that this is indispensable in order to achieve better 
results. The idea of regional cooperation was also mentioned in the AP for each of the three 
republics. For example, in Azerbaijan’s AP strengthening of regional cooperation is put under 
priority number ten, while being put under priorities number eight and five in Armenia’s and 
Georgia’s APs respectively.496  
 
In this context and given the obstacles to all-inclusive regional cooperation, it is a bit naive to 
assume that ENP objective “to foster closer cooperation among the EU’s neighbours 
themselves”497 could work out in the South Caucasus region, prior to finding a cure for 
region’s problems. The idea of regional cooperation cannot be promoted equally in the region 
                                                 
494 Ibid., 9-11. 
495 “European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper,”21. 
496 EU-Azerbaijan EU-Armenia and EU-Georgia Action Plans, online, available from (http://ec.europa.eu). 
Accessed on January 2010. 
497 See Chapter I. 
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of Southern Mediterranean, Eastern Europe and in the region of South Caucasus without due 
account of the situation on the ground. 
 
Even beyond the letter of the ENP itself, the EU tries to underline a special niche of the ENP 
in promoting regional cooperation in the South Caucasus region. For example, in its 
resolution of May 20, 2010 “on the need for an EU Strategy for South Caucasus”, the 
European Parliament makes an implicit reference to EU intention to further focus on the issue 
of regional cooperation within the ENP. The following excerpt from the resolution serves as a 
good substantiation: “The European Parliament….recognizes regional cooperation as a 
necessary condition for confidence-building and the reinforcement of security, in accordance 
with the ENP priorities...”.498 In this situation, a lot will be dependent on the ability of the EU 
to strike the right balance by cooperating with the states of the South Caucasus region on 
bilateral basis, trough the agreed individual APs without pushing for the regional cooperation.  
 
In order to hold the thought of similar policy frameworks as the ENP, let me jump to the year 
of 2009 and note that alongside the ENP, the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EPI),499 a new 
framework that was set off in May 2009, also seems to be far cry away from designing any 
clear cut strategy with regard to conflict resolution. The EPI although being a new initiative is 
often seen as the continuation of the ENP in many dimensions and implies the conclusion of 
comprehensive free trade agreements with those countries that are eager and capable for 
deeper economic integration with the EU.500 
 
The policy also envisages the extended cooperation in the field of democracy and good 
governance, energy security, security sector reform, environmental issues, etc. The intended 
bilateral Association Agreements that are to be the actual realizations of the proposed policy 
within the EPI are off to be negotiated with each of the six countries.501 However, in the same 
vain as the ENP, the EPI also maintained the EU passivity in conflict resolution and further 
                                                 
498 European Parliament resolution of 20 May 2010 on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus 
(2009/2216(INI)). 
499 Easter Partnership Initiative was launched in May, 2009 under Czech EU Presidency and aims at deepening 
bilateral cooperation in number of areas (economy, energy, border management, democratic state building, rule 
of law etc.) with six countries in the ENP - Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus. ENP and 
Eastern Partnership Initiative have differences and similarities. There is a view that hence, the ENP will lose its 
importance for the countries that are involved in Eastern Partnership Initiative, since the latter provides deeper 
integration opportunities. However, sometimes, it is also referred to as the continuation of the ENP in eastern 
dimension. 
500 “Eastern Partnership,” European Union External Action, online, available from 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm). Accessed on November 23, 2010, unpaged. 
501Ibid. 
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validated EU’s inclination to solve the aching conflict issues though economic assistance and 
stabilization instead of a direct involvement in the mediation of the conflicts. Some evaluate 
the EPI as another “attempt to camouflage the weakness of the Neighborhood Policy”.502 
 
For increasing its visibility, the EU referred to the scopes of European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) missions and launched the first mission of this kind – the rule of law mission - 
in the territory of the former Soviet Union, in Georgia in 2004, which primary focus was on 
policing and civilian administration issues. Furthermore, in 2005 the EU established a small 
Border Support team in order to provide the monitoring of the Georgian-Russian border, since 
the OSCE Border Monitoring Mission was ended in 2005 because of the Russian veto. This 
operation was initiated as a part of the EU Special Representative’s efforts in the South 
Caucasus.503  
 
These missions were also examples of the mainstream EU policy of preference for soft 
security measures targeted for achievement of long-term results, rather than direct 
involvement in conflict resolution process. The EU has felt more comfortable with a post-
conflict rehabilitation and peace building role and stood cautious to undertake a deeper 
involvement in conflict resolution process.504  
 
Although the calls for increased attention, the appointment of SR and inclusion into the ENP 
pointed to the fact that there was a degree of intent within the EU to play a more active role in 
the region, this role was still less influential, compared, for instance, to other actors in the 
region like the US, Russia, Iran and Turkey. In this context, this policy of “low” profile seems 
to constitute an apparent contradiction with EU’s security and energy interests505 in the 
                                                 
502 Nona Mikhelidze, “Eastern partnership and conflicts in the South Caucasus: old wine in new skins?” online, 
accessed via (http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0923.pdf). Accessed on December 12, 2010, p.10. 
503 Magdalena Frichova Grono, “Georgia’s conflicts: what role for the EU as mediator?” IFP Mediation Cluster, 
Initiative for Peacebuilding, (March 2010):11, online, available from 
(http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Georgia_March2010.pdf).Accessed on November 12, 2010, 
unpaged. 
504 “Conflict resolution in the South Caucasus: the EU’s role,” 2. 
505 The forecasts point out about increasing EU energy import dependence, which will grow even faster with 
recent and forthcoming enlargements. For instance, some figures suggested by International Energy Agency 
(IEA) indicate that the oil demand of the EU will increase by an average of 0.5 per cent annually until 2030, 
while gas demand will grow at 2.1 per cent annually over the same period (John Gault, “EU energy interests and 
the periphery,” in Roland Dannereuther (ed), European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a 
neighbourhood strategy,(London, New-York: Routledge, 2004):171), while the production will decline from 
roughly 7 million barrels a day currently to less than 3 million barrels a day by 2030. (Ibid.) The Caspian region 
is seen as one of the sources among others (Russia and Middle East) where EU energy supply comes from and 
which may be an alternative source for reducing EU energy dependency on the Middle East. The importance of 
the energy resources of the Caspian basin is also recognized by the EU itself. The Commission Communication 
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region. However, this is the topic for a separate research and will not be analyzed in this 
work.  
 
On the whole, while embarking upon some activities in conflict resolution field, the EU 
seemed to try to strike the right balance between the necessity to gain more visibility and not 
threatening Russian interests in the region. Irrespective of the fact that the EU had an interest 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, it was not a principal actor to take up the 
task of promoting regional security; this role was left to the OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh and 
South Ossetia, and to the UN in Abkhazia. 
 
At this place it should also be noted that out of the three republics, Georgia was the most 
outspoken and adamant demanding a more direct EU involvement in conflict resolution. It 
had through long time asked for the EU participation within the framework of the JCC talks, 
requested for the EU contribution towards border security in Georgia,506 and did not miss its 
chance to employ its pro-European vocation and an image of “progressing democracy” of 
South Caucasus, to dive the EU more into a greater political role in the resolution of its 
conflicts. Georgia wanted the EU to commit itself to a direct mediation of the conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, perhaps also at the expense of possible confrontation with 
Russia.  
However, the EU did not share Georgia’s desire to drag itself deeper into conflict resolution 
activity and was rather unenthusiastic to be tied up with this role, particularly since it implied 
possible confrontations with Russia. Despite the fact that the EU has had several 
resolutions507 on the situation in Georgia addressing various events happening in the zones of 
conflict, a more direct EU involvement did not happen.  It was only after the August 2008 that 
the EU assumed a more prominent role in conflict resolution in Georgia, even though it was 
                                                                                                                                                        
“On the development of energy policy for the enlarged European Union, its neighbours and partner countries” 
states that “the European Union has a specific interest in the extensive oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Basin 
which will in the future contribute to security of supply in Europe” (On the development of energy policy for the 
enlarged European Union, its neighbours and partner countries,” Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, COM (2003) 262 final (Brussels, 13.05.2003):12). 
506 Upon the termination of the OSCE Border Monitoring operation in 2005 in Georgia, EU extended the Special 
representative’s mandate to also cover border related issues with the aim to facilitate confidence building 
between Georgia and Russia and help Georgia to carry the reform of its border guards. Georgia wanted an EU 
border assistance mission, which would monitor the Georgian-Russian border. In 2006 Georgia requested the EU 
to deploy a mission which would estimate the demilitarization in the zone of conflict. However, the EU was 
rather reluctant to fulfill this request out of the consideration that activities having military or police component 
could have been taken as a threat on Russia’s part. (See: “Conflict resolution in the South Caucasus: the EU’s 
role,” 24). 
507 Some of them are: European Parliament resolutions of 26 October 2006, 29 November 2007, 5 June 2008. 
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necessitated by the desperation that swallowed the country in the aftermath of the Georgian-
Russian war.  
 
After the tragic August 2008 events, the EU had no choice, except being directly involved in 
conflict resolution in Georgia. The French Presidency of the Council of the EU led by 
President Nicola Sarkozy negotiated a six point ceasefire agreement on August 12, and after 
these developments, the EU established an additional EU Special Representative position for 
Georgia and deployed an EU Monitoring Mission in the Georgian controlled territories. Now, 
at the multi-party Geneva negotiations508 the EU acts as one of the negotiation parties.  
 
The cease-fire agreement, which was brokered by French President Sarkozy included the 
points such as non use of force, lasting cessation of hostilities, unimpeded access for the 
humanitarian aid providers, a demand for the Georgian forces - to withdraw to their usual 
barracks, and for the Russian forces - to step back to their positions prior to the start of 
hostilities, and the initiation of international discussions on security and stability 
arrangements for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although the achievement of such a plan was a 
good progress per se, it did not contain any deadlines for the intended actions. Therefore, on 
September 8, the sides concluded a second cease fire plan which indicated concrete measures 
for the implementation of both agreements.509  
 
The EU Special Representative for Georgia Pierre Morel was appointed on September 25, 
2008 and his mandate envisaged the preparation of international negotiations considered by 
the August 12 2008 cease fire agreement, representing the EU at this format and assisting in 
implementation of August 12 and September 8 2008 ceasefire agreements. What concerns the 
EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), it was established upon the EU decision to set up a civil 
monitoring mission in Georgia, and on October 1, 2008, more than 200 monitors were 
deployed in Georgia. The Mission’s main task was to monitor the implementation of the 
August and September 2008 agreements and the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian armed 
forces to their positions held before the war. However, the EUMM could get access only to 
Georgian controlled territories, despite of the fact that its mandate extended to the entire 
Georgian territory.510  
 
                                                 
508 See: Chapter II, Section 2.  
509 Magdalena Frichova Grono, unpaged. 
510 Ibid. Also see (http://eumm.eu). Accessed on November 23, 2010. 
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The value of the EUMM, have increased significantly after the cessation of the OSCE and the 
UN presences, especially the OSCE military monitoring observes in Georgia,511 since EUMM 
came to be the only international presence on the site, which could do at least some 
monitoring of the situation, in spite of the fact that they were not permitted by Russia to 
access the breakaway regions.  
 
Hence, the EU started to pursue a direct conflict resolution/mediation activity. Doubtlessly, 
increased EU mediation activity in Georgia’s conflicts was not flawless and suffered the 
number of limitations and setbacks, which affected the EU role not in the best way. These 
limitations will be discussed in the coming parts of the dissertation dealing with the analysis 
of the EU effectiveness.    
 
As for elaborating a cohesive EU policy towards the entire region underlining the nuts and 
bolts of the EU strategy, this has increasingly become one of the topical issues in EU’s 
approach to this part of the world. In recent years there were several resolutions of the EU 
calling for a more effective EU policy for South Caucasus. For example, in its resolution of 
January 17 2008 on “a more effective EU policy for the South Caucasus: from promises to 
actions”, the EU once again validated its adherence to peaceful resolution of the conflicts in 
the South Caucasus region within the existing formats, through advocating different programs 
directed at promotion of confidence building and conflict transformation. It expressed its 
support for sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, as well as Azerbaijan, but once 
again sent mixed signals by also emphasizing the importance of the right for self-
determination, when it came to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.512  
 
In the next resolution of May 20, 2010 “on the need for an EU Strategy for South Caucasus”, 
the European Parliament made another pledge for supporting conflict resolution process 
through confidence building, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. Besides, the 
resolution holds the promise that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty would precipitate 
more EU activism in the region. It praises the work of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia 
and envisages a greater possible EU role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through instituting 
an EU mandate for the French Co-Chair of the Minsk Group.513  
                                                 
511 See Chapter II, Section 2. 
512 See: European Parliament resolution of January 17 2008 on a more effective EU policy for the South 
Caucasus: from promises to actions (2007/2076 (INI)), unpaged. 
513 See: Draft Report on an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus, 2009/2216 (INI), European Parliament 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 11, 2010, unpaged.   
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The most outstanding element of this resolution seems to be the EU call on its High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to be “more actively involved in 
conflict resolution processes”. However, despite of the fact that this resolution is a leap 
forward in ascribing a more direct role for the EU in conflict resolution in the South 
Caucasus, it is still pretty vague since it again puts much emphasis on rehabilitation and 
assistance programs, and the EU contribution to peace-building and conflict management, 
supporting civil-society projects, etc.514     
 
Last but not least, it should be once again reinstated that despite all the efforts to increase the 
EU involvement in conflict resolution in South Caucasus, its role still remains inferior to other 
regional players, like the US, Russia, Turkey.  
 
2. Evaluating the EU conflict resolution approach 
 
After providing background to the EU relations with the states of South Caucasus region, its 
fluctuating dynamics and changing trends, this part will be devoted to the evaluation of EU 
role in the South Caucasus conflict resolution. As described in the Chapter III dealing with 
theoretical framework of the dissertation, the EU involvement in the South Caucasus region 
and its role in facilitating conflict resolution will be attempted to be explained through 
intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist approaches to the study of European integration:  
 
1- distant EU approach towards conflict resolution and its indirect role in facilitating conflict 
resolution is due to the lack of interest on the part of EU members states to dedicate attention 
to the region [intergovernmentalist assumption]; 2 - subsequent increase of EU profile in the 
region after August 2008 events was due to the initiative and a leading role of an EU member 
state [intergovernmentalist assumption]; 3 - EU’s emphasis on the necessity of regional 
cooperation on practical issues [economy, border issues] serves the EU conviction that 
cooperation on more practical issues will lead to expansion of cooperation on issues of high 
politics, which subsequently will bring to the attainment of peace in the relevant conflict cases 
[neofunctionalist assumption].  
 
The fact that the EU through quite a considerable amount of time kept low profile in the 
conflict resolution in South Caucasus region was mostly due to the unwillingness of the EU 
                                                 
514 Ibid. 
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member states to undertake more commitments in a larger geographical area, which 
transcends its own playground. For a long time South Caucasus was a “white spot” on EU 
foreign policy agenda, with no EU interest whatsoever to have a say in regional issues. As 
was already noted, there was not a clear EU strategy or policy towards the states of the region, 
because of the other priorities on EU’s external agenda like the security in Balkans and 
Eastern Europe, enlargements, EU Constitution, etc. did not leave a room for South Caucasus. 
Even after the increasing economic and strategic significance of the region, which mostly 
gained speed after 1994 oil agreements where many European oil companies also become 
shareholders, the EU kept its silence up until the end of 90s and the beginning of 2000s when 
it finally started to show the wish to undertake a more active stance in the region. Still, this 
role was not prominent and despite of the declared desire to commit to a more active 
involvement in the regional issues, its role was limited to assistance, facilitation and 
promotion of different kinds of aids, programs, etc., allowing other regional players and 
organizations to do the work.     
This brief historical summary of the genesis of EU policy towards South Caucasus was aimed 
for explaining the first intergovernmentalist assumption. We know that from the perspective 
of European integration, intergovernmentalism explains the dynamics and the nature of the 
integration process from prisms of decisions and policies adopted by the respective EU 
member states. The thrust of intergovernmentalism is mainly on states and their national 
interests, which they defend, especially on highly political issue areas such as foreign policy, 
security and defense.515  
 
Intergovernmentalism suggests that distant EU approach towards conflict resolution and its 
indirect role in facilitating conflict resolution was due to the lack of interest on the part of EU 
member states to dedicate attention to the region. Indeed, intergovernmentalism has always 
been strong in external domain of the EU, which is very much dependent on the interests and 
preferences of its member states.  
 
Plus, difficulty of attaining political solidarity and convergence of interests on the issues 
related to foreign policy has always been EU’s Achilles heel. However, in this particular case, 
it would perhaps be erroneous to assume that there was a certain debate and divergence of 
opinion over the necessity of taking stronger EU commitment to the region among the EU 
                                                 
515 See Chapter III (Neill Nugent, 565). 
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member states as a result of which EU for longer time kept low profile. Conversely, the 
problem mainly laid in the fact that there was no interest whatsoever on the part of the EU 
member states to engage with the region on a more dynamic pace, which was subsequently 
reflected in the formation of overall EU policy vis-à-vis the region and a distant EU role in 
South Caucasus issues, including conflict resolution. Thus, referring to the first 
intergovernmentalist assumption and using intergovernmentalist focus on national 
governments and their preferences as a starting point, it becomes possible to explain the 
nature and fluctuations of EU’s South Caucasus policy. 
Developing further on intergovernmentalist suppositions, it could be maintained that even 
when the EU decided to show more activism in the region in view of the region’s rising 
economic and strategic significance, its conflict resolution strategy more or less remained the 
same – maintaining distant and indirect approach. It could be assumed that the underlying 
reason for such a disparity between the increasing EU role in the region on one hand and a 
limited commitment to conflict resolution issues on the other hand, was largely conditioned 
by avoidance of the EU states to encroach upon what Russia considered to be its zone of 
influence and any probable conflicts that could have emerged with Russia on this prerequisite. 
This supposition seems particularly valid given the fact that some of the core EU member 
states such as France and Germany did not want to jeopardize their close economic 
cooperation with Russia over the tiny region.  
Moreover, some EU member states [France, United Kingdom and Germany] were acting in 
their national capacities as the members of the Group of Friends of the Secretary General of 
the UN on Georgia and as the co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group [France] to mediate 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Given their separate roles within other organizations, there was 
no desire on the part of these and also other member states to also engage the EU in active 
conflict resolution in South Caucasus and they sufficed with supporting the work of other 
existing formats in the field. Against this backdrop, it is a germane occasion to hypothesize 
that the interests of the EU member states account for EU policy fluctuations towards the 
region. 
A more direct EU role in the conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, which followed the 
August 2008 events, could be seen as rising EU profile in conflict resolution. However, I 
would argue that this change was in fact necessitated by the extreme conditions in which 
Georgia was in the aftermath of Russian offensive, when none of other organizations, such as 
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the UN, the OSCE [not to mention Russian-led CIS] could mediate peace and establish a 
representation in the conflict area due to strong Russian influence on their decision-
making.516  
 
Nonetheless, many analysts afterwards suggested that EU’s achievement to mediate August 
12, 2008 ceasefire agreement was mostly due to personal initiative of French President 
Sarkozy and France holding the Presidency in the Council of the European Union, rather than 
a well-thought and desired policy option of the entire EU as such. It was later observed that 
Sarkozy did not miss the occasion to underline that that the achievement of ceasefire was due 
to France’s efforts and not those of the EU. For instance, in his statement at a pre-election 
meeting in Nimes he noted: “...if Georgia was not wiped from the map...that is because 
France, while it held the presidency of the European Union shouldered its responsibilities so 
that Europe could take action...”.517   
 
Further, in his article in “Washington Post” he described in detail how he achieved ceasefire 
between Georgia and Russia and convinced Russians to agree to withdrawal of their forces 
from Georgia. He maintained: “…At the behest of French presidency, Europe put itself on the 
front lines from the outset of hostilities to resolve this conflict.... It was the European Union 
through France that created a space for diplomacy by quickly proposing reasonable terms for 
a cease-fire and rendering the political cost of pursuing war exorbitant for both parties...”.518 
 
The reflection on the aforesaid paragraphs on the more direct EU role, which became 
possible with President Sarkozy’s mediation efforts leads to the reasoning that even when 
there was a dire necessity for action in the region, it became possible due to individual 
initiative of EU member states, in this case France, which president beyond attempting to 
ease the conflict, also aimed to strengthen the image of his country – France, likewise his 
own. It is believed that Sarkozy grabbed the momentum to put France back on a track of 
prestige after his predecessor Jacques Chirac surrendered France’s erstwhile eminence in the 
                                                 
516 In the previous Chapters dealing with the UN, the CIS and the OSCE effectiveness, Russian role in these 
organizations has been described. 
517 “Sarkozy: Europe’s peacemaker or was it all a spin?” Sarkozy statement at a pre-election meeting in Nimes, 
May 5, 2009, in Charlemagne’s Notebook Blog, the Economist Website, (June 8, 2009). Accessed on December 
23, 2010, unpaged. 
518 Nicolas Sarkozy, “Europe gets started on quelling a crisis,” Washington Post, August 18, 2008, online, 
available from (http://www.washingtonpost.com). Accessed on February 18, 2011, unpaged. 
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EU and on international fora.519 Thus, the second intergovernmentalist assumption, which 
suggested that subsequent increase of EU profile in the region after August 2008 events was 
due to the initiative and a leading role of an EU member state, seems to be valid and relevant. 
 
General landscape of the overall EU approach towards conflict resolution was drawn around 
the EU belief that conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region will be best attained 
through long-term objectives and commitments to promotion of democracy, development and 
most importantly, regional cooperation and dialogue. 
 
EU persistence on approaching the region of South Caucasus through various institutional 
arrangements such as ENP and EPI, by means of which it tries to promote various forms of 
reforms and regional cooperation on many areas, could be perhaps be evaluated by 
neofunctionalist logic, which argues that membership in common arrangements change the 
way national interests are understood in the relevant interest groups and governments. 
Besides, having been initiated, institutions turn into supranational entities which become the 
driving force of further integration and can have an effect on the perception of national 
interests.520  
 
Moreover, it was described earlier that irrespective of the specific security situation on the 
ground and the unwillingness of some states to engage on all-inclusive regional cooperation, 
the EU insists on promotion of regional cooperation in South Caucasus through the ENP in 
areas like economy, business, social policy, trade, environment, border management, joint 
infrastructure and security projects in the sectors of energy, transport and other areas.  
 
This EU approach is seemingly based on the notion and logic of spillover of 
neofunctionalism, according to which further cooperation might follow on other areas of 
economy and relevant fields [functional spillover], which might also lead to the increased 
elite integration and socialization with gradual approximation of interests [political spillover]. 
This in its turn will make it easier for the respective governments to negotiate and come to a 
common position, which might eventually result in the achievement of a peaceful solution to 
their lingering conflicts.  
                                                 
519 Ari Indyk, “Nicolas Sarkozy’s mediation of the crisis in the Caucasus,” PiCA, A Global Research 
Organization, online, available from (http://www.thepicaproject.org/?page_id=124). Accessed on February 14, 
2011, unpaged. 
520 See Chapter III (Arne Niemann, 15). 
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Besides, it could also be suggested that the EU focus on promotion of various forms of 
policies and instruments [ENP, EPI] towards various regions, South Caucasus included, 
corresponds with the cultivated spillover type, according to which once established, 
supranational institutions will become the driving forces of integration, since they are 
interested in further development of the process.521 To conclude this analysis, it should 
nonetheless be once again reiterated that application of integration theories to EU policy 
towards conflict resolution in South Caucasus is different from the EU case, since in 
application to South Caucasus word “integration” is to be interpreted as “cooperation”. 
 
The reason why the EU hoped to bring peace to the region via assistance policy in various 
areas, and other indirect tools targeted at democracy, state-building and civil society 
development was because of its conviction that such changes will make the parent states 
more attractive for their secessionist parts, which might then seek for reintegration. However, 
this “conviction” was the declared or the visible side of distant EU attitude towards the 
conflict resolution, while underlying implication could be related to higher geopolitical 
considerations, such as EU member states’ reluctance to clash or interfere with Russia’s 
deeply entrenched leadership role in the regional issues. 522    
 
General conclusions  
 
After briefly analyzing the EU role in conflict resolution in South Caucasus, firstly, its distant 
attitude and afterwards increased role in Georgian conflict; secondly importance it attaches to 
the role of institutions and various instruments in promotion of stability, cooperation and 
conflict resolution, the following general conclusions are drawn regarding the EU role in 
South Caucasus conflict resolution:   
 
-  Due to the reluctance of the EU member states to commit themselves to the        
promotion of regional security  in South Caucasus and the priority attached to        its 
direct neighborhood in Balkans and Eastern Europe, the region and its        problems have 
long been discarded in EU’s foreign policy agenda [first intergovernmentalist 
assumption]. Increase of EU role in Georgian conflicts was due to the initiative of 
individual EU member state [second intergovernmentalist assumption] 
 
                                                 
521 Relevant description of all three spillover types are given in Chapter III. 
522 Nona Mikhelidze, “Eastern partnership and conflicts in the South Caucasus: old wine in new skins?” p. 3.  
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-  Despite of the fact that following the August 2008 war the EU had to undertake stronger 
role in South Caucasus conflict resolution, its role is still lower than other regional actors, 
such as Russia, Turkey, the US. 
 
-    EU approach to the South Caucasus through various institutional arrangements  
such as ENP and EPI is dictated by its belief that by fostering various reforms, regional 
cooperation on many areas, and the effect of spillover that such cooperation patterns 
might create it will be easier for the respective governments to negotiate and come to a 
speedy peaceful resolution of respective conflicts [neofunctionalist assumption].   
 
-  Even the above described European Parliament resolution, which underlines a necessity 
for a stronger EU role in conflict resolution and is a leap forward in ascribing a more 
direct role for the EU in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, is still pretty vague 
since it again puts much emphasis on rehabilitation and assistance programs, and the EU 
contribution to peace-building and conflict management, supporting civil-society projects, 
etc.523     
 
-  In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the EU role unfortunately did not much change even after 
the appointment of the EU Special Representative, and the increased EU role in Georgia 
after August 2008. As it was noted above, the EU Special Representative mainly performs 
facilitation/assistance activity, without bringing weightier input, which would generate 
direct EU involvement in conflict resolution beyond the facilitation and rendering support 
for the OSCE led process. EU’s role is predominantly confined to some political 
declarations and expressing support to the efforts of the Minsk Group.  
 
-  Increased EU visibility in mediating the South Caucasus conflicts has thus been left 
narrowed down only to Georgian conflicts and did not apply to Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, towards which the EU supposedly tries to maintain a balanced approach by 
avoiding any partiality in favor of either of the parties – Armenia or Azerbaijan. The EU 
unremittingly evades expressing any support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, 
without making equal references to the right of self-determination. This has turned into a 
stumbling stone in the EU-Azerbaijani relations, since Baky does not hide its 
disappointment with EU’s reticence on this issue. This is evidently different from 
                                                 
523 See: Draft Report on an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus, 2009/2216 (INI), European Parliament 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 11, 2010, unpaged.   
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Georgian case; where EU never hid its perspicuous support for the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Georgia.  
 
-  Mainstream EU policy revolves around the promotion of various institutions, such as ENP 
and EP through which EU hopes to attains regional cooperation on many areas and thus 
assist the states themselves to find a solution to their conflicts [see above: neofunctionalist 
assumption/spillover effect]. However, the issue of regional cooperation and continuous 
focus on its promotion may also be a challenge to effectiveness and success of the ENP, 
and the overall EU policy in South Caucasus, if the EU continues to employ the ENP as 
another instrument to promote all-inclusive regional cooperation in the South Caucasus 
region under the present circumstances, which is dominated by the absence of 
fundamental preconditions such as security and stability, mutual trust and confidence. 
This aspect may be one of the main hurdles for the policy’s opportunities to be exploited 
to the maximum in the states of the South Caucasus region. 
 
-  Despite all the limitations and shortcomings, however, the institute of EU Special 
Representative has done a positive work in shuttling between the conflicting parties and 
facilitating the dialogue.  
 
-  Having relatively lesser role compared to other more prominent actors, and limiting its 
increased mediation activity only to Georgian conflicts, the EU keeps on offering its 
traditional model for peaceful solution of conflicts, which is through confidence building, 
cooperation, cohabitation and respect for diversity.  
 
-   That said, conventional European approach to conflict resolution through cooperation and 
confidence building aimed at final peace through gradual rapprochement, seems 
unfortunately, not to be a viable option in South Caucasus today. This is mostly due to the 
fact that the conflicts in South Caucasus are far more deep rooted than it is understood in 
Europe, and the traces of grievances are yet sore in the hearts. On the other hand, perhaps 
the nations of the South Caucasus states need some more time to accommodate the idea of 
traditional European approach to conflict resolution through cooperation and confidence 
building, something new that they got to familiarize in depth after reacquiring their 
independence. Whatever could be the reason, though, hopes should not be foregone that 
the EU could still make a difference in conflict resolution in the entire South Caucasus 
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region employing at least the mentioned traditional model, even if this contribution may 
not be as target oriented and effective as a more direct involvement and active conflict 
resolution efforts.    
 
-  What concerns the EU participation in Geneva talks alongside the UN and the OSCE, the 
process is yet new with no concrete results so far. Of course, it is yet early to judge about 
the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of this format given the fact that it has been operating 
for a shorter time span. As was earlier stated, there are many controversial issues 
discussed within this format – the most adamantly debated one being Georgia’s demand to 
conclude a non-use agreement with Russia, which the latter rejects. Whatever could be the 
outcome of these talks, it remains to be a subject for a future extensive research. 
 
3. Summing up 
 
This chapter was devoted to the analysis of EU role in conflict resolution in South Caucasus. 
Since EU role in South Caucasus conflict resolution process is mostly different from the 
previously researched three organizations, and regime theory cannot be applied to the EU 
case, theoretical suppositions of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism were employed. 
Three major aspects of the EU policy in conflict resolution were assessed:  1- distant EU 
approach towards conflict resolution and its indirect role in facilitating conflict resolution is 
due to the lack of interest on the part of EU members [intergovernmentalist assumption]; 2 - 
subsequent increase of the EU profile in the region after August 2008 events was due to the 
initiative and a leading role of an EU member state [intergovernmentalist assumption]; 3 – EU 
believes that the regional cooperation on practical issues will lead to expansion of cooperation 
on issues of high politics, which subsequently will bring to the attainment of peace in the 
relevant conflict cases [neofunctionalist assumption].  
 
While analyzing the empirical data, the above assumptions proved to be valid. Moreover, in 
addition to the findings based on intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist suppositions, 
some general conclusions and observations related to EU policy were also underlined.     
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VII. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM524 IN SOUTH CAUCASUS CONFLICTS 
 
As was reiterated throughout the dissertation, the thrust of this work is to analyze the roles 
and effectiveness of the UN, the CIS, the OSCE in facilitating the achievement of a final 
settlement to South Caucasus conflict resolution process and the evaluation of the EU role 
and approach towards South Caucasus conflict resolution process. This Chapter will be 
devoted to the exploration of the last-third regime theory hypothesis, which unlike the 
previous two hypotheses [actors’ interests and problem solving capacity] can also be applied 
to the EU case. Thus, it is suggested that nature of the problem in South Caucasus conflicts 
influence the activity and effectiveness of the involved institutions to facilitate the achievement 
of a final solution to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics. For conducting this 
analysis, which necessitates the assessment of relevant legal issues, in this chapter I will 
firstly, cover the views of the conflicting parties on the nature of the problem and secondly, 
highlight the debate on self-determination and territorial integrity under international law, 
which is the crux of the nature of the South Caucasus conflicts. This would help me in the 
next-third step to evaluate the impact of the nature of the problem on the effectiveness of the 
institutions. 
 
1. Views of the conflicting parties on the nature of the problem  
 
Having taken a glance at the background of the conflicts in the South Caucasus region, –  the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
in Georgia, – it is a germane occasion to refresh the conclusions made at the end of the 
Chapter I about the commonalities of all three conflicts525 and to expand more on this topic. 
As we already know, despite of the differences in the history as well as the causes of all three 
conflict cases, there is however, a shared feature for all of them – a thorny issue concerning 
the juxtaposition of the two principles of international law – territorial integrity of states and 
right of peoples to self-determination.  
 
In all conflicts, irrespective of their historical background and divergent international 
mediation dynamics, this legal bifurcation has floated to surface and continues to do so, 
constituting an inalienable part of the very notion and the perception of the South Caucasus 
                                                 
524 The words “nature of the problem” will sometimes be used interchangeably with the words “problem 
structure”. 
525 See Chapter I, Section 2. 
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conflicts. This statement does not intend to overlook other factors that may as well complicate 
their nature, such as divergent historic narratives and grievances. However, neither 
ambivalent historic interpretations, nor deep-rooted animosity of the parties make the matters 
as intractable as when it comes to dealing with the complex legal issues of territorial integrity 
and self-determination.  
 
In order to better illustrate the depth of the problem, I will illuminate the positions of the 
conflicting parties and their argumentations in favor of each of the above mentioned two 
principles. My general observations allow me to argue that although in all three discussed 
conflicts the nature of problem is identical and stumble over the discrepancies as for the 
importance of any of the mentioned two principles, the intensity of legalistic discourse is not 
the same in all cases.  
 
Legal dispute in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is more ardent and ubiquitous than in 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. One reason lies in the fact that there is no bitter 
debate among the actors of Georgian conflicts when it comes to the issue of ownership over 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian regions. In the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict both Armenia and Azerbaijan claim for historic ownership over the region, which 
explains the existing affluence of legal appraisals on the nature of the conflict describing the 
opposing positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
 
Given also the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh has not been accepted as an independent party to 
the conflict and the interactions are maintained only between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both 
states are tirelessly after justifying their positions. In Georgian conflicts, however, Georgia 
recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as parties to the conflicts, which in fact grants the 
regions themselves a status of freestanding parties to negotiations. Another actor, Russia, 
which is strongly backing Georgia’s breakaway republics, unlike Armenia in the case with 
Nagorno-Karabakh does not openly allege that the regions historically belonged to itself and 
suffices with extending its support to the separatist regions under the pretext of protecting its 
citizens and the necessity of respecting the will and the right of peoples of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia to self-determination. These factors perhaps account for the lower intensity of legal 
debate on Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts, compared to Armenian-
Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
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1.1. Azerbaijan and Armenia 
 
In the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the parties - Armenia and 
Azerbaijan claim their rights to the region, the former state emphasizing its righteousness 
using the principle of self-determination, while the latter substantiating its position referring 
to the principle of territorial integrity. Armenia portrays the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as 
a struggle for independence of the local people, while Azerbaijan asserts that the conflict is 
the act of aggression imposed by Armenia and directed against its territorial integrity. 
 
Azerbaijan asserts that Armenia has occupied part of its territory with the purpose of its 
annexation and manipulates with the principle of “self-determination” for the achievement of 
its targeted objective. Self-determination does not entail the right for unilateral secession of 
any parts of the territory and is a legitimate process, which should be exercised peacefully 
within the existing norms and principles of international law and in conformity with national 
legislation, without violation of a state’s territorial integrity. Azerbaijan believes that 
Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh are not independent subjects of international law and may 
exercise their rights to self-determination only together with the entire population of 
Azerbaijan, of which they constitute a part.  
 
Therefore, Nagorno-Karabakh can only exercise its right to self-determination within 
Azerbaijan, and this is possible only through peaceful, democratic and legal process with 
immediate participation of the entire population of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, including 
also the inhabitants of Azerbaijani origin. For this purpose, Azerbaijan insists that first of all, 
the fact of occupation should be eliminated, which entails the withdrawal of the Armed Forces 
of the Republic of Armenia and demilitarization of the region, after which the Azerbaijani 
population could return to Nagorno-Karabakh and other adjacent districts. 526  
 
Following the return of the population to the liberated areas, the creation of the necessary 
conditions for life and peaceful co-existence of Armenian and Azerbaijani communities, it 
would be possible to initiate a constructive dialogue on the corresponding model of self-
government for the Nagorno-Karabakh region, within Azerbaijan. The biggest compromise 
Azerbaijan suggests it could make is to grant the Nagorno-Karabakh region the highest 
possible degree of autonomy. Otherwise, Azerbaijani side argues that attempts to secede from 
                                                 
526 General conclusion using archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 
statements and position papers of the MFA officials of Azerbaijan. 
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the state unilaterally is unconstitutional and are pursued in deepest negligence of and 
disrespect for international law, including those which prohibit forceful annexation of 
territories and the use of force.527 
 
Referring to international legal instruments such as the UN Security Council resolutions 822, 
853, 874 and 884, the Council of Europe resolution of 1416, which call for the liberation of 
the occupied Azerbaijani territories, restoration of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
Azerbaijan asserts that its position is also underpinned by the international community. 
Azerbaijan keeps on underlining that it wants and hopes for the settlement of the conflict in 
conformity with the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act,528 based on respect for 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan. It has been and is still very adamant in 
tirelessly emphasizing that Azerbaijan does not and cannot accept any compromises when it 
comes to its territorial integrity, although it is committed to peace talks, if they do not bring 
any results, the country may and will resort to any other means in order to restore its territorial 
integrity.529  
 
Azerbaijan argues that the Paris peace conference, which was held in 1919 had in fact 
recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR- 1918-
1920) and after the establishment of the Soviet regime Nagorno-Karabakh similarly remained 
within Azerbaijan.530 According to the Article 86 of the USSR Constitution autonomous 
entities stayed within the boundaries of the socialist republics. In the Article 87 of the USSR 
Constitution, all eight autonomous entities that existed in the USSR were enumerated and 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) was indicated to be within Azerbaijan 
Soviet Socialist Republic (Azerbaijan SSR). The status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an 
autonomous oblast within Azerbaijan SSR was stipulated in the Constitutions of the USSR of 
1936 and 1977531 and according to the Constitutions of the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR, 
the legal status of NKAR was governed by the Law "On the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Oblast", which had been adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan SSR on 16 June 
                                                 
527 Ibid, 
528 See Chapter V, Section 1. 
529 See: Speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Mr. E. Mammadyarov, “Towards peace in the 
Nagorny-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan through reintegration and cooperation,” (2005), 
Conciliation Resources, online, available from (http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-
karabakh/reintegration-cooperation.php). Accessed on September 23, 2010, unpaged. 
530 See Chapter II, Section 1. 
531 Constitution of the USSR (Moscow, 1936), p.14, Article 24; Constitution of the USSR (Moscow, 1977), pp. 
13-14, Article 87.  
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1981.532 The population of the region enjoyed all the social economic and political rights and 
in fact, living standards in Nagorno-Karabakh region was much higher than that of the 
remaining part of Azerbaijan.533 
The procedure of changing the borders of the socialist republics was precisely laid out in the 
constitutions of the USSR and the socialist republics themselves. In this light, Azerbaijan 
maintains that according to the Article 78 of the USSR Constitution, the territory of the 
Socialist republic cannot be altered without the consent of the republic concerned. The 
borders between the soviet socialist republics could only be the subject to change upon the 
mutual agreement of the relevant republics, and this decision was to be further approved by 
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. This provision was also enshrined in the 
Constitutions of Azerbaijan and Armenian SSRs.534 
Azerbaijan argues that the decision of the regional Council of NKAR of June 12, 1988 to 
secede from Azerbaijan SSR was a violation of the USSR Constitution as well as the 
Constitution of Azerbaijan and the Article 42 of the Law of Azerbaijan SSR on “Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous region”, according to which the Council of the deputes of the NKAR 
could take the decisions only within the authorities that it was given by the legislation of the 
Azerbaijan SSR. Besides, the Article 42 of the aforesaid law allowed revoking the decision of 
the regional Council if a certain decision did not correspond to the legislation of the socialist 
republic. The Supreme Council of Azerbaijan SSR therefore, adopted a decree, which stated 
that the June 12 decision to secede from Azerbaijan was legally null and void.535   
Azerbaijan maintains, the whole process of separation of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan 
SSR in favor of Armenia SSR, was accompanied by the apparent violation of the USSR 
Constitution, and, therefore, bore no legal value and consequences.  Azerbaijan assured that 
the actions of the NKAR were dictated by Armenia, which abated the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians for unconstitutional and illegal deeds. Alongside other illegal decisions of 
Armenian SSR in regard to the NKAR, the most famous one was the decision of December 1, 
1989 on “Unification of Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh”,536 which envisaged 
undertaking measures for fusion of political, economic and cultural structures of Armenian 
                                                 
532 Law of the Azerbaijan SSR "On the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast," 16 June 1981 (Baku: 
Azerneshr, 1987), p. 3, Article 3.  
533 T. Musayev, Legal aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Правовые аспекты Нагорно-Карабахского 
конфликта), (East-West Publishing House, Baky, 2001):17.  
534 Ibid. 
535 Ibid., 18-19.  
536 See Chapter II, Section 1. 
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SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan believes that this was a convincing fact attesting to 
the territoriality of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
Azerbaijan rebuffs Armenian argument that the proclamation of the "Republic of Nagorno-
Karabakh" was in conformity with the Law of the USSR "On the Procedures for Resolving 
Questions Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR" of 3 April 1990.537 
The purpose of this Law was to regulate mutual relations within the framework of the USSR 
by establishing a specific procedure to be followed by Union republics in the event of their 
secession from the USSR. A decision by a Union republic to secede had to be based on the 
will of the people of the republic freely expressed through a referendum, subject to 
authorization by the Supreme Soviet of the Union republic. Moreover, this law also envisaged 
that in a Union socialist republic containing autonomous republics, autonomous provinces and 
autonomous regions, the referendum had to be held separately in each autonomous unit. The 
people of these autonomous entities retained the right to decide independently whether they 
want to stay within the USSR or secede from the given soviet socialist republic, as well as to 
raise the question of their own state-legal status.538 However, the secession of a Union 
republic from the USSR was to be seen as legal only after the completion of complex and 
time consuming procedure, and the approval of the relevant decision by the Congress of the 
USSR People's Deputies.539 
 
Nonetheless, after the famous Belovejsk Agreements of 8 December, 1991 the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist as a subject of international law and the mentioned Law was without legal 
effect, since no Union republic, including Azerbaijan and Armenia, had ever referred to the 
procedure for secession stipulated in it. Therefore, until the Republic of Azerbaijan attained 
full independence and was recognized by the international community, the territory on which 
the NKAR of Azerbaijan SSR existed before 26 November 1991540, had remained as a part of 
Azerbaijan. NKAR could have exercised its right to conduct an independent referendum and 
legalize its outcomes only if Azerbaijan had referred to the Law "On the Procedures for 
                                                 
537 Archives of the MFA, Azerbaijan, position papers on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Law of the USSR "On the 
Procedures for Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR," 3 April 1990. 
Bulletin of the Soviet of the USSR, 1990, №15, pp. 303-308.  
538 See: Law of the USSR "On the Procedures for Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union 
Republics from the USSR," 3 April 1990. Bulletin of the Soviet of the USSR, 1990, №15, pp. 303-308.  
539 T. Musayev, “From territorial claims to belligerent occupation: legal appraisal,” World of Diplomacy, Journal 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, (N 18-19, 2008):35.   
540 On November 26, 1991, Azerbaijan SSR revoked the autonomous status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and 
thus, the decree of Azerbaijani Central Executive Committee of July 7, 1923 on the creation of Nagorno-
Karabakh autonomous region was also repelled. 
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Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR" of 3 April 
1990 in order to secede from the USSR. Otherwise, Azerbaijan upholds that NKAR 
referendum on unilateral secession and subsequent decisions of Armenia supporting NKAR 
and its unification with Armenia is to be considered as a violation of international law and as 
an encroachment on territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan.541  
 
Moreover, Azerbaijan asserts that when the Soviet Union ended its existence the former 
socialist republics were de-jure recognized by the international community. When Azerbaijan 
also became independent, in accordance with the principle of uti possidetis juris542 its state 
borders were accepted as being the same as the former administrative borders of Azerbaijan 
SSR, which also included NKAR. This principle is also clearly underlined in the four 
mentioned UN Security Council resolutions on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
 
In finalization of legal argumentations of Azerbaijan, it should especially be noted that 
Azerbaijan does not accept the generally established cliché about the “clash of two principles 
of international law: territorial integrity and self-determination” and retorts that there is any 
conflict between the two principles, referring to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which 
delineates clear borders of the two principles and defines the niche of the right to self-
determination within the territorial integrity and internationally recognized borders of 
states.543 It asserts that the so-called clash or conflict of two principles of Helsinki Decalogue 
is an artificial statement, since all principles of Helsinki Final Act are equal and 
interconnected and that peoples while exercising their rights to self-determination should act 
in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and with the relevant norms 
of international law, including the principle of territorial integrity, as enshrined in the Helsinki 
Final Act.544  
 
Conversely, Armenia’s position is built on Armenia’s conviction in the necessity of 
recognizing the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians’ rights to self-determination. Contrary to the 
legal substantiations of Azerbaijan, Armenia makes its case around the argument that the 
League of Nations in fact did not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of the first 
Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan (ADR 1918-1920). In this light, Armenia continues to 
                                                 
541 T. Musayev, 25.  
542 Broader information on this principle will be given later in the chapter. 
543 Helsinki Final Act, Articles IV (territorial integrity) and VIII (self-determination).     
544 Talking points by the Delegation of Azerbaijan at the Opening Session of the Annual Security Review 
Conference, June 23, 2009, (PC.DEL/486/09, June 23, 2009, RESTRICTED):2.  
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assert that Azerbaijan had never had the ownership and “effective control” over Nagorno-
Karabakh. Since today’s Azerbaijan Republic is not a legal successor of Azerbaijan SSR 
(1920-1990), but of ADR and the latter never had Nagorno-Karabakh as its constituent part, 
then from legal point of view, this meant that Azerbaijan’s claim for Nagorno-Karabakh is 
groundless. This point is substantiated by Armenia referring to Stalin’s 1921 decision, which 
according to Armenian interpretation had “granted” Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan SSR.545 
The conclusion is that due to historic misfortune Nagorno-Karabakh had only been the part of 
Azerbaijan SSR. Therefore, neither ADR had, nor the successor of the ADR contemporary 
Azerbaijan has the right to claim for Nagorno-Karabakh.546  
 
Armenia maintains that on August 30, 1991, Azerbaijan SSR adopted a “Declaration on re-
establishment of the national independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan”, which laid the 
ground for Azerbaijan’s secession from the USSR. Nagorno-Karabakh actually took the 
similar decision four days later by adopting “Declaration of the Republic of Nagorno-
Karabakh”, which was fully in compliance with international and the existing Soviet law. 
 
Armenia argues that according to the Law of the USSR "On the Procedures for Resolving 
Questions Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR" of 3 April 1990, 
autonomous entities within the USSR were entitled for self-determination and secession from 
the union republic to which they previously belonged if the given republic was to secede itself 
from the USSR. Thus, the judicial mechanism envisaged in the above law conferred the 
population of the Nagorno-Karabakh region the right to determine their future status. 
According to Armenia’s position, this action of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians was also to be 
seen as legal since Azerbaijan had declared its intention to secede from the USSR before the 
actual collapse of the USSR, by adopting the Constitutional Act on Independence in October 
of 1991. Therefore, the referendum on independence, which was held in NKAR in December 
10, 1991 had a legal value, because Nagorno-Karabakh had exercised the right for which it 
was eligible under the existing legal documents and procedures.547  
 
                                                 
545 See Chapter II, Section 1. 
546 Sergey Minasyan, “Pacific illusions in Armenia and “balance of threats,” in Karabakh conflict,” December 7, 
2005, online, available from Archives of (http://www.regnum.ru/news/556167.html). Accessed on August 23, 
2010, unpaged. 
547 Report of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh problem during 
Parliamentary hearings, March 29-30, 2005, online, available from (http://www.regnum.ru/news/437271.html). 
Accessed on August 2010, unpaged. 
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Thus, Armenia asserts that the conflict between the Articles 70 (self-determination) and 78 
(territorial integrity of Union republics) of the USSR Constitution was eliminated by the said 
law of April 3, 1990. In this light, the independence of Azerbaijan from the USSR was the 
first, while the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan SSR was the second 
level of decolonization from the USSR. Therefore, Nagorno-Karabakh’s secession from 
Soviet Azerbaijan was fully legal.548 Similarly, Armenia maintains that the principle of self-
determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act also applies to Armenians in Nagorno-
Karabakh and that all ten principles in the Helsinki Final Act should be regarded as being 
equal. That said, Armenia denies the formulation in the Helsinki Final Act, which states that 
principles of self-determination should be interpreted within the principle of territorial 
integrity of states and should not be seen as a right to secede.549 
 
Armenia believes that Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh are entitled for exercising their rights 
to self-determination, also due to the fact that they are ethnically, linguistically, religiously 
and culturally different from Azerbaijanis and the region itself has a long history of being an 
autonomous territorial unit. Nagorno-Karabakh’s referendum on declaration of independence 
held in December, 1991, was in fact a response to the abolition of the autonomous status for 
region by Azerbaijan on November 26, 1991.   
 
Developing this logic, Armenia upholds that since Azerbaijan drastically rejected Nagorno-
Karabakh’s just right to self-determination, and consequently committed an aggression 
against it, Nagorno-Karabakh had no option except defending itself referring to the Article 51 
on self-defense of the UN Charter. Against the backdrop of hostilities that lasted until 1994, 
Nagorno-Karabakh forces refuted Azerbaijan’s aggression and also, occupied seven adjacent 
district as “security zones” to insure from future similar attacks of Azerbaijan. In this context, 
the violation of the principle of territorial integrity had happened in regard to Azerbaijan only 
when Nagorno-Karabakh forces had to control other seven districts around Nagorno-
Karabakh in the course of compulsory repulse of Azerbaijan’s aggression.550 
 
Nowadays Armenia also maintains that during the years that have lapsed since the 
independence of Azerbaijan, the latter never had any control over Nagorno-Karabakh. After 
                                                 
548 Nagorno-Karabakh: A White Paper, (Armenian Assembly of America):12-13. 
549 Ibid. For the formulation in the Helsinki Final Act, see Section 2.of the Chapter. 
550 Report of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh problem during 
Parliamentary hearings, March 29-30, 2005, unpaged.  
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exercising its right to self-determination, Nagorno-Karabakh although still not recognized 
internationally, has proven to be a de-facto independent state by establishing the necessary 
attributes of statehood, which makes the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh irreversible. 
According to this view, the longer Nagorno-Karabakh lives with its de-facto acquired 
independence, the more difficult it will be to deny in the international recognition of its 
independence. Armenia repeatedly asserts that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not about 
seizure of territories, but about self-determination.551 
 
In general conclusion, Armenia believes that Azerbaijani Republic, which gained 
independence in 1991 in fact returned to the existing legal circumstances of 1918-1920 and 
became the successor of the state, which did not have under its supervision the territories that 
belong to Nagorno-Karabakh. Even Azerbaijan’s international recognition and membership in 
international organizations became the result of the “inertial international legal responsibility 
of the USSR” and did not mean that Nagorno-Karabakh was recognized as part of 
Azerbaijan.552  
 
Azerbaijan bears the burden of blame for unleashing and exacerbating the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict and Armenia had no choice but to interfere in order to protect ethnic Armenians 
living in the region in their quest for self-determination. Armenia, therefore, construes the 
right to self-determination in a nationalist sense claiming that ethnic group living in cluster in 
a given territory may and should realize its right to self-determination and create its own 
nation state.553 According to Armenia’s legalistic estimation, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is 
nether territorial, nor ethnic. Rather, it is the conflict for self-determination and self-
government.       
 
1.2. Georgia and its breakaway republics 
 
As was depicted above, legalistic discourse in Georgia’s conflicts has lower intensity, 
compared to Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nonetheless, this does not 
                                                 
551 Vartan Oskanyan, “Old states and new: shifting paradigms and the complex road to peace in Nagorno-
Karabakh,” (2005), online, available from (http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/old-states-
new.php). Accessed on January 24, 2010, unpaged. 
552 Mikhail Aghadjanyan et al, Azerbaijan against the people of Karabakh: politico-legal consequences  of 
aggression and the influence of those consequences on  the prospects of regional security, (“Nairi” Publishing 
house, Yerevan, 2007):134. 
553 Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, Country Watch, online, available from 
(http://www.countrywatch.com). Accessed on September 12, 2010, unpaged. 
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change the actual nature of the problem in Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. Both 
regions claim for independence from Georgia, while for Georgian authorities the regions’ 
demands for independence is a secessionist movement that should be suppressed. Here again 
we see the clash of the above-mentioned two principles, which the parties use as a legal 
pretext to gain support for their respective positions in the conflict. 
 
Both – Abkhazia and South Ossetia view themselves as ethnically and culturally distinct 
people, with different historical experience and statehood traditions. By putting the blame on 
Soviet leadership, which according to these entities defined the status of the two regions 
within Georgia, they believed that time was ripe for them to use their rights to self-
determination and create their independent states again. 
 
In Georgian – Abkhazian conflict, Abkhazian side claims that it became the part of the Soviet 
Union detached from Georgia and at the outset it was an independent Union Republic on 
equal status with Georgia. Only in 1931 it was subjected to Georgian rule by Stalin, who was 
of Georgian origin. Abkhaz maintain that when Georgia declared its independence in 1991, 
Abkhazia had to avail of the opportunity to regain its independence.554  
 
While Georgia was gaining international recognition as an independent state, Abkhazia 
argued that it also had the right to claim for the same treatment and restore its 1925 
constitution according to which “Republic of Abkhazia” had a federative relationship with 
Georgia. Based on this Constitution and given the fact that Georgia declared its independence 
from the USSR, Abkhazia’s declaration of independence was fully legal.555 On July 23 1992, 
Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia abolished 1978 Constitution and decided to return to 1925 
Constitution. Against this decision, Abkhazians argue, Georgians reacted with the use of 
force, which was intended “to destroy Abkhaz statehood and suppress the aspiration of the 
Abkhaz people towards self-determination”.556   
 
In Abkhaz stance, “Declaration on the state sovereignty of Abkhazia and resolution on legal 
guarantees for the protection of Abkhaz statehood” of August 25, 1990 had declared that the 
                                                 
554 See Chapter I for the history of Abkhazian declaration of independence. 
555 Levan Ramishvili, Conflict resolution in Georgia – A synthesis analysis with a legal perspective, online, 
available from (http://www.shimerli.livejournal.com/78603.html). Accessed on January 1, 2011, unpaged. 
556 Historical-Legal Factors of Georgian –Abkhazian relations, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of 
Abkhazia,” Sukhumi, 2002, online, available from (http://www.abkhazworld.com/articles/analysis/3-historical-
legal-factors-.html). Accessed on December 12, 2010, unpaged.   
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decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR taken between 1989 and 1990 on the 
inclusion of Abkhazia into the Georgian SSR had no legal effect, since Georgia could not 
unilaterally change the nature of its relations with Abkhazia. Further, Abkhazian position 
suggests that according to the Law “On the Procedures for Resolving Questions Related to the 
Secession of Union Republics from the USSR" of 3 April 1990, the autonomous entity had 
the right to decide whether it wanted to remain within the USSR if the socialist republic to 
which they belonged took the decision to secede. In the referendum, which was held on 
March 17, 1991, Abkhazians voted for the preservation of the USSR and the results of the 
referendum was confirmed by the Central Commission of the USSR.557  
 
Georgia, on the contrary held a referendum on March 31, 1991, which resulted in a positive 
vote for Georgia’s secession from the USSR. Abkhazia did not participate in the latter 
referendum and therefore, does not consider itself to be bound by its outcome. Since after this 
referendum Georgia restored its independence and declared itself to be the successor of the 
1918-1920 Georgian Democratic Republic (GDR), and Abkhazia still remained as a part of 
the USSR upon the outcome of its referendum, Georgia and Abkhazia ceased their common 
existence and became two different subjects of international law. Abkhazia continued to be 
part of the USSR until 21 December of 1991, the actual collapse of the USSR. Moreover, 
Abkhaz side also argues that when Georgia was admitted to the UN, it already had no 
ownership over Abkhazia, therefore, the recognition of Georgia within the borders of the 
former Georgian SSR had no legal effect.558 
 
Abkhaz demands for independence based on right to self-determination had also manifested 
itself in the statements of Abkhaz de-facto officials. For instance, on 25 July 2000 the 
chairman of Abkhaz Parliament stated that Abkhazia is independent, since it has passed the 
act of independence, and non-recognition does not matter. Abkhaz constitution which was 
approved by the referendum in November 1994 notes that Abkhazia is “sovereign, democratic 
state based on law, which historically has become established by the rights of nations to self-
determination”.559  
 
Regarding Abkhazian claims, Georgia maintains that Abkhazia is an inalienable part of 
Georgia and has never been independent republic during Soviet years. All changes to 
                                                 
557 Ibid.  
558 Ibid.   
559 Dov Lynch, “Separatist states and post-Soviet states,” Journal of International Affairs 78, 4 (2002): 837. 
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Abkhazia’s status and demography were done by Soviet leadership and Georgia has not to be 
blamed for this.560 Georgia also asserts that during Soviet times Abkhazia was an autonomous 
entity within the Georgian SSR and this was also maintained by the Soviet Constitution. 
Georgians argue that Abkhazians are not the only or the biggest minority group in Georgia, 
since upon the dissolution of the USSR the number of people belonging to Armenian, 
Azerbaijani, Russian and Ossetian ethnicities was more than that of Abkhazians. On this 
ground, Abkhazian claims for independence based on ethnicity factor meets with strong 
Georgian opposition, which is cautious of dangerous precedent that could be spread among 
other ethnic groups.561   
 
Concerning the unilateral declaration of independence by South Ossetia, Georgia asserts that 
like Abkhazia, this region also does not have the right to external self-determination,562 to the 
extent that these regions get recognized as independent after the August 2008 events. South 
Ossetia’s right to internal self-determination has not been recently abused by Georgia, with 
some minor examples that took place in early nineties during the tenure of President Z. 
Gamsakhurdia. Georgia’s territorial integrity was recognized by all international community, 
including Russia, after the collapse of the USSR with South Ossetia and Abkhazia being its 
integral parts.563  
 
Georgia on numerous occasions pledged to give South Ossetia higher autonomous status, 
which was rejected by the region. Moreover, Georgia does not recognize the outcome of the 
so-called referendums of independence that were held in 1991 and 2006 in South Ossetia, 
arguing that it did not consider the votes of minorities living there and the decision on the 
secession of some parts of state’s territory should be taken in a nationwide referendum, i.e. 
the entire Georgian nation. By this token, it is affirmed that South Ossetia’s claim for self-
determination is precarious.564   
 
According to Georgia’s position, under international legal practice, self-determination could 
be realized in forms of federative or autonomous arrangement, which would give Abkhazia 
                                                 
560 Ghia Nodia, “Georgian perspectives,” (September 1999), online, available from (http://www.c-
r.org/our/work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/georgian-perspectives.php). Accessed on December 24, 2010, unpaged. 
561 Ibid., unpaged. 
562 For the description of rights for external and internal self-determination see Section 3 of the Chapter. 
563 Inge Snip, “South Ossetia and self-determination,” (August 14, 2009), online, available from Evolutsa.net, 
(http://www.evolutsa.net/south-ossetia-and-self-determination). Accessed on January 3, 2011, unpaged. 
564 Ibid. 
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and South Ossetia self-government.565 Georgia asserts that neither Abkhazia, nor South 
Ossetia has legitimate claims as for applicability of the principle to self-determination to their 
cases. Self-determination does not grant the right to secede and could be achieved only 
through negotiated solutions. Like Azerbaijan, Georgia in response to the regions’ claims of 
self-determination also asserts that it is ready to grant the regions with the “highest level of 
autonomy” within Georgia and that Georgia’s Constitution is to be applicable to the regions 
too.566 Georgia suggests that the future political status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within 
Georgia is to be defined through peaceful and negotiated process after the return of the IDPs 
to their places of origin and liberation of the occupied Georgian territories.567 However, 
Abkhazia is especially ardent in demanding independence or at least, equal – confederative 
status with Georgia. 
 
Georgia maintains that according to its constitution, minorities are entitled to specific rights. 
That said, Article 14 of its constitution allows for the national minorities legal equality, 
irrespective of their ethnic or linguistic identities. With regard to Abkhazian language, Article 
8 of the Georgian constitution states that the state language in the Autonomous Republic of 
Abkhazia is Abkhazian. There is no, however, similar provision for accepting the South 
Ossetian language as official in South Ossetia, although South Ossetia also enjoyed autonomy 
regarding its language and culture. However, Georgia argues that Article 8 of the Constitution 
in fact indicates that Georgia is able to accommodate more than one language within a certain 
territorial unit and that South Ossetia was free to use its language. However, cultural freedom 
given to its administrative units did not imply their rights for secession. According to Article 
38 of Georgia’s Constitution, the implementation of the rights of minorities should not cross 
cut with the territorial integrity of states.568 
 
Separatist claims of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions with the usage of the 
principle to self-determination are widely backed by Russia, which by virtue of its own 
interests consistently supports the entities.569 In this light, Georgia’s accusations of violation 
of its territorial integrity often are directed against Russia, rather than Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, since Georgia is convinced that without Russian support, the two regions would have 
                                                 
565 Levan Ramishvili, unpaged. 
566 Edward Walker, unpaged. 
567 State Strategy of the Government of Georgia on Occupied territories: Engagement through Cooperation, 
online, available from (http://www.government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=225). Accessed on 
December 23, 2010, p.5. 
568 Levan Ramishvili, unpaged. 
569 Russia’s interests are covered partly in Chapters I and II, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV.  
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not been able to further their claims, achieve their de-facto independence and even 
international recognition, although trivial. 
 
Georgia also asserts that the war of August 2008, which was accompanied by Russian 
invasion, was a flagrant violation of international law – the principles of territorial integrity 
and sovereignty. In October of 2008 the Georgian Parliament passed a “law on Occupied 
Territories”, which regulates the legal regime, as well as international norms and 
arrangements in relation to two regions. It asserts that sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Georgia and inviolability of its internationally recognized borders must be respected.570  
 
Although the de-facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have 
repeatedly conducted referenda, the results of which were in favor of independence, these 
referendums have never been monitored by any observes and therefore their outcome is 
highly questioned by the legitimate authorities to which these regions belong. The positions of 
both Georgia and Azerbaijan lies in the assertion that the right of self-determination does not 
imply the right for secession; and national minorities could still enjoy their right to self-
determination within the territorial boundaries of the existing state. This should not jeopardize 
territorial integrity of states as firmly enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other 
fundamental documents of international law governing relations among states.  
 
On the opposite verge Armenia (backing Nagorno-Karabakh), Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
(backed by Russia) continue to perpetuate self-determination argument as a purport of their 
pursuit after secession of territories. This never-ending debate is augmented against the 
backdrop of existing inconsistencies in some of the international legal documents regarding 
the correlation of the right to self-determination with the principle of territorial integrity and 
the notion of secession, which increases the chances for political interpretations of the given 
legal concepts. The latter issue is the subject of the section below.  
 
2. Principles of territorial integrity and self-determination: the acrimonious debate in 
international law.  
 
From the preceding section it could be inferred that the real nature of the problem is 
interpreted by the conflicting parties based on two principles of international law: territorial 
                                                 
570 State Strategy of the Government of Georgia on Occupied territories: Engagement through Cooperation, p.5. 
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integrity of states and right of peoples to self-determination. Some would describe this as a 
clash or irreconcilability of the two principles, since reference to these principles makes the 
positions of parties more immutable and inflexible.  
 
Whether there is indeed a so-called clash between the two principles, or the existing 
extremeness in the positions of the concerned parties has political connotations and is 
predominantly strengthened by the ambiguity and omissions in some documents of 
international law regarding the principle of self-determination as such, and its interrelation 
with the principle of territorial integrity, will be the subject for discussion in the coming 
paragraphs of the given section. To this end, the section will be limited to the quest for the 
interrelation of the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity under international 
law, plus the notion of secession in this context, without going deeper into the history of the 
principles as well as their thorough legal assessment. 
 
Due to the vagueness of the existing language on self-determination in international law, the 
principle nowadays has become the frequent subject for ambivalent academic and political 
discourse that are designed for justification of political motivations. It is not fully clear from 
the existing provisions under international law if and under which conditions the principle 
also entails the right to secede, although the general understanding has developed around the 
assertion that the principle of self-determination should not be construed as a green light to 
violate the territorial integrity of states. Territorial integrity of states and inviolability of the 
internationally recognized borders are generally considered to be principled tenets of the very 
existence of states, and norms and principles of international law governing the relations 
among the states.571  
 
The principle of self-determination in fact was mostly being associated with the process of 
decolonization and the creation of new states after 1945 and was reflected in the relevant 
provisions in the UN Charter. However, Articles 1, (2) and 55 of the UN Charter are quite 
ambiguous about the essence of the right itself. For instance, Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the UN 
Charter state the following about the right to self-determination: 
 
                                                 
571 Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, relevant provisions of the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, 1960 
Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, Articles III and IV of the Helsinki 
Final Act 1975 (and reference to this principle in numerous occasions in the document), 1933 Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States, 1948 Charter of the Organization of American States, 1963 Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity, etc.  
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Article 1 (2) - To develop friendly relations among the nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and 
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.572 
Article 55 – With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a) higher standards of living, full 
employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development; b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and 
related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.573 
As evinced by the quoted paragraphs on self-determination above, the description of the 
principle itself is rather vague, and does not give the definition of what the right actually 
implies and whether indeed this right serves as a legal justification for secession, which makes 
almost impossible marrying it with the principle of territorial integrity.  Nonetheless, there 
was a common acknowledgement of the fact that the principle of self-determination applied 
merely to nations who were under colonial domination and “whose destinies had to be 
resettled in one way or another, because they had been unsettled by the War” and hence had 
the right to determine their future. It is understood that the notion of “self-determination” was 
a political formula and had therefore, to be seen in the context of political circumstances that 
necessitated its usage. That said, self-determination applied only to those areas that finally had 
to define their destiny upon the end of their colonial dependence.574 
 
Articles 73 and 76 (b) of the UN Charter further consolidates this assertion and links the 
principle of self-determination with the notion of self-government for the territories freed 
from the colonial domination. Consequently, Article 73 states the following: 
 
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the 
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure 
of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of 
these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to 
promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security 
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these 
territories.575 
                                                 
572 UN Charter, Article 1 (2), Chapter I (Purposes and Principles).  
573 UN Charter, Article 55, Chapter IX (International Economic and Social Co-operation). 
574 Gilbert Murray, “Self-determination of nationalities,” Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, 
Vol. 1, No.1. (January, 1922, pp.6-13), online, available from (http://links.jstor.org/sici=1473-
7981%28192201%291%3A1%3C6%3ASON%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W). Accessed on December 23, 2010, pp.10-11. 
575 UN Charter, Chapter XI: Declaration regarding non-self-governing territories, Article 73. 
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Article 76 of the Charter furthermore specifies the contents of the said Article 1 (2) of the 
Charter to suggest that: 
 
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes 
of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be: to 
further international peace and security; to promote the political, economic, 
social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and 
their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may 
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples 
and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be 
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement.576 
 
As the paragraphs above illustrated, the right to self-determination is reflected from two 
different angles in the UN Charter –as a general right and a basis of international and 
economic cooperation (Articles 1 and 55), and as a right in the context of decolonization 
(Articles 73 and 76). However, the precise definition of the right itself, or at least 
differentiation of its various aspects is lacking, which leads to controversial interpretations. 
 
The UN Charter also makes explicit references to the importance of the principles of 
territorial integrity and non-use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
states. Nonetheless, given the realities of the time when the Charter was born into life, 
especially because the right to self-determination was designed in the de-colonization context, 
for objective reasons it contains no relation or correlation between the principles of self-
determination and territorial integrity. The following is said regarding territorial integrity and 
non use of force in the UN Charter:  
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.577 
 
With the growth of the UN membership of Afro-Asian origin in 1960s, the principle of self-
determination was more and more seen as a right of people living under colonial domination. 
Although the idea of enshrining the right of self-determination as a legal right was rebuffed by 
the colonial powers at that time, later, they also came to accept the right and the concept of 
self-determination, which hence was linked to the context of de-colonization. In Namibia and 
                                                 
576 UN Charter, Chapter XII: International Trusteeship System, Article 76. 
577 UN Charter, Article 2 (4), Chapter I (Purposes and Principles). 
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Western Sahara Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, the Court also 
establishes the relevance of the right to the context of de-colonization and with that, the 
concept of self-determination as a right of people living under colonial domination to decide 
their future was reinstated.578 However, it should be reinstated that although the right was 
recognized in light of de-colonization, the language in the UN Charter (Articles 1 and 55) and 
in the later documents579 remain pretty much vague as for its interaction with the principle of 
territorial integrity.  
 
The principle had further been mentioned in other international documents and conventions, 
such as 1960 Declaration on Granting of independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
1966 Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations among the States. These documents in fact marked 
certain alteration and evolution of the principle of self-determination out of colonial context 
into being a human right580 by generally maintaining that peoples’ rights to self-determination 
allows them to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.581  
                                                 
578 Judge Rosalyn Higgins, “Self-determination and secession,” in Julie Dahlitz (ed.), Secession and 
International Law, Conflict Avoidance, Regional Appraisals (United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2003): 26-
27. 
579 Examples are: 1960 Declaration on Granting of independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1966 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 1970 Declaration on 
Friendly Relations among the States – see in the coming paragraphs. 
580 Judge Rosalyn Higgins, 26-27. 
581 - Preamble - “Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful 
and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, 
and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion;” Article 2- “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.” (1960 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, 
Adopted by general assembly resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960);  
- Article 1 – “…All peoples have the right for self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development….” (International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with 
Article 49).  
- “Convinced that the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples constitutes a significant 
contribution to contemporary international law, and that its effective application is of paramount importance for 
the promotion of friendly relations among States, based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality;” 
“Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the 
elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom 
and independence;” “By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their 
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to 
respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter;” “Every State has the duty to promote, 
through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the 
responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the principle, in order;” “The 
establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State 
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Although likewise the UN Charter these documents also contain general references to the 
right itself at first, without explicitly linking it to colonial context and slightly enriching it 
with human right component, further clarifications in these documents indicate that despite 
some evolution of the concept of self-determination as a human right, it is not completely 
taken and seen out of the context of de-colonization.582  
 
Two of the above documents (1960 declaration and 1970 Declaration) also maintain the 
importance of territorial integrity, prohibition of non-use of force in this regard583 as a 
primary principle of international law, however, only 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations 
among the States made a subtle attempt to highlight the correlation of the principles of self-
determination and territorial integrity of states in the following provisions: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing 
the right of self-determination by that people.” (Declaration on principles of international law friendly relations 
and co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970). 
582 - Article 5 – “Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other 
territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, 
without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any 
distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.” 
(1960 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, Adopted by general 
assembly resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960). 
 - Article 1 – “…The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations…” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 
1976, in accordance with Article 49). 
- “Convinced that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a major 
obstacle to the promotion of international peace and security,” “The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-
Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State 
administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony 
or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, 
and particularly its purposes and principles.” (Declaration on principles of international law friendly relations 
and co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970). 
583 - Article 6 - “Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” 
(1960 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples);  
- Preamble – “Recalling the duty of States to refrain in their international relations from military, political, 
economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any 
State;” “Considering it essential that all States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;” “Convinced in consequence that any attempt aimed at the 
partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a State or country or at its political 
independence is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter;” - Text -“The principle that States 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations;” “Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.” (Declaration on principles of international law friendly relations and co-
operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970). 
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Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs [author: paragraphs on the principle of 
self-determination in the section “The principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples”] shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour. Every State shall refrain from any action 
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial 
integrity of any other State or country. 584 
 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975 further attempted to fill this gap and to underline appropriate niche 
for the principle of self-determination by overtly stating that the principle should only be 
understood and applied within and without detriment to the principle of territorial integrity of 
states. Helsinki Final Act states the following with regard to the principles of territorial 
integrity (Article IV) of States and equal rights and self-determination of peoples (Article 
VIII): 
 
The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the 
participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against 
the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating 
State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of 
force.585 
 
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right 
to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of 
international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.586 
 
The principle of refraining from the threat or use of force, which was once again fortified in 
the Helsinki Final Act also focused on the principle of territorial integrity of states, once more 
proving its role and place within the system of interstate relations: 
 
The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their 
international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
                                                 
584 Declaration on principles of international law friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970. 
585 Article IV of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1 August 1975. 
586 Article VIII of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1 August 1975. 
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manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the 
present Declaration.587 
 
This specification of the right to self-determination in the context of the principle of territorial 
integrity was expanded in the Charter of Paris for New Europe of 1990, which once again 
defined the contemporary right of self-determination taken out of colonial context to fall 
within the territorial integrity of modern nation states: 
 
We reaffirm the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms 
of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.588 
 
Alongside reemphasizing the principle of territorial integrity as one of the cornerstones of 
interstate relations, the Charter of Paris also underscores the unacceptability of the threat or 
use of force against territorial integrity of any state:  
 
Although the threat of conflict in Europe has diminished, other dangers threaten 
the stability of our societies. We are determined to co-operate in defending 
democratic institutions against activities which violate the independence, 
sovereign equality or territorial integrity of the participating States.589 
 
In accordance with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and 
commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, we renew our pledge to refrain from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any State, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles 
or purposes of those documents recall that non-compliance with obligations 
under the Charter of the United Nations constitutes a violation of international 
law.590 
 
 
In fact, the principle of territorial integrity is tightly linked with other principles of 
international law, like prohibition of the threat or use of force, non-intervention in the internal 
and external affairs of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, etc., and self-determination 
belongs to the list of many principles. It is due to the importance of the principle of territorial 
integrity that international community generally does not accept the plausibility and eligibility 
of certain group of peoples for secession availing from the right of self-determination. Peoples 
                                                 
587 Article II of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1 August 1975. 
588 Charter of Paris for New Europe of 1990, Paris, 19-21 November, 1990. 
589 Ibid. 
590 Ibid. 
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who are granted an internal right to self-determination and living on equal rights without any 
discrimination do not seem to have the right to secede.591 
 
Having sketched the cited paragraphs on self-determination in the given section it should not 
be overlooked that the definition of the people or nation to which the right becomes applicable 
is another contentious issue as there are no objective criteria in this regard. According to 
some, these criteria should include shared ethnicity, religion, history, language and territory; 
however, they too are indicated to be relative, since sometimes these criteria do not 
necessarily and automatically testify to the existence of sense of national identity. Common 
language, religion and etc. may and may not be the indicators of the presence of the sense of 
national identity. It is argued that belonging to a certain category of “people” has to do with a 
psychological feeling of being the part of a larger group of people and since international law 
does not support the rights based on such subjective criteria as sentiments and feelings, and 
maintains a concrete and factual approach, it is rather difficult to discern the borders of the 
notion of “people” to whom the right to self-determination is applicable.592    
 
As was previously discussed, another hotly debated issue in regard to the concept of self-
determination is if this right constituted a legitimate basis for secession by a national minority 
living in a certain part of a state’s territory. Although the linkage of the concept of self-
determination with the principle of territorial integrity and notion of secession is established 
in some of the mentioned international documents (i.e. Helsinki Final Act and 1970 
Declaration and Paris Charter to some extent), some ambiguity under international law 
regarding the interrelation of the concept of self-determination and the right to secession still 
do exist. Taken out of the context, certain provisions on self-determination contained in the 
aforementioned international documents, are nowadays interpreted from a political spectrum, 
which equals and associated the notion of self-determination mentioned therein with the 
acceptability and legality of secession. 
 
In common acceptance, the end of colonial system did not end states’ existence as main 
players of international law and the significance of territorial integrity. Rather, it set up the 
                                                 
591 Butler, W. E., “Territorial integrity and secession: the dialectics of international order,” in Julie Dahlitz (ed.), 
Secession and International Law, Conflict Avoidance, Regional Appraisals (United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2003): 112-113. 
592 Levan Ramishvili, unpaged. 
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idea of self-government within the existing state borders.593Article 6 of the 1960 Declaration 
on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries clearly maintains that the right to self-
determination must not be seen as a basis for secession, and states: “Any attempt aimed at the 
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”.594 
Although some international legal documents do shed some light on the stance of the 
principle of self-determination vis-a-vis the principle of territorial integrity, political 
interpretations are not fully absent from the context.   
 
Existing divergences of opinions and the attempts to politicize legal concepts have brought 
controversial legal estimations of the acceptability of secession in the context of self-
determination. Some lawyers believe that self-determination as seen in the context of de-
colonization does not entitle for the right to secede, because it implied that colonialists should 
free the territories and peoples under colonial domination, and did not imply that people 
should secede from the rulers.  Therefore, any arguments about the national minorities’ rights 
to secede through the right to self-determination beyond colonial context, which emerged 
within colonial context, are highly ambivalent, although much debated and referred today.595 
These statements will be further explored below. 
 
However, some lawyers believe that provisions of international legal documents and state 
practice do approve the legality of secession. According to them, secession is not 
compulsorily to be seen as an end-state of exercising the right to self-determination; however, 
it is approved only in some cases and within the scope of the right to self-determination. 
According to the UN practice and other subsequent documents, such as Declaration of 1970 
and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of 1993, secession could be seen as a 
legitimate element of self-determination only in four cases – 1) if it is in relation to the 
peoples in the territories to be de-colonized; 2) if it is enshrined in the constitution of a given 
state; 3) if the territory where certain population lived, was annexed after 1945 (in the context 
of Arab people of Palestine); 4) if certain people live in the territory of a state, which does not 
                                                 
593 Valerie Epps, “Evolving concepts of self-determination and autonomy in international law: the legal status of 
Tibet,” Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 08-33, (Suffolk University Law School, Boston, 
Massachusetts, October 21, 2008): 8. 
594 Article 6, 1960 Declaration on Granting of independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
595 Judge Rosalyn Higgins, 36. 
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respect the principle of equal rights and self-determination and which does not guarantee the 
representation of all its peoples in the governance of the state.596  
 
Other views that offer justifications to secession propose to increase the number of cases 
under which secession is legal and state that when there is no agreement between the state and 
the seceding entity about the act of secession, the international  community may recognize 
secession provided that following five [author: quite controversial though] criteria are met: 1) 
the people of the seceding territory are linguistically, culturally and historically different; 2) 
the people have a historical claim to the territory they live; 3) the territory where the 
secessionist people live became the part of the parent state as a result of unjust historical 
event; 4) the will for secession of the given people have been supported by a referendum; 5) 
human rights of the people have been deliberately suppressed and they are refused to 
participate in the governance of a state from which they want to secede.597  
 
Nonetheless, some authors offer to shorten this list and argue that state practice and the 
resolutions of the UN do endorse territorial separation only in two cases, which are 1) 
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, and 2) colonialism.598 
Other plausible and acceptable cases for secession are noted to be the following: if a decision 
to secede was taken by the whole population of the state to secede peacefully and if the 
national boundaries have been rearranged as a result of war and a subsequent peace treaty.599  
 
However, despite of these rather divergent views, which maintain that secession could be 
accepted in certain circumstances, nowadays, no international mechanisms or concrete norms 
of international law exist, which would arrange the relation of secessionist movements with 
the state concerned or which could be referred to in arguing whether certain population has 
the right to secede.600 There is also no agreement within the legal discourse on the issue of 
interrelation of secession with the principle of self-determination. Some believe that the 
                                                 
596 Stanislav V. Chernichenko and Vladimir S. Kotliar, “Ongoing global legal debate on self-determination and 
secession: main trends,” in Julie Dahlitz (ed.), Secession and International Law, Conflict Avoidance, Regional 
Appraisals (United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2003): 78-79. 
597 A.A. Idowu, “Revisiting the right to self-determination in modern international law: implications for African 
states,” European Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 4 (September, 2008):49.  
598 Dinah Shelton, “Self determination and secession: the jurisprudence of international human rights tribunals,” 
in Julie Dahlitz (ed.), Secession and International Law, Conflict Avoidance, Regional Appraisals (United 
Nations, New York and Geneva, 2003): 52. 
599 Johan D. Van der Vyver, “Self-determination of the peoples of Quebec under international law,” 
Transnational law and policy, Vol. 10:1 (Fall, 2000), online, available from 
(http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/translational/vol101/vyer.pdf). Accessed on December 23, 2010, pp. 22-26. 
600 Stanislav V. Chernichenko and Vladimir S. Kotliar, 78-79. 
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concept of self-determination also encircles secession, and that secession is the last 
destination within this purview, if the existing state fails to provide the necessary human and 
citizen rights of the people in question. Therefore, the question of secession should not be 
detached from the principle of self-determination.601 
 
Protagonists of merging secession with self-determination argue that the concept of self-
determination is not a right to secede from the given state. They maintain that the concept of 
self-determination is applied to peoples, while secession has to do with a certain territorial 
unit. Because the right to self-determination is mostly envisaged against the backdrop of the 
principle of territorial integrity, it should not include a right to secession.602 If the concept of 
self-determination is seen in the context of territorial integrity of states and inviolability of 
borders, then secession cannot be regarded as an offspring of the concept of self-
determination. The right to self-determination therefore, is a right to enjoy equal rights and 
freedoms and the right for equal representation in the governance of a given state, which as 
such, excludes the right to secession.603  
 
Opponents of linking secession with the right to self-determination maintain that from the 
recent examples of emergence of some entities as sovereign actors through secession from the 
body of existing states, it could be concluded that contemporary state practice accepts the 
legitimate secession of certain territories. Nevertheless, in the given context this right to 
secession is a freestanding right, without further linkages with the concept of self-
determination.604  
 
Although not manifested perspicuously in the international legal documents whether self-
determination makes eligible for secession or not, general legal discourse suggests that self-
determination of national minorities also does not allow for a secession of a territorial unit as 
such and the independence of the minorities from the parent state. Instead, the international 
documents and conventions, such as 1960 Declaration on Granting of independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1966 Covenants on Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations among the States, as well as the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975 - imply that minorities’ rights to self-determination is generally 
                                                 
601 A.A. Idowu, 51.  
602 Johan D. Van der Vyver, pp. 28-29. 
603 Ibid., 12. 
604 Ibid. 
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confined to exercising their rights for economic, social and cultural development and freedom 
within the boundaries of a state to which they originally belong, hence excluding the right for 
secession. This message is firmly entrenched in the positions of Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
which inexorably continue to emphasize that population of their breakaway regions are 
entitled to exercise their minorities rights within the existing state boundaries, which excludes 
any possibility of their secession. 
 
The opponents also maintain that even the peoples who are subjected to discrimination of 
their political rights are not entitled to secede. In such cases the state in question should 
eliminate the suppressive and discriminatory policies. Therefore, self-determination is 
described as a right making peoples eligible for national independence from colonial rule or 
foreign domination, participation in the political life of a state and sovereignty of peoples to 
keep their group identity, all of which exclude any damage to territorial integrity.  
 
Irrespective of the existing differences of opinions and contradictions with regard to the 
essence of the right to self-determination, generally, two aspects of self-determination is 
underlined: 1) internal aspect, according to which “all peoples have the right to pursue freely 
their economic, social and cultural development, without outside interference”; and 2) 
external aspect, which states that “all peoples have the right to freely determine their political 
status and their place in the international community based upon the principle of equal rights 
and exemplified by the liberation of peoples from colonialism and by the prohibition to 
subject peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”.605 
 
Some analysis suggest that when the realization of the external aspect of self-determination 
was finalized, as there were no longer any colonies left, internal aspect of self-determination 
became a more and more debated issue. According to this view, internal self-determination 
became the right of people already living within an independent state to choose their political 
institutions and even to secede from their state in order to form a new state or join another 
state. These developments befuddled many scholars of international law as to whether the 
concept of self-determination was confined only to the colonial context, or this right has now 
been applicable to ethnic groups, nations or peoples who live in independent states and the 
exercise of this right could threaten sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.606 
 
                                                 
605 T. Musayev, 7. 
606 A.A. Idowu, 45.  
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The secessionist movements in Kashmir, Basque region, Quebec, Chechnya, Uygur region of 
Xinjiang Province, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and etc. all have to different 
extents refereed to the principle of self-determination. The process of disintegration of the 
former USSR as well as former Yugoslavia, which resulted in the creation of new nation-
states, had added new spirit into the perception and meaning of the principle. Sometimes 
separation can happen peacefully, on the basis of consent of the concerned parties, thus 
gaining the acceptance of international community and legitimacy under international law.  
 
Vivid examples are the separations of Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 and Serbia and 
Montenegro in 2006 through the so-called “Velvet revolution” or a “peaceful divorce”. 
However, mostly these separatists movements are accompanied by conflict and bloodshed in 
order to forcefully detach from greater territory to which they belong, such as Eritrea which 
became independent from Ethiopia in 1993, East Timor, which gained independence from 
Indonesia in 2002,607 and the most recent examples being the independence of Kosovo from 
Serbia in 2008 through unilateral declaration, South Ossetia and Abkhazia which 
independence was recognized by a handful of states in 2008. 
 
In highlighting the right to self-determination in and out of the colonial context, several words 
should be devoted to the principle of uti possidetis. This principle consolidates the sanctity of 
previous administrative borders, both within and outside the colonial context, and suggests 
that the existing administrative borders remain unchanged also at the moment of 
independence as the nations gain independence. The principle is connected to two other 
principles of international law – right to self-determination and non-interference in internal 
affairs of states.608 
 
Although the principle was in wide usage during the period of de-colonization when the wave 
of states in Latin America (in 1810-1824) and Africa (in 1960s) became independent,609 state 
practice has established the validity of the principle outside of the colonization context.610 
Upon the dissolution of the USSR, various agreements reflecting the new developments, - 
such as the Agreement on establishment of the CIS of December 8, 1991, Alma–Ata 
                                                 
607 Valerie Epps, 2-3. 
608 Enver Hasani, “Self-determination and territorial integrity within the Yugoslav context,” National Defense 
Academy, Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management, Vienna, online, available from 
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Declaration of December 21, 1991 and the declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of 
the New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union of December 16, 1991, - reinstated 
respect for territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of newly independent states, 
which emerged instead of a big empire. With that, the principle of uti possidetis was invoked 
and the previous administrative borders of the socialist republics became their new state 
borders.611 
 
For example, in opinion No 2. of the Arbitration Commission, which considered Serbia’s 
questions as to – whether “the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one 
of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, have the right to self-determination” and whether 
“the internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Serbia be regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law” – concluded that “the 
right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of 
independence (uti possidetis juris), except when the states concerned agree otherwise” and 
that “Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is entitled to all the rights 
accorded to minorities and ethnic groups under international law”.612 However, according to 
the view of some researchers, the rule uti possidetis is in contradiction with the principle of 
self-determination and has increased the occurrence of ethnic conflicts and civil wars.613  
 
However, the debate over the right of self-determination, its correlation with the principle of 
territorial integrity and whether this right paves the legitimate way for the secession of the 
territorial units of the states is far from being consummate. Certain questions are yet open for 
appraisal, for instance: Do the secessionist movements in different parts of the world 
(Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Albanians in Serbia and 
Macedonia) have valid grounds to refer to the principle of self-determination as a justification 
for secession? Do the recently acquired independence of Kosovo and its subsequent 
recognition by many world powers, recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, although by a very little number of states, indeed constitute the violations of 
international law and its peremptory principle of territorial integrity?  
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What about ICJ’s Advisory opinion on Kosovo, which says that Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence was not the violation of international law?614 Or these 
developments attest to a new state practice in the process of establishment and changing 
trends in the doctrinal approaches to the principle of territorial integrity and self-
determination? What are the limits and addressees of the principle of self-determination? 
What is its interrelation with the notion of secession and the principle of territorial integrity? 
Is it trumped by the superiority of the principle of territorial integrity, or this assertion is 
geared to independent cases? 
 
Existence of contradicting narratives with regard to the right to self-determination, secession, 
territorial integrity manifest the fact that concept of self-determination has undergone changes 
throughout the history and that applicability of the concept to certain cases is conditioned 
upon the specifics of the given situation. The evolution of the concept of self-determination 
cannot leave untouched the principle of territorial integrity too. Although the principle of 
territorial integrity still continues to preserve its significance among the peremptory norms of 
international law, and this was firmly reinstated under international law, recent cases of 
secession of certain territorial parts of states with the demands for self-determination arises 
the thought that the principles of territorial integrity and sanctity of borders have not emerged 
intact in a constant juxtaposition with the concept of self-determination.  
 
Still, it is rather difficult to argue or assert that the changing trends in international law are in 
favor of this or other principle, since both of them still preserve their importance as principles 
of international law. However, it could be concluded that any debate or problem involving the 
two principles at a time and necessitating to find a common denominator for accommodating 
both of them, has been, continues to be and will be complicated. This holds true in the light of 
the problem that is under question in the given dissertation.  
 
As Chapter II of the dissertation and the Section 2.1 of this Chapter illustrated, the nature of 
the problem in the South Caucasus conflicts has to do with the usage of the two mentioned 
principles and their conflicting interpretations. Given that some international documents are 
not fully articulate, quite the contrary, rather ambivalent with regard to the principle of self-
determination and the notion of secession, especially their correlation with the principle of 
                                                 
614 On July 22, the ICJ issued its opinion on the question “is the unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?” and ruled that in 
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and territorial integrity, secessionist entities in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia-
Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts extrapolate well on the fluidness of the said concepts 
for justification of secessionist clams. This, no doubt gets adequate backlash from the parent 
states, which by any means try to preserve their territorial integrity.  
 
3. Impact of the nature of the conflict on the effectiveness of the institutions 
 
According to the regime theory analysts, problem type is the main reason for variance in 
effectiveness and problem solving skills. As was previously described in the Chapter III 
dedicated to theoretical framework, malign problems demand more intensive level of 
cooperation and relevant arrangements, plus more focus on monitoring and enforcement. It is 
further conceptualized that a benign problem is the one over which the relevant actors have 
similar preferences and vise versa – remoter the interests get from common denominator more 
malign the problem becomes.615Problem malignancy increase with the decrease of the parties’ 
wishes to achieve and uphold the cooperative solutions and the objective to maximize their 
unilateral benefits though uncooperative actions. It was also noted that malign problems are 
characterized as an interaction of incongruity, asymmetry and cumulative cleavages.616 When 
an institution deals with a malign and poorly perceived problem, then the chances for 
effectiveness of the organization further diminish. In this sense, the aggregation of a problem 
malignancy with a degree of uncertainty over the real nature of the problem is considered to 
be a major impediment on the way of attaining functional effectiveness.617 
 
Based on the above assumptions of the regime theory, which presupposes that some problems 
are more difficult to be solved than others and hence, could be classified as malign problems, 
and considering the ambivalent characteristics of the South Caucasus problems, I would 
suggest that the conflicts in the South Caucasus region are malign in nature and therefore, 
much more difficult to be solved. 
 
                                                 
615 Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 15. 
616 Problems of incongruity are described to be the problems where cost-benefit calculations of a given actor are 
continuously being partial for either the costs or the benefits of a certain course of action. Asymmetry 
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will also win (or lose) in other dimensions – cumulative cleavages come to the fore. (See Chapter III, 
(Emphasizes are mine. (See: Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 19-20)). 
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International organizations researched in the current dissertation (the UN, the OSCE, the CIS, 
and the EU) have found themselves in the middle of confronting legal debates of the warring 
parties, which have also been embedded in the parties’ political stances regarding the ways of 
conflict resolution, with Azerbaijan and Georgia adamantly insisting on keeping their 
territorial integrity, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia618 tirelessly invoking the principle 
of self-determination. This legal dilemma accounts for the intransigence of the parties’ 
positions and their irreconcilability, which also affects the conflict resolution/mediation 
efforts of the said organizations.  
 
Having reviewed the positions of the conflicting parties – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, plus Russian factor in all three conflict cases, - and legal conundrum 
encircling the whole debate over the righteousness of this or that position, it is not difficult to 
imagine how apart remain the positions of the involved actors from each other. This is a 
prominent indicator of the problem malignancy in South Caucasus conflicts. 
 
Given the above illuminated debate between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia, and its 
separatist entities over the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, plus the 
lack of clarity in some documents of international law on the correlation of the two principles 
and existing loopholes over the concept of self-determination, who is eligible for the right, 
and whether this right actually legitimizes secession, the nature of South Caucasus problem 
could also well be clarified as being malign problems coupled with uncertainty. Since it is 
also known from the assumptions of the regime theory that vagueness in the perception of the 
malign issue tends to further complicate the attainment of effectiveness, it could be asserted 
that poorly understood problem malignancy is a powerful impediment on the way of 
attainment of effectiveness of the researched four institutions.    
 
It is also assumed that while addressing malign problems the regimes with decision making 
rules of unanimity and consensus usually bring to less effective results than the regimes with 
majority or qualified majority rules.619 This assumption could be well applied to the cases of 
the OSCE and the UN Security Council,620 which consensus decision making was well 
manipulated by the concerned powerful states in order to block the adoption of unfavorable 
                                                 
618 Nagorno-Karabakh is not a party to negotiations. 
619 Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 26. 
620 But not applied to the CIS and the EU, because the conflicts have never been extensively discussed within 
these institutions.   
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for them decisions, the adoption of which could have brought good contribution to the conflict 
resolution process.  
 
Besides, both regime theory and theoretical approaches to international mediation suggest that 
“conflicts about values” are relatively harder to solve than others, in conflict about values 
there is a strong divergence of views between the actors about the validity or rightness of 
given action or a practice.621 Mediation theories further maintain that when vital interests such 
as sovereignty and territorial integrity are at stake it is much more difficult to succeed. 
Ideology disputes, conflicts over the issues of resources and ethnicity have greater possibility 
to be resolved through successful mediation than security and sovereignty disputes.622 The 
conflicts in the South Caucasus region could well be classified as conflicts about values due to 
the specifics of their problem structure, and therefore, it could be inferred that the nature of 
the problem in the South Caucasus conflict is a real culprit depleting the effectiveness of the 
international organizations to facilitate the achievement of a final peace.  
 
The selected suppositions of the mediation theories that were stated in Chapter III and later 
utilized in Chapter V for analyzing the OSCE Minsk Group effectiveness, repeat the 
conclusions inferred through the prisms of regime theory about the impact of the problem 
structure/nature of problem on the effectiveness of the institutions. So that, according to the 
theory of conflict mediation as defined by the authors in their mentioned work, the nature of 
the dispute is one of the important factors determining the outcome of the mediation and it is 
an uphill challenge for the mediators to succeed when vital interests such as sovereignty and 
territorial integrity are at stake.623 It would be redundant to repeat the obvious fact that the 
conflicts of the South Caucasus are about vital security interests of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity confronted by the equivocal principle of self-determination, which is increasingly 
becoming one of the most debated and also evolving principles of international law. 
 
Being entrapped in this set of issues that open up Pandora’s box about the whole legal 
arguments of the conflicting parties on sovereignty and territorial integrity vs. the right of 
self-determination, the organizations, frankly speaking, had a little chance to make any 
                                                 
621 See Chapter III (Arild Underdal and Edward L. Miles, “Explaining Regime Effectiveness: Combining “Soft” 
and “Hard” Methodological Approaches,” unpaged). 
622 See Chapter III (Jacob Bertcovitch and Allison Houston, “The study of international mediation: theoretical 
issues and empirical evidence,” in Jacob Bertcovitch (ed.) Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and 
Practice of Mediation, (USA, Lynne Rienner Publishers, inc.1996):22-25). 
623 See the first section of the chapter. 
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difference, inasmuch as the positions based on these two principles seem unlikely to be 
changed or influenced by the efforts of the third party, unless the parties themselves are ready 
for mutual compromises. In this sense, the nature of the problem in the South Caucasus 
conflicts has overwhelmingly affected the achievement of success by the discussed 
organizations and their effectiveness. 
 
Also, problem malignancy is estimated to be dependent on the decision rule and actor’s 
capacity to reach the effective solutions.624 As was described earlier, in the Chapter III, the 
regimes that are dealing with malign problems could be effective only when the following 
factors are present: 1 – selective incentives for cooperation; 2- linkages for more benign 
issues and 3 – a system with high problem solving capacity. For a given regime to be effective 
at least two of the mentioned elements should be present, otherwise, regime’s efforts will be 
ineffective.625 Judging against the backdrop of these suppositions it could be inferred that in 
the example of the four institutions which had a role in conflict resolution only the first 
determinant was present to some extent. The four organizations626 unfortunately, did not 
possess the latter two determinants, which in its turn, inhibited their effective operation.  
 
In conclusion, for the purposes of clarity, the applicability of this hypothesis to the EU case is 
to be once again qualified. It could be rightly argued that the mentioned regime theory 
suppositions on the nature of the problem are not applicable to the EU [and its problem 
solving capacity]. However, the fact that there is such an ardent debate among the conflicting 
parties over the nature of the problem, existence of many controversial and moot questions on 
this issue, in itself presents to be a “given” problem, which is not subdued to the influence or 
the internal cuisine of the institutions as such. From this perspective, the factor explored 
through the third regime theory hypothesis, could be considered as also influencing the 
success of EU conflict resolution policy in South Caucasus.  
 
In the light of the above said, it is established by the author that the effectiveness/success of 
the organizations dealing with conflict resolution in the South Caucasus republics is affected 
by the nature of the problem/problem structure of the given conflicts in the South Caucasus 
region. Thus, as the third regime theory hypothesis suggests, the nature of the problem in the 
                                                 
624 Arid Underdal, “One question, two answers,” 28. 
625 See Chapter III (Arid Underdal, “Conclusions,” 445). 
626 As it was repeatedly stressed in this work, although the previous two regime theory hypotheses were not 
applied to the EU, this hypothesis could also be applied to it given the fact that this hypothesis deals with an 
independent and external factor not depending on the internal dynamics of any organization. 
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South Caucasus conflicts influence the activity and effectiveness/success of the UN, the 
OSCE, the CIS and the EU to facilitate the achievement of a final solution to the conflicts in 
the South Caucasus republics.  
 
4. Summing up. 
 
This Chapter aimed at exploring the last-third hypothesis of the regime theory – the nature of 
the problem in the South Caucasus conflicts as a factor influencing the effectiveness of the 
UN, the OSCE, the CIS and the EU to facilitate the achievement of a final solution to the 
conflicts in the South Caucasus republics. To this end – the views of the conflicting parties 
regarding the nature of the problem (self-determination and territorial integrity) in all three 
conflicts, as well as the existing legal controversies in international law with respect to the 
principles of self-determination and territorial integrity were explored. The analysis of the 
nature of the problem in the South Caucasus conflicts enabled me to conclude that the 
conflicts are to be seen as malign coupled with uncertainty due to the conflicting narratives 
among the warring parties based on the principles of territorial integrity and self-
determination, as well as the existing legal loopholes under the international law vis-à-vis the 
principle of self-determination, secession and territorial integrity. This in its turn affects the 
effectiveness of the involved international organizations, which had to address poorly 
understood malign problem with low problem solving capacity.   
 
Although the first and the second regime theory hypotheses were not applied to the case of the 
EU, the third hypothesis, nonetheless, could be considered as relevant in the latter case, owing 
to the fact that the nature of problem in the South Caucasus conflicts is an independent, 
external and a very potent factor not contingent upon the internal dynamics of any institution, 
which influences their performance and effectiveness/success. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This work attempted to explore the roles of four institutions – the UN, the CIS, the OSCE and 
the EU – in the process of conflict resolution in South Caucasus and wherever applicable, the 
analysis of their effectiveness in facilitating the achievement of final settlement. In the case 
with the EU, the overall evaluation of its conflict resolution strategy was made, instead of the 
mentioned “effectiveness analysis”. 
 
In analyzing the stated phenomenon some suppositions of the “effectiveness” concept of the 
regime theory, theoretical approaches to the study of international mediation and theoretical 
approaches to the study of European integration [intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist 
assumptions] were employed.  
 
Following regime theory hypotheses were tested in the work: 
 
1. Actors’ interests: Interests and preferences of the concerned powerful states influence the 
effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE and the CIS to facilitate the achievement of a final solution 
to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics.  
 
2. Problem solving capacity: Problem solving capacity of the organizations influence the 
effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE and the CIS to facilitate the achievement of a final 
settlement to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics.  
 
3. Nature of the problem (Problem structure):  Characteristics of the given conflicts 
influence the effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE, the CIS and the EU to facilitate the 
achievement of a final solution to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics. 
 
Throughout the work the first and the second regime theory hypotheses were explored 
together because of the fact that they are interconnected. The first and the second hypotheses 
were employed in analyzing the effectiveness of the UN, the CIS and the OSCE, while not 
applied to the EU case due to the fact that the EU is an aggregate of partial regimes, multiple 
behavioral norms, rules and procedures and therefore, is considered to be a too split system of 
policy interrelations, and not an international regime. The third hypothesis, however, is also 
applied to the EU, owing to the fact that nature of problem is an independent, external and 
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potent factor, not depending on the internal dynamics of any organization, but nonetheless, 
influencing their effectiveness/success. 
 
In order to fulfill the targeted objective this work was divided into seven chapters and several 
sub sections. In the Chapter I, the general introduction of the South Caucasus region and its 
transformation processes after the reacquired independence, as well as the ongoing power 
politics among the influential regional and some external players were highlighted. In the 
Chapter II historical background to the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts was provided. Chapter III introduced the theoretical 
frameworks of the dissertation: regime theory, theoretical approaches to international 
mediation and theoretical approaches to the study of European integration. 
 
In the Chapter IV the roles of the UN and the CIS in conflict resolution in Abkhazia were 
highlighted and subsequently, their effectiveness was analyzed based on the first and the 
second regime theory hypotheses. The reason why this chapter discussed the two mentioned 
institutions in conjunction is due to the fact that the activities of the two actors – the 
UNOMIG and the CIS PKF - were largely interconnected. The general findings suggested 
that the interests of a coercive hegemon [first hypothesis] and low problem solving capacity of 
the institutions [second hypothesis] that had faced the malign problem diminished their 
effectiveness to attain final peace. Despite of the fact that they managed to make some 
positive changes to the combustible security context in the given conflict case, their overall 
effectiveness was evaluated with “low” grade in the “low, medium and high” measurement 
scale. 
 
Chapter V has dealt with the OSCE role in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetian conflicts 
and evaluated its effectiveness from the spectrum of the first and the second regime theory 
hypotheses. In case of the OSCE Minsk Group activity in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it was 
established that the two hypotheses of the regime theory cannot fully explain the Minsk 
Group work, given the fact that this institution is not a full-fledged organization. However, the 
discussed first regime theory [powerful actors’ interests] hypothesis could still explain the 
internal dynamics within the Minsk Group. Only the third determinant [efforts directed to 
achievement of cooperative solutions] of the second hypothesis [problem solving capacity] 
was applicable to this case, given the fact that the Minsk Group was quite active in initiating 
proposals and meetings, and power balance within this entity is not disturbed [there is no 
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coercive hegemon]. Therefore, theoretical assumptions to international mediation were 
utilized in order to rate its effectiveness/success. This analysis has concluded that the activity 
of the OSCE Minsk Group could be named as “partly successful” having analyzed its 
performance from the prisms of four determinants - 1) previous relations between the 
conflicting parties; 2) nature of problem; 3) mediation strategies; 4) impartiality/or perceived 
bias of the mediators.  
 
In case of OSCE role in South Ossetian conflict the first and the second regime theory 
hypothesis could explain the case of its effectiveness. It was concluded that the interests of 
concerned powerful actors do indeed affect the effectiveness of the organization [first 
hypothesis]. Moreover, the problem solving capacity [second hypothesis] of the OSCE is 
reduced because of its consensus rule and the unequal power distribution within the entities 
[especially the JCC] that were created with the OSCE efforts, irrespective of the fact that 
there were some targeted efforts on the part of the OSCE towards the conflict resolution. 
OSCE’s problem solving effectiveness was also diminished in the face of a poorly understood 
malign problem. Since the OSCE effectiveness in this case was greatly influenced by the 
interests of a coercive hegemon, like in the case of the UN and the CIS, its overall 
effectiveness was also graded with “low” mark in the “low, medium and high” measurement 
scale. 
 
Some general regime theory suppositions were still utilized to suggest that the UN and the 
OSCE did not have an actor capacity in addressing the Abkhazian, Nagorno-Karabakh and 
South Ossetian conflicts respectively. The CIS was not analyzed against this element, given 
that it bore no political involvement in conflict resolution, and its input into the conflict 
resolution was only restricted to the CIS PKF. Moreover, it was inferred that almost all three 
organizations – the UN, the CIS and the OSCE [including the OSCE Minsk Group] had 
managed to achieve some behavioral effectiveness while functional effectiveness remained an 
unattainable task. They all had made some relative improvement, and in a hypothetical 
noncooperative situation their presence brought to positive changes, but all of them had failed 
to attain collective optimum. In the Annex A the general outcomes of the conducted analysis 
is highlighted in more succinct terms. 
 
Chapter VI focused on the EU role and evaluation of EU policy towards the conflict 
resolution in South Caucasus. As it was qualified earlier, “effectiveness” analysis from the 
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perspective of regime theory was not applied to the EU due to the specifics of EU as a sui 
generis entity and its policy-making, which disqualifies it as a simple international regime. 
Therefore, this chapter at first discussed the nature and evolution of EU policy towards the 
region of South Caucasus and its conflict cases, and later, evaluated the EU conflict resolution 
strategy towards the region from the spectrum of intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist 
approaches.  
 
Three major aspects of the EU policy in conflict resolution were assessed:  1- distant EU 
approach towards conflict resolution and its indirect role in facilitating conflict resolution was 
due to the lack of interest on the part of EU members [intergovernmentalist assumption]; 2 - 
subsequent increase of the EU profile in the region after August 2008 events was due to the 
initiative and a leading role of an EU member state [intergovernmentalist assumption]; 3 – EU 
believes that the regional cooperation on practical issues will lead to expansion of cooperation 
on issues of high politics, which subsequently will bring to the attainment of peace in the 
relevant conflict cases [spillover effect/neofunctionalist assumption]. In addition to the 
findings based on intergovermentalist and neofunctionalist suppositions, some general 
conclusions and observations related to the EU conflict resolution policy towards South 
Caucasus were also underlined.     
 
In the Chapter VII, which is the last one, the third regime theory hypothesis was explored and 
this time the EU was also covered. Although the first and the second regime theory 
hypotheses were not applied to the case of the EU, the third hypothesis, nonetheless, could be 
considered as relevant in the latter case, due to the fact that the nature of problem in the South 
Caucasus conflicts is an independent, external and a very potent factor not contingent upon 
the internal dynamics of any institution, and influencing their effectiveness/success. 
 
In exploring the nature of South Caucasus conflicts and its impact on the effectiveness of the 
institutions the views of the conflicting parties regarding the nature of the problem (self-
determination and territorial integrity) in all three conflicts, as well as the existing legal 
controversies in international law with respect to the principles of self-determination and 
territorial integrity were explored. The analysis of the nature of the problem in the South 
Caucasus conflicts enabled me to conclude that the conflicts are to be seen as malign coupled 
with uncertainty due to the conflicting narratives among the warring parties based on the 
principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, as well as the existing legal omissions 
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in the international law vis-à-vis the principle of self-determination, secession and territorial 
integrity. This in its turn affects the effectiveness of the involved international organizations, 
which had to address poorly understood malign problem with low problem solving capacity.   
 
In conclusion, the described analysis suggested that the effectiveness of the UN, the CIS in 
Abkhazian conflict and the OSCE in South Ossetian case was “low”, while OSCE Minsk 
Group mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was “partly successful”. EU has 
maintained distant conflict resolution attitude towards South Caucasus, which although 
slightly changed over the past two years, still remains more or less the same.    
 
 What concerns the EU, the UN and the OSCE jointly sponsored Geneva talks that started off 
after the August 2008 war and present the format where both Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
cases are discussed, the reason why this format is not extensively analyzed in terms of 
“effectiveness” or “mediating success” is because of the fact that this process is yet new with 
no concrete results so far. As was highlighted in Chapter V, there are many controversial 
issues addressed within this format, but it is yet early to analyze the effectiveness of this 
format and look for failures given the fact that it has been operating only for about three 
years. Whatever could be the outcome of these talks, it remains to be a good subject for a 
future research of a similar kind. 
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capacity.- 
Result- low 
effectiveness 
 
 
Applicable. 
Malign 
problem 
coupled with 
uncertainty. 
Addressed 
with low 
problem-
solving 
capacity.- 
Result- low 
effectiveness 
 
 
Applicable. 
Malign 
problem 
coupled with 
uncertainty. 
Addressed 
with low 
problem-
solving 
capacity.- 
Result- low 
effectiveness 
 
 
Applicable. 
Malign 
problem 
coupled with 
uncertainty. 
Addressed 
with low 
problem-
solving 
capacity.- 
Result- low 
effectiveness 
 
 
Applicable. 
Although 
regime 
theory and its 
hypotheses 
are not 
applied to the 
EU, this 
hypothesis is 
relevant to 
the EU case, 
given the fact 
that the  
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Theories UN CIS OSCE in 
South 
Ossetia 
OSCE in 
Nagorno-
Karabakh 
EU 
     nature of 
problem is an 
independent 
and  
external 
factor, not 
depending on 
the internal 
dynamics of 
the 
organizations 
 
Functional 
vs. 
behavioral 
effectiveness 
 
 
Some 
behavioral 
effectiveness 
– no 
functional 
effectiveness
. 
 
  
Some 
behavioral 
effectiveness 
– no 
functional 
effectiveness. 
 
Some 
behavioral 
effectiveness 
– no 
functional 
effectiveness. 
 
 
Collective 
optimum 
and 
noncoope 
rative 
situation 
 
No 
achievement 
of collective 
optimum, 
but positive 
contribution 
vis-a-vis 
noncoopera 
tive 
situation. 
 
 
No 
achievement 
of collective 
optimum, but 
positive 
contribution 
vis-a-vis 
noncoopera 
tive situation. 
 
No 
achievement 
of collective 
optimum, but 
positive 
contribution 
vis-a-vis 
noncoopera 
tive situation. 
 
No 
achievement 
of collective 
optimum, but 
positive 
contribution 
vis-a-vis 
noncoopera 
tive situation. 
 
 
Relative 
improve 
ment 
 
some 
 
some 
 
some 
 
some 
 
 
Actor 
capacity 
 
no 
  
no 
 
no 
 
 
 
 
Overall 
effectiveness 
in the “low, 
medium, 
high” 
measure 
ment scale  
 
 
 
low 
 
 
 
low 
 
 
 
low 
  
Mediation 
theory (for 
OSCE 
Minsk 
Group) 
    
Partly 
successful 
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Theories 
 
UN CIS OSCE in 
South 
Ossetia 
OSCE in 
Nagorno-
Karabakh 
EU 
Theoretical 
approaches 
to European 
integration 
[intergovern
mentalism 
and 
neofunctiona
lism] 
     
Rather 
distant 
approach to 
South 
Caucasus 
conflicts and 
subsequent 
increase of 
EU attention 
is due to its 
member 
states’ 
preferences 
[intergovern
mentalist 
assumption]; 
emphasis on 
fostering  
institutions 
and 
cooperation 
on various 
areas are 
directed at 
achievement 
of rapproche 
ment on 
political 
issues, 
including 
conflict 
resolution 
[neofunctiona
list 
assumption] 
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ADR  Azerbaijan Democratic Republic 
BSEC  Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
BTC  Baky Tbilisi Ceyhan 
BTE  Baky Tbilisi Erzurum 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
CISPKF Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force 
CSTO  Collective Security Treaty Organization 
CSCE  Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
ENP  European Neighborhood Policy 
ENP APs     European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans 
EPI  Eastern Partnership Initiative 
ERP  Economic Rehabilitation Program 
ESDP   European Security and Defense Policy  
EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission  
EU  European Union 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GDR   Georgian Democratic Republic 
IDP  Internally Displaced Persons 
INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe 
JCC  Joint Control Commission 
JPKF  Joint Peacekeeping Force 
MMO  Military Monitoring Officers 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NKAR  Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic 
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
UN  United Nations 
PACE  Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
SDR  Strategic Defense Review 
TACIS Technical Assistance for Commonwealth of Independent States 
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia  
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UN GA United Nations General Assembly 
UN SC United Nations Security Council 
UNOMIG       United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
USA  Unite States of America 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This scholarly work focuses on the roles of four institutions – the UN, the CIS, the OSCE and 
the EU – in the process of conflict resolution in South Caucasus and analysis of their 
effectiveness in facilitating the achievement of final settlement. Since the EU, unlike the 
previous three institutions has until recent times maintained rather distant conflict resolution 
approach in South Caucasus, in case with this institution the overall evaluation of its conflict 
resolution strategy is made, instead of the mentioned “effectiveness analysis.” 
 
Although some scholarly works have been previously written on the subject, the originality to 
this dissertation is added by virtue of the fact that it attempts to explore the effectiveness and 
evaluate the policies of these institutions by incorporating various assumptions of regime 
theory, theoretical approaches to international mediation and theoretical approaches to the 
study of European integration. Moreover, provided that the in scholarly literature, regime 
theory and its “effectiveness” concept were mostly researched and applied to international 
environmental regimes, and study on the effectiveness of non-environmental regimes from the 
perspective of the regime theory seems lagging behind, this work is one of the humble 
attempts to fill this gap. Regime theory constituted the main theoretical scope of this work.  
 
The effectiveness of the UN, the CIS and the OSCE were analyzed from the prisms of two 
regime theory hypotheses, which suggested that 1- Interests and preferences of the concerned 
powerful states influence the effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE and the CIS to facilitate the 
achievement of a final solution to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics [first 
hypothesis-powerful actors’ interests]; and 2- Problem solving capacity of the organizations 
influence the effectiveness of the UN, the OSCE and the CIS to facilitate the achievement of a 
final settlement to the conflicts in the South Caucasus republics [second hypothesis – problem 
solving capacity]. 
 
The effectiveness/success of the OSCE Minsk Group was additionally evaluated using the 
suppositions of theoretical approaches to international mediation, owing to the fact that the 
Minsk Group cannot qualify for a full-fledged regime due to the specifics of its institutional 
build-up. What concerns the evaluation of the EU role in conflict resolution, “effectiveness” 
analysis based on the mentioned two hypotheses from the prisms of regime theory was not be 
applied to the EU, because the EU is to be regarded as a compilation of multiple regimes and 
therefore, is considered to be a disintegrated system of state and policy interrelations, which 
disqualifies it as an international regime as such. Therefore, in an attempt to explain the EU 
approach to the conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region, this work used the relevant 
assumptions of two theoretical approaches to the study of the European integration - 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.  
 
Unlike the first and the second regime theory hypotheses the last - third regime theory 
hypothesis - Characteristics of the given conflicts influence the effectiveness of the UN, the 
OSCE, the CIS and the EU to facilitate the achievement of a final solution to the conflicts in 
the South Caucasus republics – was also applied to the EU, owing to the fact that the nature 
of problem in the South Caucasus conflicts is an independent, external and a very potent 
factor not contingent upon the internal dynamics of any institution, but nonetheless, 
influencing their effectiveness/success. The analysis of the nature of the problem in the South 
Caucasus conflicts enabled me to conclude that the conflicting narratives among the warring 
parties based on the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, as well as the 
existing legal omissions in the international law vis-à-vis the principle of self-determination, 
secession and territorial integrity makes the achievement of a solution harder and affects the 
effectiveness of the involved international organizations.   
 
In conclusion, the described analysis suggested that the effectiveness of the UN, the CIS in 
Abkhazian conflict and the OSCE in South Ossetian case was “low”, while OSCE Minsk 
Group mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was “partly successful”. EU has 
maintained distant conflict resolution attitude towards South Caucasus, which although 
slightly changed over the past two years, still remains more or less the same.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Der Fokus dieser Forschungsarbeit richtet sich auf die Rolle von vier Institutionen – der 
Vereinten Nationen, GUS, OSZE und EU  im Konfliktlösungsprozess im Südkaukasus und 
die Analyse ihrer Effektivität bei einer endgültigen Regulierung. Da die EU im Unterschied 
zu anderen drei Organisationen eine bis vor kurzem ziemlich distanzierte Haltung zur 
Konfliklösung im Südkaukasus zeigte, wurde  in ihrem Fall eine umfangreiche Bewertung 
ihrer Konfliktlösungsstrategie statt der oben erwähnten „Effektivitätsanalyse“ vorgenommen. 
 
Obwohl bereits einige wissenschaftliche Arbeiten über diese Frage geschrieben worden sind, 
besteht die Besonderheit dieser Dissertation darin, dass bei der Untersuchung der Effektivität 
sowie bei der Policy-Bewertung dieser Organisationen die Regimetheorie, die theoretischen 
Ansätze über die internationale Vermittlung und europäische Integrationsstudien einbezogen 
wurden. Während  sich in der Fachliteratur die Regimetheorie und das „Effektivität“-Konzept 
vornehmlich mit Blick auf internationale Umweltregimen beziehen bildet die Untersuchung 
der Effektivität der Nicht-Umweltregimen aus der Sicht der Regimetheorie eher ein 
Forschungsdesiderat. Dabei ist diese Arbeit ein bescheidener Beitrag, diese Lücke zu füllen. 
Regimetheorie bildet mithin die theoretische Grundlage dieser Arbeit.  
 
Die Effektivität der Vereinten Nationen, GUS und der OSZE wurden anhand der zwei 
Regimetheorie-Annahmenuntersucht: 1. Die Interessen und Präferenzen der mächtigen 
Mitgliedsstaaten beeinflussen die Effektivität der Vereinten Nationen, OSZE, GUS bei der 
Ermöglichung einer endgültigen Lösung der Konflikte im Südkaukasus und 2. Die 
Problemlösungskapazität dieser Organisationen beeinflusst die Effektivität der Vereinten 
Nationen, OSZE und GUS bei der Ermöglichung einer endgültigen Lösung der Könflikte in 
den Süskaukasischen Republiken.  
 
Die Effektivität/der Erfolg der Minsk-Gruppe der OSZE wurde zusätzlich mithilfe der 
theoretischen Ansätze über  internationale Vermittlung evaluiert, weil die Minsker Gruppe 
aufgrund ihrer institutionellen Besonderheit nicht als ein vollwertiges Regime angesehen 
werden kann. Auf die Bewertung der Rolle der EU bei der Konfliktlösung wurden die oben 
genannten zwei Annahmen nicht angewendet, weil sie als Bündel multipler Regimen und 
damit als ein desintegriertes System der WechselBeziehungen zwischen Staat und Policy zu 
betrachten ist, was wiederum die EU als ein internationales Regime disqualifiziert. Daher 
werden beim der Analyse der EU-Haltung zur Konfliktlösung im Südkaukasus die relevanten 
Annahmen der zwei theoretischen Ansätze der Forschung über die Europäische Integration 
Intergouvernementalismus und Neofunktionalismus verwendet.  
 
Anders als die ersten und zweiten Regimetheorie-Annahme wurde die dritte Annahme - der 
Charakter der gegebenen Konflikte beeinflusst der Vereinten Nationen, OSZE und GUS bei 
der Ermöglichung einer endgültigen Lösung der Konflikte in den süskaukasischen Republiken 
– auch im Falle der EU angewendet, weil der Charakter der Konflikte im Südkaukasus ein 
unabhängiger, externer und sehr wirksamer Faktor ist, der zwar nicht von der internen 
Dynamik einer Organisation abhängig ist, jedoch ihre Effektivität/ihren Erfolg beeinflusst. 
Die Charakteranalyse der Konflikte im Südkaukasus führte zur Schlussfolgerung, dass die 
konkurrierenden Narrativen der Kriegsparteien, die auf die Prinzipien der territorialen 
Integrität und Selbstbestimmung basieren, sowie die vorhandenen rechtlichen Lücken im 
Völkerrecht mit Blick auf Prinzipien der Selbstbestimmung, Sezession und der territorialen 
Integrität erschweren eine Lösungsfindung und beeinflussen die Effektivität der involvierten 
internationalen Organisationen negativ.   
 
Abschließend weist die Analyse darauf hin, dass die Effektivität der Vereinten Nationen und 
der GUS beim Konflikt um Abchasien „gering“ gewesen ist, während die Minsk-Gruppe der 
OSZE bei der Vermittlung im Bergkarabachkonflikt als „teilweise erfolgreich“ betrachtet 
werden kann. Die EU hat eine zurückhaltende Haltung zur Konfliktlösung im Südkaukasus  
eingenommen, die zwar in den letzten zwei Jahren leicht variert hat, aber mehr oder weniger 
diesebe bleibt. 
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